Coordinated Attacks in Mali and Jihadist Resurgence in the Sahel: The Sahel States Alliance Facing the Test of Fire

The day of April 25, 2026, will be remembered as a dark turning point for security in the Sahel. Unidentified armed groups carried out coordinated attacks against several strategic localities across Mali, including the capital Bamako, according to military sources. The Malian army claimed that the situation was "under control," a statement that, in itself, speaks volumes about the extent of the threat: when it is necessary to specify that the capital is secure, it indicates that doubt has set in.

These attacks occur in a context of accelerated deterioration of the security situation throughout the Sahelo-Saharan strip. In neighboring Nigeria, a jihadist ambush resulted in at least 17 civilian deaths in the Gwoza region of Borno State, where farmers had gone into the bush to collect firewood and prepare their fields ahead of the planting season. Local sources mention a toll that could reach 20 victims. The attackers are believed to be linked to Boko Haram or the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP), two groups that, far from being neutralized, have intensified their operations in recent months, simultaneously targeting civilian populations and military positions.

The Nigerian army recently announced that it had eliminated around thirty fighters during airstrikes around Lake Chad and had repelled several coordinated assaults in different localities of Borno State. These official statements, as encouraging as they may be, struggle to mask a more complex reality: the jihadist insurgency in northeastern Nigeria is entering its seventeenth year and has already claimed the lives of more than 40,000 people, while nearly two million residents remain displaced, according to United Nations figures. The symbolic recapture of Gwoza by the army in 2015 never signified the end of the threat. The fighters simply retreated into the surrounding mountainous areas, from where they continue to launch deadly raids.

Mali, for its part, is experiencing a security crisis of unprecedented severity since the departure of French forces from Barkhane in 2022 and that of MINUSMA in 2023. The transitional authorities, led by Colonel Assimi Goïta, had high hopes for the arrival of mercenaries from the Wagner Group — which became Africa Corps in 2024 — and for a supposed strategic redeployment of the Malian armed forces. The attacks of April 25 demonstrate, if it was ever needed, that armed groups have retained a significant strike capability, even in the suburban areas of Bamako. This ability to conduct synchronized operations across multiple theaters simultaneously reflects a level of coordination and planning that goes beyond mere opportunistic acts.

At the same time, the three member countries of the Sahel States Alliance (AES) — Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso — are attempting to build an institutional and security alternative for the region. Meeting in Niamey on April 21 and 22, 2026, for the third edition of the Civil Aviation Days (JDAC), they signed an agreement to create a joint airline, placed under the aegis of the Confederation. The documents were initialed by the Nigerien Minister of Civil Aviation, Colonel-Major Abdourahamane Amadou, the Malian Minister Dembélé Madina Sissoko, and the Burkinabè representative Kiswendsida Alice Ouédraogo. The participants also announced the creation of a joint office for investigating air accidents and advocated for the pooling of resources in maintenance, training, and bulk purchasing.

While this initiative reflects an undeniable desire for regional integration, it also raises fundamental questions. How can one claim to develop a credible aerospace sector without mastering ground security? The creation of a joint airline, however symbolically strong it may be, cannot obscure the urgency of a coordinated security response to armed groups that, precisely, cross borders with an agility that states struggle to match.

Algeria, a major regional power, is also going through a troubled period. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and General Saïd Chengriha, chief of the armed forces, announced the deaths of soldiers during anti-terrorist operations "on national territory." However, Western security sources cast doubt on this version, suggesting that these soldiers may have been deployed beyond the borders as part of unofficial missions. Persistent rumors indicate Algerian support for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah in operations in the Sahel, an involvement already mentioned in other contexts. Whether these are established facts or information warfare, such allegations undermine Algeria's credibility as a regional stability actor.

Dr. Mamadou Tangara, former Gambian Minister of Foreign Affairs, has also been appointed to head the African Union Mission in the Sahel, a nomination that occurred on April 21. This is an important political signal, but the mandate and resources available to him remain unclear. Historically, the African Union has struggled to deploy robust missions, and the lack of logistical and financial support from Western powers — which have deserted the region after the withdrawal of Barkhane and MINUSMA — suggests only increased difficulties.

The convergence of these events — multiple attacks in Mali, a deadly ambush in Nigeria, integration ambitions of the AES, Algerian ambiguities, and the appointment of a new AU official — paints a picture of a Sahel at a crossroads. The states in the region are trying to build security sovereignty without Western partners, but the results remain mixed. Armed groups, whether affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Sahel (JNIM) or the Islamic State (ISGS), constantly adapt their tactics and exploit the coordination gaps between national forces.

For civilian populations, the toll is unequivocal. The latest Global Report on Food Crises, published under the auspices of the United Nations, reminds us that nearly two-thirds of people facing food insecurity worldwide are concentrated in ten countries, several of which are located in the Sahel. Food insecurity and physical insecurity fuel a vicious cycle that armed groups know how to exploit, recruiting from among the most vulnerable populations.

The time is urgent. The question is no longer whether the Sahel can do without international aid, but how the states in the region can build a credible, legitimate, and effective security architecture before the next wave of attacks strikes. The events of April 25 in Mali serve as a severe warning that no one should ignore.