APACHE AP was built for one doctrinal problem: closing an enemy air base without flying over it. The anti-runway weapons that preceded it in French and allied service, from Durandal and BAP 100 to the British JP233, all required an overflight at very low altitude, a flight profile that the 1991 Gulf War showed to be extremely costly against a defended airfield. Fitting a turbojet, low-observable shaping and a terrain-hugging flight profile to a dispenser body moved the release point roughly 140 km back, with a millimetre-wave radar cueing the ejection of ten KRISS penetrators along the runway axis and delayed fuzing intended to keep repair crews away for hours afterwards.
The weapon nevertheless remained a narrow instrument, and French procurement treated it as such. An early ambition of several hundred rounds was cut to the hundred funded under the 1997-2002 programming law, and at 1.66 million euros apiece a runway strike consuming roughly five missiles was an expensive proposition for a mission that mattered only in the opening phase of a high-intensity campaign. Ten unguided submunitions per round also placed APACHE within the scope of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, which France signed that December; French sources date the withdrawal and cocooning to 2008-2009 without attributing it to a single cause, and disposal ran from 2014 to 2018. The missile was never fired in anger.
Its more durable contribution was structural. The aerodynamics, stealth treatment and low-level penetration logic proved on APACHE were carried into the SCALP EG from 1994, trading the submunition bay for a single penetrating warhead and a longer reach, and that design in turn became the Storm Shadow, Black Shaheen and the naval SCALP now fielded from French surface ships and submarines. Judged as a fielded capability APACHE was a short and limited episode; judged as the reference airframe for Europe's principal conventional deep-strike family, it was among the more consequential French missile programs of the 1990s.