Europe's Defense at a Turning Point: Record Spending, Strategic Realignment, and the Question of Plan B

The European security architecture is undergoing one of its most profound transformations since the end of the Cold War during these spring days of 2026. The annual report published on April 8 by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte confirms what defense experts have been observing for months: European allies and Canada have increased their defense spending in 2025 for the second consecutive year by nearly 20 percent compared to the previous year. Joint expenditures reached 2.3 percent of the combined gross domestic product — a historic milestone that would have been hardly imaginable just a decade ago when the figure was only 1.4 percent.

These numbers are more than mere statistics. They reflect a fundamental shift in the strategic consciousness of the continent. Russia's attack on Ukraine, the increasingly strained transatlantic relationship under the Trump administration, and the realization that European security can no longer be taken for granted have triggered a momentum that is manifesting in concrete armament programs, industrial capacity expansions, and new operational concepts.

The European Union is systematically driving this development forward with its "ReArm Europe" initiative — also known as Readiness 2030 — decided the previous year. The program aims to mobilize an additional 800 billion euros by the end of the decade, financed through a combination of national budget adjustments, joint procurement loans, and repurposed EU funds. France has already raised its defense budget to a level that is set to increase from the current approximately 50 billion euros to 76.3 billion euros by 2030, which corresponds to about 2.5 percent of French GDP. The Netherlands has decided to raise its defense budget to 3.5 percent of GDP — a figure that would have been considered politically impossible just a few years ago.

The material dimension of this catch-up process is impressive. Europe's armed forces collectively have more than 1.7 million active soldiers, surpassing the estimated 1.3 million of Russia. Finland alone can mobilize up to 900,000 trained reservists, many of whom are qualified for Arctic combat operations. European air forces operate over 1,400 combat aircraft, navies possess five aircraft carriers, more than 60 submarines, and over 120 frigates and destroyers. More than 6,000 artillery systems are available in land forces, with Poland conducting the largest armament program since the Cold War by procuring 212 additional self-propelled howitzers.

However, numbers alone do not tell the whole story. The European defense sector is experiencing an unprecedented expansion of production capacities. German, French, Italian, and British manufacturers are increasing the production of artillery ammunition, guided missiles, naval platforms, and armored vehicles. There is a growing awareness that strategic autonomy also means industrial independence. Dependence on American components — especially in advanced air defense systems, precision reconnaissance material, and strategic air refueling — remains a sensitive vulnerability.

It is precisely this vulnerability that fuels the debate about a European Plan B for NATO. The European Policy Centre published a remarkable analysis on April 10, originally appearing in Der Spiegel, which presents an uncomfortable thesis: The Europeanization of NATO has already been decided — not because Europe wants it, but because the United States is estimated to provide only 50 percent of allied combat power by 2027. The question is no longer whether, but how and when the alliance will become more European.

This analysis strikes at the heart of a dilemma that many European heads of government are reluctant to articulate. The Trump administration created a trust problem with its demand for a financial restructuring of NATO and statements that make American security guarantees appear conditional, which cannot be resolved by even the highest increases in spending alone. The Greenland crisis, in which the United States directly threatened an ally, and the call for Europe to join the American military operation against Iran have shown that the transatlantic relationship is subjected to fundamental stress tests.

Nuclear deterrence remains the most sensitive issue. France and the United Kingdom together possess about 515 nuclear warheads, primarily deployed on eight nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missiles. This independent European deterrence is substantial but not comparable to the American nuclear readiness. As long as Washington maintains its nuclear guarantees, it also retains influence over conventional warfare. The more uncertain these guarantees become, the more urgent the question of independent European leadership will be.

The internal tensions within Europe must not be overlooked. One axis runs from east to west: Eastern European states, which have massively increased their defense spending, advocate much more hawkish positions and demand the capability to stop a potential Russian attack on Russian territory. Western European states with stronger leadership claims are more reserved. A second axis runs from north to south: NATO's northern flank has dramatically expanded with the accession of Finland and Sweden, and the northern European states increasingly treat the region as a unified operational area, where national borders play little role in planning and maneuvers.

The 75 active defense projects under the PESCO framework of the European Union, the Galileo satellite navigation system as an autonomous positioning and timing service infrastructure, and the Joint Expeditionary Force under British leadership with ten nations are building blocks of a European defense architecture that is taking shape. Whether it will be completed in time before the transatlantic guarantee expires or fundamentally changes is the crucial question of 2026.