48 F-35 Fighters for Saudi Arabia Threaten Israeli Military Superiority: America Between Two Contradictory Promises

On the first day of the World Defense Exhibition 2026 in Riyadh, Lockheed Martin unveiled a life-size model of the F-35A fighter jet bearing the emblem of the Royal Saudi Air Force. This was not just an ordinary marketing display; it was a clear political announcement: Saudi Arabia wants the F-35, and Washington seems ready to provide it. On the same day, two F-35C aircraft from the U.S. aircraft carrier "Abraham Lincoln" flew over Riyadh in a flyover, while President Donald Trump commented in November 2025: "We will sell them the F-35; they want it, and they have been great allies."

But 1,300 kilometers to the west in Tel Aviv, the tone was completely different. Israeli media reported that the Israeli Air Force prepared a white paper warning that Saudi Arabia's acquisition of the F-35 could "lead to significant erosion or deterioration" in Israel's qualitative military edge (QME) in the region. This term is not just diplomatic rhetoric; it is a U.S. legal commitment under the Arms Export Control Act of 2008, which requires Washington to ensure that no arms deal in the Middle East undermines Israel's ability to maintain its technological and operational superiority.

48 F-35s Are Not 48 Operational Fighter Jets

Let's start with the numbers. Saudi Arabia is seeking to acquire 48 F-35A fighters, according to multiple sources. This number seems modest compared to Israel's current fleet of F-35I (about 50 operational aircraft, with orders reaching up to a hundred), but the real issue is not the number, but the ability to actually use them.

Operationally, purchasing 48 F-35s does not mean having 48 aircraft ready to fly at any moment. The operational readiness rate of the F-35 in the U.S. Air Force itself does not exceed 55-60% at best. This means that Saudi Arabia, in the best-case scenarios, might have 25-30 aircraft ready to fly at the same time. The more important question is: how many Saudi pilots can actually operate the F-35? Training an F-35 pilot takes at least 18-24 months and requires a complex logistical infrastructure for maintenance and technical support that cannot be fully localized.

Israel knows this well. It has over 15 years of experience operating the F-35, and its pilots have flown hundreds of combat sorties over Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) does not have similar combat experience in contested airspace. The gap is not just in technology; it is in the ability to use this technology on the battlefield.

The U.S. Double Commitment and the QME Dilemma

The United States is now in an unenviable position. On one hand, it signed a Strategic Defense Agreement (SDA) with Saudi Arabia in November 2025, which includes the sale of F-35s and nearly 300 M1 Abrams tanks. On the other hand, it has a legal and moral commitment to Israel under the QME.

The problem is that these two commitments cannot be easily reconciled. If Washington sells the F-35 to Saudi Arabia with the same specifications that Israel possesses, it clearly violates the QME. And if it provides a "diluted" version of the F-35 with lesser capabilities (for example, without some advanced electronic warfare systems or precision targeting software), Saudi Arabia will not get real value for its massive investment—which is estimated at around $15-20 billion for the complete deal.

A potential compromise that Washington is considering is to delay the actual delivery until Israel can acquire more advanced models (such as Block 4 or the future Block 5), keeping it technologically ahead. But this means that Saudi Arabia will have to wait years longer to receive its aircraft, and by that time, regional threats (Iran, the Houthis, instability in Iraq) may have evolved in ways that make the F-35 less significant than it is now.

Does Saudi Arabia Really Need the F-35?

The question that is not often asked: what specific threat does Saudi Arabia face that requires the F-35?

If the issue is Iran, the Royal Saudi Air Force already possesses 232 F-15 fighters (including 84 modern F-15SA), 72 Eurofighter Typhoons, and 81 Tornado IDS (which will soon be replaced). This is a massive fleet capable of handling most defensive scenarios. The F-15SA is equipped with AESA radar and an advanced electronic warfare system, and it can launch Harpoon anti-ship missiles and SLAM-ER for long-range land strikes.

If the threat is the Houthis in Yemen, the F-35 is a complete overkill. What Saudi Arabia needs is advanced drones (like the MQ-9B or GA-ASI Gambit) and improved air defense systems (like THAAD and Patriot), not a stealth aircraft costing $100 million per unit.

The bitter truth is that Saudi Arabia wants the F-35 not because it needs it militarily, but because it is a political symbol. Owning the F-35 means you are in the "elite club" of U.S. allies—alongside Israel, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. It is a message to Iran: "We are protected by Washington at the same level as Israel." And it is a message to the United Arab Emirates, the rising Gulf competitor, which does not have the F-35 and will not get it soon due to similar Israeli objections.

The American Contradiction: Weapons as a Political Tool

For decades, the United States has used arms deals as tools to manage alliances and keep its allies in a state of continuous dependency. The sale of the F-35 to Saudi Arabia is no exception; it is a continuation of this pattern.

Washington knows that selling the F-35 to Saudi Arabia will create a long-term dependency relationship. Unlike older aircraft, the F-35 requires extremely precise maintenance, specialized spare parts, and continuous software updates—all of which come from Lockheed Martin and the U.S. Department of Defense. Even if Saudi Arabia "owns" the aircraft, it will not be able to operate them independently without ongoing U.S. approval. This is what analysts call "embedded strategic dependency."

But this creates a deeper contradiction. If the United States is serious about supporting Saudi Arabia's "strategic independence" (as it claims in the SDA agreement), why sell it a weapon that makes it more dependent? The answer is simple: because Washington does not want independent allies; it wants interconnected allies.

Israel: The Real Objection and the Public Objection

The public Israeli objection is the QME—maintaining military superiority. But the deeper, unspoken objection is purely political.

Israel does not fear the Saudi F-35 in a direct war scenario; that is unrealistic in the foreseeable future. What it truly fears is that Saudi Arabia becomes a regional air power capable of acting independently of Israeli coordination. Imagine a scenario where Saudi Arabia bombs Iranian targets in Syria or Iraq without informing Israel in advance; this creates risks of "unintended engagement" or "target confusion" in a crowded operational theater.

In reality, Israel wants to remain the only air power in the region capable of executing deep long-range strikes without anyone's permission. Selling the F-35 to Saudi Arabia breaks this monopoly—even if Saudi capabilities are much lower in the short term.

Conclusion: A Deal Fraught with Contradictions

If the Saudi F-35 deal goes ahead, it will be a symbolic victory more than a military one. Saudi Arabia will acquire advanced aircraft, but it will remain dependent on Washington to operate them. The United States will have to convince Israel that it remains the primary partner, perhaps by offering technical compensations or additional security guarantees. As for Israel, it will get what it has always wanted: assurance that it remains the strongest military power in the region, even if that means delaying Arab arms deals rather than canceling them.

From a purely military perspective, it would have been better for Saudi Arabia to invest $15-20 billion in improving training, building advanced simulation platforms, and establishing a local industrial base capable of maintaining the already existing F-15 and Typhoon. But in the world of Gulf politics, symbols are sometimes more important than actual capabilities. The F-35 is the ticket to the elite club, even if the price is steep and the practical benefit is limited.