"Deep Dive: With Nuclear Arms Control Treaties Failing, Can the US and Russia Reach a 'Better Agreement'?"

[Global Times Special Correspondent in the U.S. Feng Yaren, Global Times Reporters Zhang Xiaodong, Li Xundian] Editor's Note: On February 5, there was no renewal ceremony between the United States and Russia, and thus, the only arms control treaty between the two countries, the New START Treaty, quietly became ineffective. The nuclear arms race may be the most unsettling and potentially destructive emblem of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation during the Cold War. Over decades of competition, the U.S. and the Soviet Union fiercely competed while managing their confrontation to prevent nuclear war from spiraling out of control. Currently, the ineffectiveness of nuclear arms control treaties has raised widespread concerns in the international community that the specter of a nuclear arms race may re-emerge. As the first nuclear-armed state, the U.S. has transformed its "first-mover advantage" into comprehensive dividends, deeply dominating nuclear arms control rules for decades. Now, the U.S. claims it wants to reach a so-called "better agreement" with Russia, but behind this lies deep political calculations.

The treaty had already become a "legal shell" before its expiration

"The chain that once connected the two nuclear powers has been severed. The New START Treaty was the last security barrier of the Cold War era, and it has now become history," said a February 6 article from Russian media "life.ru." On April 8, 2010, then U.S. President Obama and then Russian President Medvedev jointly signed the New START Treaty, aimed at limiting the number of strategic nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles such as intercontinental ballistic missiles deployed by both countries. The treaty was originally set to last for 10 years but was extended through negotiations to February 5, 2026. In addition to limiting the number of strategic nuclear warheads and launch systems deployed by both sides, the treaty also allowed for regular on-site inspections and required both sides to exchange data and report on their strategic weapons status.

The non-governmental organization coalition "International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons" stated on its official website that the New START Treaty has been under pressure for many years: although the U.S. and Russia have largely adhered to the treaty's limits on strategic weapons, the verification and reporting mechanisms of the treaty have not been fully implemented for quite some time. Wu Xiaofan, a researcher at Shanghai International Studies University’s Institute of American and Pacific Studies, told Global Times reporters, "This treaty had already become a functionally paralyzed 'legal shell' before its formal expiration."

The New START Treaty originally allowed for a maximum of 18 on-site inspections per year by both the U.S. and Russia; however, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 led to the suspension of the verification mechanism, which has not been restored since. After the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, geopolitical confrontation between the U.S. and Russia led to blocked communication channels, with both sides accusing each other of violating the treaty. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists reported that Russia has not shared data on its strategic nuclear weapons deployments with the U.S. since September 2022, and the U.S. has not published data on its total nuclear arsenal since May 2023. At the end of January 2023, the U.S. stated that Russia "refused to facilitate on-site inspection activities" and publicly declared that Russia was in violation of the treaty. A few weeks later, Russian President Putin announced the suspension of the New START Treaty, accusing the U.S. of "intending to deliver a strategic strike against Russia." Russian media reported that the U.S. did not approve the visa applications of Russian inspectors against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which was the trigger for Russia's suspension of compliance. Wu Xiaofan stated: "With the end of the verification and reporting mechanisms, the U.S. and Russia have entered a legal vacuum regarding strategic nuclear forces. This loss of strategic transparency has not formed overnight but is a chronic depletion brought about by the deterioration of geopolitical relations."

In September last year, Putin proposed extending the restrictions of the New START Treaty for another year, until February 2027, but has not received a formal response from the U.S. President Trump initially called this idea good but later stated he did not intend to renew the treaty. He said, "If it expires, let it expire. We will reach a better agreement."

As the first nuclear-armed state, the U.S. took the lead in controlling nuclear arms rules

On July 16, 1945, the U.S. conducted the first atomic bomb test in human history in the New Mexico desert. In August of the same year, U.S. bombers dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This devastating strike forced Japan to announce its surrender and showcased to the world a weapon capable of rewriting the nature of warfare. In August 1949, at the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union successfully detonated its first atomic bomb.

As geopolitical confrontations intensified, the U.S. and the Soviet Union quickly turned their attention to a new generation of more destructive weapons—thermonuclear weapons, or hydrogen bombs. In November 1952, the U.S. detonated the world's first hydrogen bomb. In November 1955, the Soviet Union also completed its first thermonuclear weapon test. Subsequently, the nuclear competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union escalated rapidly, with each technological breakthrough bringing them closer to "mutually assured destruction." However, the true impetus for U.S.-Soviet nuclear negotiations was not a moral awakening but profound fear.

In October 1962, U.S. reconnaissance planes discovered that the Soviet Union was secretly building missile bases in Cuba, igniting the Cuban Missile Crisis. For the next 13 days, the two countries were locked in a high-stakes standoff. The U.S. implemented a maritime "quarantine" of Cuba, and the world held its breath, waiting for the worst possible outcome. Ultimately, the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw the missiles deployed in Cuba, while the U.S. promised not to invade Cuba and agreed to withdraw missiles deployed in Turkey. This crisis was ultimately resolved and became one of the closest moments to nuclear war in Cold War history.

Thus, nuclear arms control negotiations took center stage in history. "The danger of the nuclear age is that we may hand humanity's future over to a miscalculation, an accident, or an uncontrolled escalation," said then U.S. President Kennedy in a speech in 1963. On July 1, 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was opened for signature in London, Washington, and Moscow. To date, 191 countries have become parties to the treaty.

"Make every effort to avoid military confrontation and prevent the outbreak of nuclear war." This is a statement written in the 1972 document "Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations." Since the 1970s, the U.S. and the Soviet Union have reached multiple arms control treaties, most of which took years to negotiate. In May 1972, the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which stipulated that neither side could deploy nationwide anti-ballistic missile systems, using the so-called "nuclear terror balance" to avoid nuclear war, with negotiations lasting about two and a half years. In December 1987, the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which stipulated that neither side would possess, produce, or test intermediate-range missiles and launchers. This was the first agreement in human history to genuinely reduce the number of nuclear weapons, rather than just setting numerical limits, and it also introduced a verification mechanism that had not existed before, with negotiations lasting over six years. For example, the predecessor to the New START Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, was signed in July 1991, but related negotiations had begun as early as June 1982, lasting nine years.

After the Cold War, these constraints gradually came to an end. The U.S., which possesses the world's largest nuclear arsenal and the most advanced conventional arsenal, gradually shifted its strategic focus from nuclear deterrence confrontation to strategic advantage layout. Since the late 1990s, voices advocating the establishment of a national missile defense system have emerged in the U.S. During his presidential campaign, then-Texas Governor George W. Bush stated in a speech in September 1999, "We will provide Russia with the necessary amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a relic of the Cold War... If Russia refuses these amendments, we will promptly notify them that we will no longer comply with the treaty." However, the U.S. ultimately did not propose any amendments. In December 2001, President Bush directly announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

In August 2019, the U.S. also withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, with the Trump administration accusing Russia of secretly developing and deploying new land-based intermediate-range missiles, which triggered a fierce backlash from Russia. Russia countered that the U.S. deployed anti-ballistic missile systems in Europe that "possess offensive capabilities," posing a direct threat to Russia's national security. Russia emphasized that the U.S. was the first to tear up the treaty and announced the suspension of compliance in response to U.S. actions.

Looking back at half a century of nuclear arms control history, the U.S. has always been at the core of rule-making. Wu Xiaofan analyzed for Global Times reporters, As the world's first nuclear-armed state and the founder of the nuclear order, the U.S. has deeply dominated nuclear arms control rules for decades, successfully transforming its "first-mover advantage" into comprehensive dividends. First, the U.S. relied on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to gain legal justification, establishing its legitimate identity as an "existing nuclear power" and defining newcomers as "proliferators," attempting to make global treaty parties subordinate to the U.S.-led nuclear order. Second, from the 1970s to the 1990s, the U.S. transformed "transparency" into institutional arrangements through arms control negotiations, using low-cost verification methods to gain predictability of opponents' nuclear arsenals, securing its strategic advantage after the Cold War. Third, by providing "extended deterrence" to allies, the U.S. effectively tied its nuclear policy goals to the defense motivations of its allies, not only consolidating U.S. leadership among allies but also suppressing the motivations of key allies like Japan, South Korea, and Germany to develop nuclear weapons independently. Finally, the identity of "rule-maker" also earned the U.S. a "moral high ground," allowing it to impose "legitimate" sanctions and pressure on other countries, packaging its national interests as global security interests.

Wu Xiaofan stated: "Nuclear arms control rules have not only been a defense line for the U.S. to maintain strategic stability over the past few decades but also the institutional foundation for it to exercise hegemony and ensure its strategic flexibility and leading position."

Rebuilding the nuclear arms control treaty requires overcoming three thresholds

As early as his first term, Trump called the New START Treaty an "outdated" agreement. After the Russian side proposed a renewal, Trump recently posted, "We should not extend the New START Treaty... but rather have nuclear experts draft a new, improved, and modernized treaty that can last for a long time." However, Vladimir Vasilyev, a researcher at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of North American Studies, bluntly stated that for the so-called new treaty, "the Americans are not prepared at all, and the State Department is in chaos."

Russian newspaper "Izvestia" reported that it may take years for the U.S. and Russia to reach a new agreement due to differences on multiple issues. The U.S. believes that the old treaty did not take into account the realities of new technologies, such as Russia's deployment of the "Avangard" hypersonic glide vehicle, "Dagger" and "Zircon" missiles, and the latest "BrahMos" missile, all of which are not constrained by the old treaty. Meanwhile, the U.S. also plans to deploy the "Dark Eagle" long-range hypersonic missile this year. Some believe that Russia currently has an advantage in new weapon systems, and the U.S. wants to include these weapon systems in the new treaty for limitation. However, for Russia, which relies primarily on nuclear deterrence to maintain a relative strategic balance and has limited conventional military development, this U.S. demand is difficult to accept.

Another issue is the multilateralization of nuclear negotiations. Wu Xiaofan analyzed that the U.S. is insisting on pushing nuclear negotiations towards multilateralization, which hides political calculations. The U.S. aims to use its leading "quota system" to construct a new constraint framework, artificially setting limits on nuclear arsenals to lock in the growth of other countries' nuclear capabilities within controlled ranges, thereby dissolving their "latecomer advantages." However, the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia are not on the same scale as those of other countries, and relevant countries will not respond. Russia has also requested that the UK and France join the relevant negotiations, but was rejected by both.

Wu Xiaofan told Global Times reporters, What Trump refers to as a "better agreement" actually means an agreement more favorable to the U.S. Under the current circumstances where existing constraints have ended, mutual trust and verification atmospheres are weak, and there are significant differences in positions, rebuilding the nuclear arms control treaty requires overcoming three thresholds: first, restoring stable dialogue channels and a minimum level of strategic mutual trust; second, restoring a minimum level of transparency through voluntary information exchange and limited on-site verification; third, reaching a feasible consensus on the order of negotiation subjects.

Regarding the changes that the expiration of this treaty may bring to global security and nuclear order, Academician Alexei Arbatov, director of the International Security Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, stated that the expiration of the old treaty will make negotiations for a new treaty more difficult. He said, "Typically, old agreements serve as baseline points for new agreements. However, these baseline points have become history, and we will be in a state of high uncertainty." Multiple observers have warned that the risk of a nuclear arms race will surge after the treaty's expiration. Daria Dolzhikova, a senior researcher at the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, pointed out in an interview that Trump's plan to establish the "Iron Dome" missile defense system will only hinder the achievement of a new treaty, "A new arms race has already begun."

Wu Xiaofan told Global Times reporters that currently, a more responsible approach to nuclear arms control should be oriented towards risk reduction and structural reduction. First, the U.S. and Russia, which possess the largest nuclear arsenals, should bear more special and prioritized responsibilities to create realistic prerequisites for multilateral arms control. Second, recognize that there are significant differences in the scale of nuclear capabilities among countries, avoiding a "one-size-fits-all" approach in responsibility sharing and institutional arrangements. Finally, adhere to a nuclear strategy of self-defense, uphold a no-first-use policy, and unconditionally commit not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear-weapon-free zones, always maintaining nuclear forces at the minimum level required for national security, not engaging in an arms race with any country, and promoting major nuclear states to form a common commitment.