American and Iranian Attacks on Oil Tankers Expand the Hormuz War and Reveal the Inability of Gulf Deterrence

On September 9, 2026, the U.S. military command announced the destruction of five Iranian oil tankers following attacks targeting U.S. warships, while Reuters and Al Jazeera reported that Iran attacked about ten ships and a U.S. base in Jordan. This is no longer a limited confrontation over a shipping lane; it is a clear transition from pressuring trade movement to striking commercial assets themselves. For Gulf countries, the danger is not just the rising price of oil, but that every civilian ship becomes a battlefield extension of the war.

Navigation Interdiction Turns into Ship Destruction

The distinction between intercepting a tanker and destroying it is important militarily. Interception sends a deterrent message that can be retracted, while sinking or burning a tanker creates a security incident and a new legal and political environment. Washington claims that the tankers were linked to an Iranian logistical network and that the strikes came after missile attempts on a U.S. ship. Tehran, for its part, responds to the ships and expands the pressure towards U.S. bases in Jordan and the Gulf. Thus, the Strait of Hormuz becomes a combat zone where shipping companies cannot assume the presence of a neutral party.

Notably, the battle does not depend on the number of destroyed ships as much as it relies on the impact of fear. Five tankers may not immediately change the volume of global supplies, but they raise insurance premiums, push crews to refuse voyages, and force companies to choose longer routes. Brent crude has surpassed $101 according to CNBC, indicating that the market reads the incidents as a continuous threat rather than an isolated incident.

The Gulf Between the American Umbrella and the Risk of Escalation

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar possess advanced air defense systems, but they do not have political control over the escalation cycle. The missile system protects a specific facility from a known aerial target; it cannot alone determine which tanker will become a target, nor can it guarantee that intercepting a missile near a trade route will prevent a larger escalation. This is the gap that has long been hidden behind spending figures: air defense is not comprehensive protection for the maritime economy.

Practically, military capability consists of equipment, training, and institutions. Equipment is abundant, but joint training on protecting civilian convoys in an environment of jamming, missiles, and drones is much rarer. As for the institution, meaning the decision-making authority and rules of engagement, it remains tied to Washington. Therefore, Gulf capitals can purchase Patriot and THAAD systems, but they cannot independently decide when to escort a tanker, when to open a corridor, and when to respond to an unknown source.

Why American Strikes Do Not Mean the Return of Deterrence

The strong American strike may seem like a restoration of deterrence, but deterrence is not measured by the strength of the explosion but by the adversary's ability to anticipate the limits of the response. If Washington destroys Iranian tankers and then Tehran responds with attacks distributed across ships and a base in Jordan, the message that reaches the region is that both parties accept a low-threshold horizontal escalation. Iran does not need to officially close the strait; it is enough to make passage fraught with the possibility of an unknown source strike.

Moreover, expanding the targeting to oil tankers places the United States in a legal and practical dilemma. Every additional ship struck by U.S. forces may reduce Iran's ability to transport oil, but at the same time, it provides Tehran with a pretext to portray the war as a comprehensive blockade on the Iranian economy. At that point, Asian oil-importing countries no longer view the crisis as a U.S.-Iranian dispute, but as a direct threat to their supply chains. This explains why South Korea and other Asian countries are monitoring their role in Hormuz with great caution.

The Real Test for Saudi Arabia and the UAE

The test is not to purchase additional escort ships within a week, but to build a regional naval command capable of integrating radars, drones, and commercial intelligence with rapid political decision-making. The convoy should know who protects it, the field commander should know who has the authority to respond, and port and insurance companies should be part of the plan, not just recipients of orders after a strike occurs. Without that, Gulf countries will continue to buy excellent platforms and manage a crisis for which they do not hold the keys.

What is happening now reveals an old contradiction. Gulf capitals want independence in decision-making, but they rely on American power to protect trade routes; Washington wants its allies to bear the burden of security, but retains the right to set the limits of war. In my view, this contradiction will not be resolved by the number of tankers that will be destroyed, but by the more difficult question: Can Gulf countries build independent naval and institutional capability before Hormuz turns from an energy corridor into a permanent front?

Sources

• Reuters, September 9, 2026, coverage of the largest wave of attacks on shipping since the start of the war.
• Al Jazeera, September 9, 2026, U.S. strikes on five tankers and Iran's response to the ships and the U.S. base in Jordan.
• NPR, September 9, 2026, announcement by the U.S. military of the destruction of five Iranian oil tankers.
• CNBC, September 10, 2026, Brent crude rises above $101 after tanker strikes.