"After More Than a Hundred Days of Conflict, What Has Changed in the Strait of Hormuz?"

[Global Times Special Correspondent in Iran, Bao Xiaolong, Global Times Reporters Ding Yazhi, Xue Dan] Editor's Note: Although the ceasefire memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran is being implemented, the conflicting statements and positions from both sides continue to "tug-of-war." The passage through the Strait of Hormuz, the core of the game, has not yet returned to "normal," but is in a "quasi-crisis" middle ground. After more than a hundred days of conflict, the methods and logic of the parties involved in the Strait's game have undergone significant changes, which may have systemic impacts on the games surrounding other key waterways globally. This crisis has dealt a heavy blow to global shipping market confidence, and restoring that confidence cannot be achieved through a single meeting or a piece of paper, but rather requires the rebuilding of a more inclusive, diverse, and resilient global shipping governance system.

Navigation has somewhat recovered from the most tense phase

The Strait of Hormuz, connecting the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, is one of the world's energy chokepoints, with approximately one-fifth of the world's oil transported through this strait. After the outbreak of the recent conflict between the U.S. and Iran, Iran announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, leading to a rise in global energy transportation costs and creating significant uncertainty for trade activities in various countries.

On June 15, the day after the U.S. and Iran announced the ceasefire memorandum, the documentary producer Wang Mingwu's team "ActionNow" set sail from Iran's Abbas Port on the northern shore of the Strait of Hormuz, taking about an hour by boat to reach Hormuz Island, one of its eight main islands. Wang Mingwu told Global Times reporters that although news reports often describe the strait as "narrow," when he was in it, he saw an endless expanse of blue sea, which was quite spectacular.

Another immediate feeling was the heat. At that time, weather software indicated a local temperature of 42 degrees Celsius, but it felt even hotter. Under such high temperatures, Wang Mingwu saw several ships anchored at sea—one was relatively close and larger in tonnage, with "MSC (Mediterranean Shipping Company)" written on its hull; another was farther away, with half of its hull submerged in the sea. The accompanying Iranians told him that some ships had been anchored there since the outbreak of the conflict, and the crew still lived on board.

Previously, the team had set out from Tehran, traveling southeast to shoot, and personally felt the north-south differences within Iran: the northern cities were functioning normally, while the southern population was greatly affected by the war, especially the fishermen in Abbas Port who rely on the sea for their livelihood. An Iranian fisherman said that during the peak of the conflict, they were unable to go to sea and had no income for many consecutive days.

On June 23, Iran announced that the Strait of Hormuz was fully open to commercial vessels and would not charge any fees. According to reports from Iran's state television on June 30, from a navigation and market perspective, the strait has somewhat recovered from the most tense phase. Data from the market service company Kpler, based in Belgium, showed that on June 29, 24 oil tankers and cargo ships passed through the Strait of Hormuz; on June 30, shipping activities further increased, with a giant oil tanker and several smaller vessels entering the Gulf.

On the evening of June 30, Iranian Speaker of Parliament Ghalibaf emphasized in an interview that Iran would not compromise on sovereignty and management issues regarding the Strait of Hormuz. He stated that the "free passage" arrangement is limited to 60 days, mainly targeting ships that were stranded locally due to the closure of the strait during the war, and does not mean that Iran is giving up its rights, "The sovereignty of the Strait of Hormuz belongs to Iran and Oman."

U.S. media reported that there are currently three different shipping routes in the Strait of Hormuz: the northern route is controlled by Iran; the central route is the conventional international shipping lane prior to the obstruction of the strait; and the southern route is coordinated by Oman, the U.S., and the International Maritime Organization. In response, Ghalibaf stated that Iran would not allow the U.S. to promote alternative routes to weaken Iran's position in strait affairs. Currently, Oman is in an awkward position—on one hand, it is under pressure from Iran to cooperate in jointly managing the strait and collecting "maritime service fees," refusing to accept alternative or parallel channels; on the other hand, it is under pressure from the U.S. to open parallel routes for ships to pass freely.

Regarding oil exports, Ghalibaf attempted to explain to the domestic audience the actual benefits the memorandum has brought to Iran: since the reopening of the strait, Iran has exported over 40 million barrels of oil, and the U.S. has also announced relevant temporary exemption measures. However, he emphasized that Iran does not trust the U.S.—these exemptions need to be renewed every 60 days until a final agreement is reached and all sanctions are lifted. He even warned that if the U.S. again deprives Iran of its oil export rights, "then no one should expect to profit from oil," "If they want to fight, we will also fight."

Tehran University professor Vafai stated that the Strait of Hormuz is a geographical reality and strategic advantage for Iran that "cannot be taken away." If Iran tightens passage, the U.S., Gulf countries, and the global energy market will all be under pressure; but if the situation spirals out of control, Iran's own oil exports, port transportation, and economy will also be impacted. Therefore, Iran does not wish to keep the strait closed for a long time but hopes to increase its bargaining chips through "controllable instability."

On the streets of Tehran, ordinary Iranians told Global Times special correspondents that they do not want the war to continue; they care about negotiations but are more concerned about whether prices, jobs, and life can return to stability. For the Iranian government, the strait is a card in negotiations; but for ordinary people, the opening and closing of the strait affect oil prices, exchange rates, food prices, and the lives of families. The current state of the strait is a microcosm of U.S.-Iran relations: neither fully closed nor fully open; neither total war nor true peace.

There are still five major differences between the U.S. and Iran

Wang Guangda, Secretary-General of the China-Arab Reform and Development Research Center and a professor at Shanghai International Studies University, told Global Times reporters that the focus of the U.S.-Iran game over the Strait of Hormuz is not just whether ships can pass, but also who defines the standards for safe navigation, who bears the costs of maritime security, and the order of concessions in negotiations. There are still five major differences between the U.S. and Iran regarding the Strait of Hormuz.

First, differences in legal definitions. The U.S. and most maritime nations assert, based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, that the Strait of Hormuz is a strait used for international navigation, and vessels and aircraft have the right of innocent passage. Iran and Oman emphasize that coastal states should have rights over navigation safety supervision, environmental control, maritime search and rescue, and navigation order management. The essence of this difference is the competition between the U.S. and Iran over the definition of navigation rules in the strait.

Second, differences in navigation rules. The Strait of Hormuz has long used a traffic separation scheme recognized by the International Maritime Organization. However, Xu Kai, Director and Chief Information Officer of the Shanghai International Shipping Research Center, told Global Times reporters that after this round of conflict, Iran has effectively established a single navigation lane called the "Larak Corridor," requiring vessels to be under Iranian radar and speedboat monitoring throughout the journey and implementing tiered approval—different national fleets face different approval durations and passage conditions. The U.S. is promoting the operation of the southern route under the control of the United Nations or a coalition of multiple countries, attempting to bypass Iranian approval. For shipowners, this means that there are two sets of mutually unrecognized "traffic rules" in the same strait, sharply increasing compliance costs.

Third, differences in service fees for navigation. International law generally does not allow coastal states to levy tolls on international straits, but Iran has proposed a "maritime service fee" covering costs for navigation, search and rescue, security, and environmental protection. Iran has also envisioned tiered billing based on vessel tonnage, type, and cargo category. Oman has taken a cautious stance, not supporting direct tolls but not ruling out discussions around actual service costs. The U.S. is concerned that Iran may establish tax sovereignty over the strait under the guise of "maritime service fees," thereby obtaining long-term economic and strategic benefits.

Fourth, differences in the order of negotiation compliance. The U.S. demands that Iran fully restore navigation in the strait before negotiating on sanctions relief, the nuclear issue, regional security, and other topics; Iran views the strait as a core bargaining chip, requiring the U.S. to first lift sanctions and cease military pressure before gradually normalizing navigation in the strait. The basic crisis communication mechanisms between the two sides are also very fragile, with hotlines, coordination, and third-party mediation not forming stable institutional arrangements, which is also an important reason for the repeated tensions in the strait.

Fifth, differences in the control mechanism of the strait. The U.S. control model relies on naval power, multinational escort fleets, and maritime intelligence monitoring systems; Iran opposes a Western-led order for strait governance, advocating for coastal states to take the lead. Currently, the strait has formed a three-layer parallel governance state: legally, it falls under the category of international public waterways; daily navigation relies on international maritime technical rules; and maritime security is mutually checked by coastal states, the U.S., Gulf countries, and major energy-importing countries. This system lacks clear priorities for rights and responsibilities; if any link fails to coordinate, the situation in the strait can easily return to a tense state.

Any negotiation outcome is unlikely to repair the damage done to the global shipping market

The Strait of Hormuz has never been calm—there were the tanker wars between Iran and Iraq in earlier years, and in recent years, there have been frequent incidents of ship seizures and maritime friction. However, for a long time, all parties formed a tacit understanding: deterrence can be continuously released, but the shipping lane cannot be easily cut off. However, after this round of conflict, the Strait of Hormuz has transformed from an ultimate deterrent into a flexible, adjustable, and phase-based negotiation tool.

Wang Guangda analyzed that in the past, discussions about the risks of the strait often focused on whether Iran would completely block the shipping lane. However, this round of confrontation shows that Iran can effectively exert pressure on international markets and diplomatic negotiations through partial temporary control, defining exclusive shipping lanes, differentiating the release of vessels, and low-intensity harassment. Moreover, the core competition among all parties has shifted from maritime escort capabilities to the definition of safety standards. In the past, the presence of warships could basically guarantee shipping; now, even with the U.S. fleet stationed, the market may proactively reduce shipping routes due to risk assessments. Whether shipping companies are willing to send vessels into the Persian Gulf, whether insurance companies are willing to issue policies, whether ports and refineries can operate normally, and whether liquefied natural gas buyers accept delayed deliveries—these factors collectively determine the actual circulation efficiency of the shipping lane. Whichever side can gain recognition from the shipping, insurance, and energy industries will truly grasp the initiative to restore navigation.

Xu Kai stated that this crisis may have systemic impacts on the games surrounding other key waterways globally. First, the means of blockade are no longer limited to military aspects but have extended to the financial realm—this March, core members of the International Group of P&I Clubs collectively canceled Gulf War insurance, and shipowners without war insurance are reluctant to "sail naked," causing the daily passage volume through the Strait of Hormuz to plummet from about 150 vessels before the war to single digits. Second, a "camp-based passage" order has emerged during the conflict—Iran's tiered approval system essentially classifies global merchant ships based on political relationships, which serves as a warning for China's shipping industry: in similar situations in the future, Chinese fleets may receive conveniences or may also face targeted restrictions. Finally, the settlement currency for the global energy chokepoint has shifted for the first time from a single dollar to multiple currencies—this April, Iran announced that passage fees could be settled in RMB, rials, or stablecoins, and crude oil trade accepted RMB settlements. However, this arrangement is only based on the current geopolitical landscape, and its future stability remains to be tested.

"Regardless of the outcome of the negotiations, it will be difficult to repair the deep wounds this crisis has inflicted on the global shipping market in the short term," Xu Kai bluntly stated, "For the past few decades, or even a hundred years, the international shipping community has established a maritime order based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, International Maritime Organization rules, London insurance market practices, and international classification society standards, and this crisis indicates that this order is extremely fragile in the face of political games. Restoring market confidence cannot be achieved through a single meeting or a piece of paper, but requires the rebuilding of a more inclusive, diverse, and resilient global shipping governance system."

For major energy-importing countries, this crisis highlights the urgency of building an energy cooperation community. Wang Guangda stated that China, India, Japan, South Korea, and European countries need to strengthen cooperation in diversifying energy sources, diversifying shipping routes, diversifying reserves, and coordinating transportation insurance to reduce the systemic impact caused by the obstruction of a single shipping lane.

For China's shipping industry, Xu Kai believes that in addition to adjusting the proportion of energy imports, there is also a need to focus on the autonomy and controllability of data and information capabilities. Core shipping intelligence such as global vessel dynamic tracking, AIS satellite data, and vessel registration information has long been held by Western commercial institutions and government intelligence systems, and Chinese shipowners are highly reliant on external information sources for risk assessment. In the future, China should build an independent vessel risk rating system and accident database, enhance global vessel dynamic tracking capabilities, to grasp the initiative in similar crises.

Wang Guangda stated that the Strait of Hormuz crisis is a cautionary event. It reminds the international community that once key waterways are politicized, global trade, energy transportation, and supply chain stability will all be affected. Whether it is the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Mandeb Strait, or the Suez Canal, the public nature of international waterways needs to be re-emphasized. The United Nations, the International Maritime Organization, and responsible major powers should play a more active role in the governance of key waterways.