Continuous Expansion Under the Anti-Corruption Storm: Analyzing the Strategic Implications of China's 2026 Defense Budget

On March 5, 2026, at the 14th National People's Congress, China announced a defense budget of 1.91 trillion yuan (approximately 277 billion USD) for 2026, representing a year-on-year increase of 7%. Although this growth rate is the lowest in the past five years, it still significantly exceeds the economic growth target and continues to maintain the overwhelming military spending advantage of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the Asia-Pacific region. However, behind this seemingly stable budget figure lies a profound impact on the PLA's command system caused by an unprecedented anti-corruption storm within the military.

From a macro perspective, China's defense spending in 2026 is nearly five times that of Japan and about nine times that of Taiwan. According to statistics from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, China's military expenditure now accounts for 44% of the total in the Asia region. More notably, the U.S. Department of Defense warned in its December 2025 "China Military Power Report" that China's publicly disclosed defense budget does not include expenditures for military research and development, certain capital expenditures, internal security, and mobilization-related activities. The Pentagon estimates that, for example in 2024, China's actual military spending could be 32% to 63% higher than the official figures. This means that China's real defense investment may have approached or even exceeded 400 billion USD, further narrowing the gap with the U.S. military budget of 700 billion USD.

However, alongside the budget increase, the PLA is undergoing an unprecedented high-level purge. At the National People's Congress meeting on March 5, 2026, only Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin was seated next to Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping—this scene sharply contrasts with the 11-member military commission when Xi took office in 2012. Since 2022, according to statistics from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the U.S., Xi has purged 101 senior PLA generals. Among the 47 officers who became generals in 2022 or were promoted to three-star generals thereafter, 41 may have been purged. Two members of the Central Military Commission—Zhang Youxia and He Weidong—also fell during this anti-corruption storm, with Zhang Youxia being investigated in January 2026 and He Weidong expelled from the military and the Party in October 2025.

The depth and breadth of this anti-corruption campaign are extremely rare in PLA history. Zhang Shengmin emphasized at the meeting that the military must "fully implement the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Military Commission, strengthen political rectification, and deeply carry out style construction and anti-corruption struggles." This indicates that the anti-corruption effort is not only about punishing corruption but also a political means for Xi Jinping to reinforce his absolute control over the military. In the short term, the large-scale replacement of generals will inevitably impact the PLA's command efficiency and readiness, with disruptions in the command chain and loss of experience being unavoidable costs.

However, it is worth noting that the anti-corruption storm has not weakened the intensity of the PLA's military activities around Taiwan. On the contrary, in 2025, PLA aircraft activities in the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) reached a record 5,709 sorties, compared to just 380 sorties in 2020. A report released by Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party's Mainland Affairs Council on February 1 indicated that the PLA's high-frequency aerial activities have become a "new normal," aimed at eroding Taiwan's sense of threat and expressing dissatisfaction with Taiwan's political developments. This ongoing military pressure forces Taiwan to raise its response thresholds to avoid resource depletion.

Notably, since the beginning of 2026, PLA incursions into the ADIZ have shown a seasonal decline, consistent with the pattern observed every winter since 2023. However, analysts generally expect that with the conclusion of the National People's Congress in March, military activities may heat up again in the spring. The PLA has normalized high-intensity aerial patrols, which serve not only as a deterrent to Taiwan but also as a strategic response to the military presence of the U.S. and its allies in the Western Pacific.

On a deeper level, the 7% increase in the defense budget for 2026 reflects China's strategic determination to persist in military modernization despite a slowing economic growth backdrop. Although China's economy faces multiple challenges, the continued growth of defense spending indicates that military capability building remains an unshakable priority in national strategy. According to official Chinese statements, the increase in the defense budget is intended to "defend sovereignty, security, and development interests in a rapidly changing world."

The International Institute for Strategic Studies believes that while the anti-corruption storm has temporarily affected the PLA's command structure and readiness, the enhancement of the PLA's capabilities and modernization process is expected to continue. From this perspective, anti-corruption and military expansion are not contradictory— the former ensures the absolute loyalty and discipline of the military, while the latter serves as the material foundation for achieving the strategic goal of "basically realizing national defense and military modernization by 2035 and building a world-class military by 2050."

For neighboring countries and regions, the strategic signal of China's 2026 defense budget is clear: regardless of internal adjustments, the PLA's modernization process will not stagnate, military pressure on Taiwan will not diminish, and military presence in the South China Sea and East China Sea will continue to strengthen. The anti-corruption storm may cause short-term shocks to the command system, but in the long run, a more obedient, more efficient, and better-equipped PLA is gradually taking shape under Xi Jinping's leadership. This will have far-reaching implications for the security landscape in the Asia-Pacific region and the dynamics of great power competition.