Europe's E5 Puts NATO's 2026 Ukraine Problem on the Table

Europe did not need another photo-op before the Ankara NATO summit. It needed a smaller room where the countries that actually carry military weight could admit what everyone else keeps dressing up as alliance management. That is what happened in Berlin on Wednesday, when Germany hosted the leaders of Britain, France, Italy and Poland in the European Group of Five format.

The public language was deliberately bland. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said the group wanted to send a strong signal of support for Ukraine before NATO leaders meet in Ankara on July 7 and 8. According to Al Jazeera, Merz framed the message to Moscow simply: Ukraine remains strong. Euronews reported that the five leaders, joined by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte by video link, discussed long-range weapons, air defence and artificial intelligence as core European defence challenges.

That sounds like normal summit choreography. It is not. The E5 is Europe admitting, quietly but unmistakably, that NATO's European pillar cannot be built by communique.

The E5 Is a War Cabinet Without the Name

The E5 format brings together Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Poland. That matters because these are not just symbolic NATO members. They are the largest European military powers, the biggest defence spenders, or in Poland's case the indispensable logistical state for Ukraine's war effort. If Ukraine is to be armed, sustained, trained and eventually folded into a postwar European security structure, these five countries will do most of the heavy lifting.

The timing is the point. Euronews described the meeting as a bridge between the G7 summit in Evian, last week's European Council, the coming NATO summit in Ankara and the coalition of the willing discussions on Ukraine security guarantees. That is an unusually dense diplomatic chain. It tells us Europe is trying to create momentum before Washington defines the terms for it.

There is a sharper interpretation. The E5 exists because the old assumption that the United States will provide the strategic skeleton of European defence is now unreliable. Euronews reported that the Ankara summit is unfolding against the backdrop of a US review of American force levels in Europe and a broader scaling-back of strategic enablers, including logistics, command structures and infrastructure. Those are not glamour capabilities. They are the things that make the difference between having brigades on paper and sustaining them in a war.

Ukraine Is Forcing Europe to Talk About Real Capabilities

The most useful detail from Berlin was not the pledge of unity. Leaders always pledge unity. The useful detail was Merz's list: long-range weapons, air defence and artificial intelligence.

Those are the right categories because Ukraine's battlefield has punished every European fantasy about defence being mostly a matter of budget lines and procurement announcements. Long-range fires decide whether Russia can stage aircraft, missiles and logistics beyond the front. Air defence decides whether Ukrainian cities and industry can survive Russia's missile and drone campaigns. AI is not a magic word here; it is shorthand for target processing, drone autonomy, electronic warfare adaptation and the speed at which a military can turn sensor data into fire.

The uncomfortable part is that Europe is still structurally dependent on the United States in all three areas. Patriot batteries and interceptors remain the most politically visible example. Storm Shadow, SCALP and Taurus-class strike weapons show Europe has capable systems, but not enough depth. Command-and-control, ISR and strategic airlift remain heavily tied to American architecture. The E5 can say it wants a stronger European pillar. The hard question is whether it can buy, build and integrate one fast enough.

That is where Ukraine changes the conversation. Kyiv is no longer just a recipient of European security. It is becoming the test range for Europe's future military model. A Ukrainian army that has survived mass drone warfare, missile saturation, electronic warfare and Russian attritional pressure has operational knowledge most NATO armies still discuss in conference rooms. Alexandra would put it bluntly: Europe is trying to defend Ukraine, but Europe also needs Ukraine to teach it how to defend Europe.

The Politics Are Messier Than the Statement

The Berlin meeting also exposed a political problem that NATO prefers to hide. The earlier E3 format of Britain, France and Germany was too narrow. Italy and Poland did not want to be spectators in decisions about Europe's security future. Poland, in particular, cannot be treated as a useful transit corridor while Paris, Berlin and London make the strategic decisions. Any serious Ukraine settlement, reinforcement plan or eastern-flank posture depends on Warsaw.

Euronews noted that Italy and Poland had been irritated by their exclusion from an earlier E3 meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on security guarantees, anti-ballistic missile support and deep-strike capabilities. Expanding to E5 is therefore not just a courtesy. It is a recognition that European defence politics are becoming more transactional and more regional. The eastern flank wants weight in decisions because it carries the immediate risk. Southern Europe wants a say because the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Strait of Hormuz now compete for attention and naval capacity.

Al Jazeera reported that Macron and Meloni also signalled readiness at the NATO summit to discuss a military mission in the Strait of Hormuz, if US-Iran conditions are met. That matters for Ukraine because Europe does not get to choose one crisis at a time. A serious European pillar has to handle Russia, keep the Atlantic relationship alive and still manage instability in the Gulf. This is exactly why speeches about unity are cheap. Force packages are expensive.

What Ankara Will Actually Test

The Ankara summit will not be judged by whether leaders use the right words about Ukraine. They will. It will be judged by whether Europe can turn the E5 discussion into measurable commitments.

• First, air defence: more launchers matter, but interceptor production is the real bottleneck.
• Second, deep strike: Ukraine needs the ability to hold Russian logistics, airfields and command nodes at risk beyond the front line.
• Third, sustainment: Europe must replace enough US strategic support to make its promises credible.
• Fourth, command: the E5 needs a mechanism that coordinates procurement and operational planning, not just summit language.

The strategic implication is simple. Russia does not need NATO to collapse. It only needs NATO's European members to remain politically loud and militarily slow. Berlin was a small sign that the five biggest European players understand the danger. But recognising a capability gap is not the same as closing it.

The E5 is useful because it narrows the room to countries that can actually move steel, money and political authority. It will be useless if it becomes another format for admiring the problem.

So yes, the Berlin meeting was a signal to Moscow. More importantly, it was a signal to Washington and Kyiv that Europe knows it has been living on borrowed American infrastructure. The next thing to watch is whether Ankara produces hard numbers for air defence, long-range fires and sustainment. If it does not, Europe's new defence seriousness will remain what it has too often been: an urgent speech waiting for a procurement order.