China's Carriers Doubled Their Far-Seas Operations in 2025

The Liaoning and Shandong spent nearly twice as many days operating beyond the First Island Chain in 2025 compared to the year before. That's the headline number from a new CSIS ChinaPower analysis published this week, and it matters more than the usual carrier deployment statistics.

Here's why: for years, China's carrier program has been dismissed as a prestige project. Nice ships, limited combat utility, confined to waters where shore-based aviation could do the same job cheaper. That argument is getting harder to sustain.

The Numbers

According to CSIS data, the PLA Navy (PLAN) ramped up far-seas training significantly in 2025. Beyond the doubled carrier activity, China conducted several unprecedented operations beyond the First Island Chain:

• Extensive naval voyages and live-fire drills around Australia and New Zealand
• Simultaneous operations by both Liaoning and Shandong in the Pacific—a first
• China Coast Guard vessels operating far into the Pacific

The simultaneous carrier deployment is the most significant development. Operating two carriers at once requires a level of logistical coordination that the PLAN has been working toward for a decade. They've now demonstrated it.

What Changed

The CSIS report notes that 2025 saw China's military activity increase across virtually every metric in the Indo-Pacific—Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, waters near Japan, and beyond the First Island Chain. The only area showing decreased activity was China-Russia joint exercises, down to six from an all-time high of fourteen in 2024.

That last point deserves attention. Fewer exercises with Russia doesn't mean less PLAN activity—it means more independent Chinese operations. Beijing is building a navy that can operate without partners.

The Taiwan Strait numbers are equally striking: 3,764 air incursions into Taiwan's ADIZ in 2025, a 22.4 percent increase over 2024. The South China Sea saw 163 recorded PLA operations, including a record number of live-fire drills. The CCG more than doubled its presence around Scarborough Shoal.

The Capacity Problem

Any naval officer will tell you there's a difference between deploying ships and sustaining operations. China's carrier strike groups still lack the underway replenishment capacity that U.S. carrier groups take for granted. The Type 901 fast combat support ships exist, but in limited numbers.

But here's the uncomfortable part: capacity constraints didn't stop the PLAN from doubling its far-seas carrier days. They did it anyway. Either they're stretching their logistics harder than we thought, or they've quietly solved problems we assumed would take longer.

The Justice Mission-2025 exercise in December brought the PLA closer to Taiwan's shores than any previous exercise. Multiple zones intruded into Taiwan's territorial waters. This wasn't just signaling—it was rehearsal.

What It Means for the Pacific

The U.S. Navy operates with three basic assumptions about the Western Pacific: that forward-deployed forces can hold until surge forces arrive, that allied bases will remain available and intact, and that American maritime superiority exists beyond the First Island Chain even if the near-seas are contested.

China's 2025 activities challenge the third assumption directly. When Chinese carriers drill near Australia and New Zealand—5,000 miles from the Chinese mainland—they're demonstrating that the Pacific is no longer an American lake. The live-fire exercises aren't training for defense of the South China Sea. They're training for power projection.

The Fujian, China's third carrier and its first with electromagnetic catapults, conducted sea trials in 2024 and is expected to join the fleet soon. When it does, the PLAN will have the capacity to keep one carrier in maintenance, one in home waters, and one deployed far—the same rotation pattern the U.S. Navy uses.

The Math

Washington currently plans on 11 carriers through 2050. China's trajectory suggests four to six carriers by 2035, with some analysts projecting more. The U.S. still has more carriers, more aircraft, and more experience. But the Pacific is large, the maintenance cycle is relentless, and American carriers are increasingly stretched between the Indo-Pacific and other commitments.

The question isn't whether China can match U.S. carrier numbers. It's whether China can concentrate enough capability in contested waters, at contested times, to achieve local superiority when it matters.

The 2025 data suggests they're building toward exactly that.