36 Nigerien soldiers killed in Makalondi — JNIM strikes the Niger-Burkina Faso border

On February 4, at the end of the day, around 6:30 PM, a Nigerien military position in Makalondi, in the Tillabéri region, was overwhelmed by fighters from the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM). At least 36 soldiers are dead. This was not an ambush on an isolated patrol. It was a deliberate assault on a defensive position, in a border area that Niamey believed it held.

The Makalondi attack in detail

Makalondi is located on the border between Niger and Burkina Faso, in a triangle where the three countries of central Sahel almost meet. The Tillabéri region has concentrated the majority of jihadist attacks in Niger since 2021 — about 63% of incidents and 67% of casualties.

According to security sources cited by Zagazola Makama, the assailants took away at least 12 military vehicles equipped with heavy machine guns, as well as weapons, ammunition, and personal effects. One of the vehicles was found destroyed a few kilometers away — likely sabotaged to delay the pursuit.

The next day, General Salifou Mody Barmou, chief of staff of the Nigerien forces, visited the site. This rapid movement of an officer of this level reflects the extent of the material and human losses.

What this offensive reveals

Three points are noteworthy:

• JNIM is no longer just conducting ambushes. Here, it assaulted a fortified military position, with enough fighters and firepower to overwhelm it.
• The timing is calculated. The attack occurred at 6:30 PM, during the last hour of daylight. Early enough to see the targets, late enough to complicate air support or ground reinforcements before nightfall.
• The loot is strategic. Twelve military vehicles mounted with heavy weapons represent a considerable operational capability for JNIM in the region.

Tillabéri, a fracture zone

Tillabéri is not a geographical accident. It is a region of 100,000 km² where the Nigerien state has historically struggled to project its authority. It is crossed by smuggling routes, transhumance corridors, and clan networks that do not stop at the borders drawn by Europeans.

Since the departure of French forces and the dissolution of Operation Barkhane, the region has become a contested space among three actors: the Nigerien forces, JNIM, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS). JNIM, affiliated with Al-Qaeda, has been gaining ground there since 2023.

From experience, I know that in this region, territorial control is not measured in square kilometers but in passable roads, accessible wells, and villages that still agree to talk to the authorities. Makalondi was supposed to be one of those anchor points. This no longer seems to be the case.

The failed response in Mali

On the same day, a few hundred kilometers to the west, JNIM launched coordinated assaults against Dozo militias in Mali, in the regions of Ségou and Mopti. The militias had requested the intervention of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa). No response came in time.

This pattern repeats: isolated positions call for help, support is delayed or does not arrive, jihadists take advantage of the window. This is not a coincidence. It is a strategy tested since 2012 in northern Mali, refined in Liptako-Gourma, and now methodically applied across the entire central Sahel.

The Sahel States Alliance facing its limits

After the attack in Makalondi, the Sahel States Alliance (AES) — comprising Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso — announced renewed efforts to combat terrorism through a joint military force.

On paper, this makes sense. The three countries share the same porous borders and the same jihadist enemies. But on the ground, coordination remains fragile. The Malian FAMa are already stretched between Timbuktu, Gao, and the Niger Valley. Burkinabé forces are fighting on three simultaneous fronts. And the Nigeriens have just lost 36 soldiers in a single attack.

An effective joint force requires secure communications, shared logistics, and a clear chain of command. For now, the AES resembles more of a political alliance than an integrated military structure.

What comes next

JNIM does not take Makalondi only to then withdraw. It is testing the response capability. If no major counter-offensive comes in the next few weeks, it will consolidate its grip on the border area and expand its control eastward, towards Niamey.

The next likely targets are the roadways between Makalondi and the capital, particularly the road connecting Tillabéri to Ouallam. If JNIM manages to systematically block or mine these roads, it can isolate Niamey from its western regions.

The window for a counter-offensive is narrow. The rainy season begins in June, and with it, ground mobility becomes much more difficult. By then, JNIM will likely have extended its grip by several dozen more kilometers.

Incomplete intelligence: The figure of 36 soldiers killed comes from local sources relayed by Zagazola Makama. The toll could be higher if injured personnel died in the following days. Niamey has not issued an official statement confirming the exact number of casualties.

— Marie Dubois, defense analyst specializing in the Sahel, former officer of Operation Barkhane