95 missiles in a week and the Iskander-M strike on Kyiv show Russia's bet on ballistics

Five intercepted ballistic missiles out of seven in one night may seem like a Ukrainian success, but the arithmetic itself is less pleasant than the victorious report. If the enemy forces the air defense system to expend interceptors on every wave, then they are already shifting the war from the realm of precision to the realm of expenditure. On the night of July 25 to 26, Russian troops, according to the command of the Ukrainian Air Forces, used one Kh-59/69 missile, seven ballistic missiles of the Iskander-M/S-400 type, and 136 drones Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and Parodiya; the Ukrainian side reported the defeat or suppression of one Kh-59/69, five ballistic missiles, and 104 UAVs. On the same day, Volodymyr Zelensky announced the weekly figures: almost 1,700 drones, over 1,630 guided aerial bombs, and 95 missiles of various types, with more than half of the missiles being ballistic (Ukrinform, July 26, 2026). This is no longer just another night of terror. It is an indicator of how the Russian strike system is trying to bypass the saturated but finite Ukrainian air defense.

Ballistics as an economic tool of pressure

The Russian logic here is quite cold. A cruise missile provides route flexibility, a strike drone offers mass and cost-effectiveness, while a ballistic missile provides a reaction time compressed to minutes. The Iskander-M in its classic variant has a range of up to 500 km, a maneuvering trajectory, and a warhead weighing about 480-700 kg depending on the modification. Ukrainian reports of the use of S-400 missiles in ground strike mode should be read cautiously: they refer to the classification of the Ukrainian Air Forces, not to a Russian technical briefing. But the military essence does not change because of this. An anti-aircraft missile used against a ground target is less accurate and logical in application than a specialized operational-tactical missile system, but it allows for an expansion of the nomenclature of pressure tools where speed of approach and exhaustion of defense are important.

In the Soviet school, this would have been called inelegantly but honestly: fire impact on the entire depth of the enemy's operational formation. The difference is that Soviet theory assumed a connection between strikes on the rear and the advance of large combined arms groupings. Russian practice in 2026 often shows a different linkage: a massive air strike, local pressure from infantry and armored groups, then another strike on energy facilities, cities, warehouses, bridges, and UAV control points. According to the Ukrainian General Staff, by the morning of July 26, 258 combat engagements, 74 airstrikes using 225 guided aerial bombs, 9,623 kamikaze drones, and 3,137 shellings of populated areas and positions were recorded in one day. The most severe situation remained in the Pokrovsk area, where the Ukrainian side reported repelling 46 attacks. These numbers, even with the usual adjustment for the military statistics of the warring side, show not a flash of activity, but the operating mode of the machine.

Why 95 missiles are more important than one night’s report

One night can be explained by an operational task. A week with 95 missiles and more than one and a half thousand aerial bombs requires a different explanation. The Russian army, judging by the structure of the strikes, is trying to solve three tasks at once. The first is to overload Ukrainian air defense with mixed packages, where cheap and false UAVs open corridors or force the expenditure of observation and fire resources. The second is to compel Kyiv to request from partners specifically anti-ballistic systems, not just universal air defense missiles. The third is to support ground pressure in Donbas and the south not so much through maneuvering as through constant destruction of the defense environment.

Here an unpleasant detail for Moscow emerges. The mass of strikes does not equate to a strategic result. If 1,700 drones in a week do not paralyze state management, and 1,630 guided bombs do not lead to an operational breakthrough, then the Russian system is purchasing tactical destruction at a very high price. In 1944, the Red Army could afford a barrage of artillery because armies, corps, and echeloned logistics followed behind it. In 2026, the Russian army often creates a barrage of fire where infantry is pushing forward by kilometers, rather than conducting a deep operation. This does not make the strikes less dangerous for Ukraine. It makes them less effective in terms of classical operational science.

Ukraine's response strikes at the reverse side of the Russian model

On the same timeline, the Ukrainian side reported night strikes on July 26 against the Chornomorneftegaz facility in the Vnukovo area in Crimea and a ground relay station for controlling combat UAVs Geran/Gerbera in the Chornomorske area. The Ukrainian General Staff claims that such stations increase the range, resilience, and quality of control over Russian drones. If confirmed, the strike is important not symbolically, but functionally: Kyiv is trying to hit not only launch sites and warehouses but also the infrastructure that turns a cheap drone into a controlled element of the campaign.

ISW in its July analysis separately points out that Ukrainian long-range and medium-range strikes on oil refining, logistics, and energy facilities are already creating for Russia not only financial but also frontline consequences. According to the institute's estimates, from the beginning of 2026 until June 30, Ukraine struck 22 Russian oil refineries, and the shortage of fuel and sales restrictions affected most subjects of the Russian Federation and occupied territories. In an interview with Ukrinform, Austrian Colonel Markus Reisner called the Ukrainian assessment of damage to 43-45% of Russian refining capacities plausible and linked the successes of the strikes to intelligence, corridor selection, and targeting accuracy. The Russian side, of course, will call this temporary difficulties. In Russia, the word temporary is generally loved: temporary shortages, temporary restrictions, temporary bridges over institutional failures.

The strategic limit of Russian escalation

The main question is not whether Russia can continue such strikes in the coming weeks. It can. The production of Shahed/Geran, accumulated missile stocks, the use of S-300/S-400 in ground roles, and the flow of planning aerial bombs give Moscow a wide range of means. The question is different: does the increasing share of ballistics lead to the political effect for which it is expended? Zelensky directly formulates Kyiv's response as the necessity of timely supplies of anti-ballistic packages. If these supplies are delayed, the Russian bet gains a window of effectiveness. If supplies arrive on time, Moscow finds itself in a situation more familiar to the late Soviet system: it increases the barrage but is forced to pay for it with increasingly scarce components, fuel, transport, and air defense means for its own depth.

The Russian campaign of strikes becomes not proof of omnipotence, but a dispute between two deficits: the Ukrainian deficit of interceptors and the Russian deficit of protected logistics.

In the coming month, I would expect a high share of mixed packages to be maintained: UAVs Shahed/Gerbera/Italmas, false Parodiya, individual Kh-59/69, and periodic ballistic salvos of Iskander-M or missiles classified by Ukraine as S-400. But the strategic cost of this scheme will rise if Ukraine continues to strike oil refineries, Crimean UAV control nodes, and transport arteries. The Russian army is capable of inflicting pain; this should not be underestimated. But the ability to inflict pain does not equal the ability to win a war—especially when its own rear system begins to burn according to the enemy's schedule.