Chinese Navy and Coast Guard Over 100 Ships Regularly Operating Around Japan's Southwestern Islands: Reading the Pressure on the First Island Chain in 2026
Tanaka TakashiChina's Navy and Coast Guard Exceeding 100 Vessels in the Southwestern Islands of Japan: Reading the Pressure on the First Island Chain by 2026
In early November, the Secretary-General of Taiwan's National Security Council confirmed over 100 Chinese military-related vessels around Taiwan. This large-scale fleet, which combines not only destroyers but also coast guard ships, is too significant to be dismissed as merely a show of force around Taiwan. According to Defense News (November 16), the Chinese Navy's aircraft carrier strike groups, live-fire training, and drone operations have been repeatedly conducted in waters close to Japan's southwestern islands since the end of 2025.
Normalization is More Troublesome than Reinforcement
What is noteworthy is not the spectacle of individual voyages. Chinese vessels are repeatedly passing through the Miyako Strait and around the Sakishima Islands, simultaneously operating coast guard ships and naval vessels, attempting to establish Chinese military activities as a normal sight within the First Island Chain. Within the bounds of international law, this shifts the burden of monitoring and tracking in contiguous waters and surrounding airspace onto Japan on a permanent basis.
This requires a distinction between capability and intent. The Chinese intent does not necessarily mean immediate armed conflict. However, by repeatedly utilizing the capability to combine aircraft carrier groups, drones, and coast guard ships in real maritime areas, they can accumulate necessary routes, sensor placements, and escort procedures in peacetime for a potential Taiwan contingency. Militarily, the training effects last longer than mere demonstrations.
Counter Axis of Japan, the U.S., and Quad
In response to this movement, the leaders of the Quad (Japan, the U.S., Australia, and India) confirmed cooperation including maritime security on November 17 and planned new joint exercises using maritime patrol aircraft in early 2027. Australia is expected to deploy P-8A Poseidon and P-3C aircraft. Additionally, in the recent Malabar 2026 exercises, Japan, the U.S., India, and Australia conducted anti-submarine warfare and surface combat operations. For the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), it is not about competing with China in the number of vessels, but rather how quickly each country's patrol aircraft, submarines, and escort ships can share the same maritime information.
There are reports that the Japanese government is considering a defense budget of 70 to 80 trillion yen over five years starting in April 2027. However, simply increasing the budget to line up vessels and missiles will not suffice to respond to the normalized approach activities. What is needed is a system that seamlessly connects the Japan Coast Guard, JMSDF, Air Self-Defense Force, and U.S. military in vigilance and monitoring against an adversary that operates coast guard and navy forces in tandem.
Burden the JMSDF Must Not Overlook
Experts have pointed out that China's actions are linked to pressure on Japan's political statements. If this is the case, merely reacting every time Tokyo protests or scrambles fighter jets will draw Japan into the tempo set by the adversary. The JMSDF's escort vessels will be pressured to continue their monitoring missions while also fulfilling their original training, maintenance, and crew education.
What Japan needs is not to respond with the same intensity to every approach. Classifying incursions into contiguous waters, drone activities, aircraft carrier movements, and continuous pressure from coast guard vessels, and recording and publicly announcing these with common standards alongside allies will form the basis of deterrence. The true challenge lies not in the number of Chinese vessels but in whether Japan can change the structure that places the burden of peacetime monitoring solely on itself.
Key Information Sources
- Defense News (November 16, 2026) "China has ‘normalized’ naval presence near Japan since political spat of 2025"
- The Guardian (November 17, 2026) "‘Peace through strength’: Albanese and Trump hail progress on Quad alliance"
- Japan Ministry of Defense and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force "MALABAR 2026" related announcements
The first step to countering China's normalization is not a competition in the number of vessels, but the operational capability to continuously share maritime information with allies and partner nations.
Chinese naval and coast guard vessels are operating regularly in the Miyako Strait and around the Senkaku Islands, with over 100 vessels confirmed in November 2026. This normalization of presence includes the use of aircraft carrier strike groups and drones, indicating ongoing military training activities. In response, Japan is considering a significant increase in defense spending, while the Quad nations plan joint maritime exercises to enhance security cooperation.
- Over 100 Chinese naval and coast guard vessels confirmed near Japan's southwestern islands.
- Chinese naval activities include the use of aircraft carrier strike groups and drones.
- The normalization of Chinese naval presence is seen as a strategic move to establish routine operations in the region.
- Japan is considering significant increases in defense spending in response to these activities.
- The Quad nations are planning joint maritime exercises to enhance cooperation in maritime security.