Cross Kauwa in flames — 8 Nigerian soldiers killed in the largest ISWAP offensive since Lake Chad

On February 17, around 5 a.m., approximately 70 fighters from the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) attacked the military base at Cross Kauwa, a village located 24 kilometers from Baga in Borno State. Eight soldiers were killed, and 23 others were injured. The base was set on fire. Eleven armored vehicles were destroyed, and the anti-aircraft guns mounted there were taken away.

This was not an opportunistic ambush. It was a planned operation, launched from Dabar Masara Island in the middle of Lake Chad, with a long detour to avoid monitored routes. The insurgents knew what they were after.

A weekend of fire — three bases, two jihadist groups

The attack on Cross Kauwa was not isolated. Between February 15 and 17, three Nigerian military bases were targeted in Borno State, in what appears to be the most advanced operational coordination observed in months:

• Mandaragirau (February 16) — ISWAP launched a multi-pronged attack with armed pick-ups and motorcycles. The soldiers, who had anticipated the assault according to the military, held their position. Unspecified losses were reported among the troops and the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) militias.
• Pulka (February 16, late at night) — Boko Haram and ISWAP elements breached the perimeter of the base near the Cameroonian border. They destroyed housing and equipment before being repelled by reinforcements. The military claims that no soldiers were killed, but that the insurgents suffered heavy losses, including that of Abou Aisha, a commander shot in the neck.
• Cross Kauwa (February 17) — The deadliest assault. Official toll: 8 dead, 23 injured, base destroyed.

This is the first time since the beginning of the year that two rival jihadist groups — ISWAP and Boko Haram — seem to coordinate their strikes over such a short period. Normally, these two factions fight against each other. Here, they struck simultaneously, even though their targets were distinct.

Lake Chad as a rear base

The attack on Cross Kauwa is indicative of ISWAP's strategy in the Lake Chad basin. Dabar Masara, from where the attackers launched, is a hard-to-access island surrounded by swamps and channels. Nigerian forces lack the boats and logistics to conduct sustained operations there.

The detour taken by the insurgents to reach Cross Kauwa shows a fine knowledge of the terrain and an ability to avoid patrols. This is not a column improvising. It is a mobile unit that knows where to go and how to get there.

Cross Kauwa itself is strategic. It protects Baga, a vital fishing hub for the region. If this base falls or remains unoperational, Baga becomes vulnerable. And if Baga falls, the entire route to Chad opens up.

Two hundred U.S. troops as reinforcements — too little, too late?

On the same day that Cross Kauwa was burning, U.S. Africa Command announced the deployment of 200 American troops to Nigeria to provide technical support and training to security forces. This is not a direct intervention. It is assistance, advice, logistics.

The American deployment comes amid a French withdrawal from the Sahel and a Russian buildup in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Washington seeks to reposition itself without repeating the mistakes of its European allies: no large bases, no visible presence, just training and intelligence.

But 200 instructors, even if competent, do not change the tactical equation in the short term. Nigerian soldiers are facing insurgents who know the terrain, have mobile sanctuaries (Lake Chad), and benefit from a constant flow of recruits.

The regional coalition is collapsing

In theory, Nigeria is not alone. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), created in 2015, brings together Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin to combat Boko Haram and ISWAP.

In practice, this coalition is in tatters. Niger withdrew in 2023 after the military coup and the diplomatic break with Nigeria. Chad, once the spearhead of cross-border operations, has reduced its commitment. Cameroon is focused on its own northern border.

The result: insurgents can move freely between the islands of Lake Chad (Nigeria), the Mandara Mountains (Cameroon), and the border areas of Niger. There is no longer effective operational coordination.

What comes next

The attacks in February are not a turning point. They are a confirmation: ISWAP and Boko Haram are far from defeated. They are testing defenses, exploiting weaknesses, and maintaining constant pressure on Nigerian forces.

The Baga-Cross Kauwa-Lake Chad corridor is now a permanent frontline. If the Nigerian army cannot rebuild Cross Kauwa and maintain a credible presence there, Baga will become the next target. And if Baga falls, the entire southern shore of Lake Chad will shift.

On the ground, the question is not whether the jihadists will attack again. It is when, and whether the army will be ready this time.