Examining the Deep Dilemmas of PLA Modernization through the Fall of Zhang Youxia: The Dual Pressure of Anti-Corruption and Combat Readiness

At the end of January 2026, Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department Liu Zhenli were successively removed from their positions. This shocking anti-corruption storm within the upper echelons of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) not only signifies that Xi Jinping's military governance and rectification actions have reached the highest levels but also profoundly exposes the sharp contradictions between institutional corruption and combat readiness in the modernization process of the Chinese military.

## Strategic Considerations of High-Level Anti-Corruption

Zhang Youxia's downfall is particularly symbolic. As the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, his position within the PLA was second only to Xi Jinping, and he had long been regarded as Xi's "red second generation" fellow townsman from Shaanxi and confidant. His removal shatters the so-called "myth of the red second generation's social connections," indicating that Xi's anti-corruption campaign has no political taboos.

From the perspective of timing, Beijing's actions against the highest military command at this moment reflect a calm strategic judgment: although the situation in the Taiwan Strait is tense, it has not yet reached the critical point where immediate military action is necessary. After Trump returned to the White House, the U.S. strategy towards China seems to lean more towards maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait rather than deliberately escalating tensions. This provides Beijing with a rare window of opportunity to prioritize addressing deep-seated issues within the military.

## The Erosion of Military Readiness by Corruption

The downfall of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli is not an isolated incident. Since 2023, several senior PLA generals have been removed due to corruption issues, including former Minister of Equipment Development Li Shangfu and former Rocket Force Commander Li Yuchao. These cases reveal several core characteristics of military corruption:

First is the systemic corruption in the equipment procurement sector. The Rocket Force, as the core of China's strategic deterrence, faces a direct threat to the combat readiness quality of its missile units due to large-scale corruption at its higher levels. Corruption at every stage, from missile fuel quality to launch site construction standards, could lead to catastrophic systemic failures at critical moments.

Second is the phenomenon of buying and selling positions in personnel appointments. This type of corruption not only undermines the fairness of the military's selection and appointment mechanisms but, more seriously, pushes unqualified commanders into key positions, directly weakening the military's actual combat command capabilities.

Third is the transfer of interests in military infrastructure and logistics support. These areas may seem far from the front lines, but they are crucial for modern warfare logistics. Quality issues arising from corruption could lead to disastrous consequences in wartime.

## The Dilemma of Anti-Corruption and Readiness

The current personnel configuration of the Central Military Commission highlights the short-term costs brought about by the anti-corruption campaign. The commission is left with only Xi Jinping and Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin, who is responsible for anti-corruption. Although this power vacuum is temporary, it does impact daily military decision-making and the planning of major military operations.

The PLA Daily published commentary articles for three consecutive days, emphasizing "removing obstacles" and "being ready to fight at any time." This wording itself reveals the high command's concerns about declining combat readiness. The articles call for the entire military to support anti-corruption while also stressing that "anti-corruption will surely succeed, and strengthening the military will surely be achieved," attempting to seek a balance between political correctness and military preparedness.

However, achieving this balance in the short term is difficult. Large-scale personnel adjustments inevitably lead to a period of adaptation within the command system, and newly appointed generals need time to familiarize themselves with their responsibilities, establish authority, and sort out relationships. During this transition period, the PLA's ability to launch large-scale military operations will objectively be weakened.

## Far-Reaching Impacts on the Taiwan Strait Situation

Beijing's decision to act against the military's high command at this time sends an important signal to the outside world: in the foreseeable future, China is unlikely to take military action against Taiwan. This judgment is based on several considerations:

From a readiness perspective, the PLA is currently undergoing the painful period of anti-corruption, and the high command personnel have not yet stabilized completely, making the risk of launching large-scale amphibious landing operations extremely high. Any military adventure could encounter unexpected setbacks due to an inefficient command system or equipment quality issues.

From a political perspective, Xi Jinping needs to ensure the military's absolute loyalty, rather than mere surface compliance. Removing dissenters through anti-corruption and establishing authority aligns more closely with current political needs than hastily initiating a war with uncertain outcomes.

From an international perspective, although the Trump administration's policy towards China has been tough, it has been relatively restrained on the Taiwan issue, not frequently playing the "Taiwan card" as previous administrations did. This provides China with a rare strategic buffer period.

## Institutional Challenges to Military Modernization

The deep-seated issues exposed by the Zhang Youxia incident go far beyond individual corruption. They reveal the institutional dilemmas in the PLA's modernization process:

First is the excessive concentration of power and the lack of oversight mechanisms. While the chairman responsibility system ensures unified command, it also leads to insufficient checks and balances, providing a breeding ground for corruption.

Second is the rent-seeking space in the execution of the military-civil fusion strategy. Military-civil fusion is intended to promote innovation in national defense technology, but in practice, issues of interest transfer between private enterprises and military high command frequently arise.

Third is the lag in military professionalization reform. Although the PLA has vigorously promoted professionalization in recent years, non-institutional factors such as "networks of relationships" and "cliques" still exist in the selection and appointment of cadres, providing fertile ground for corruption.

## Future Directions

The PLA's anti-corruption campaign will not stop with Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. Xi Jinping has made it clear that he intends to "investigate thoroughly," which means that more individuals involved may be implicated. In the short term, personnel turmoil at the military's high levels will continue, and its impact on combat readiness will persist.

However, in the long run, if anti-corruption can truly reach the institutional level and establish effective power oversight and checks and balances, then this period of pain will clear obstacles for the PLA's modernization. The key is that anti-corruption cannot merely stay at the "tiger-hunting" level; it must also delve into institutional construction, or else it will fall into a cycle of "anti-corruption-corruption."

For the Taiwan Strait situation, this anti-corruption storm objectively delays the possibility of military conflict, providing a rare buffer period for cross-strait relations. But this does not mean that Beijing has abandoned the option of force; rather, it chooses to achieve its unification goals at a more favorable time and in a more assured manner. How long this window of time lasts depends on the PLA's speed in completing internal rectification and rebuilding combat readiness, as well as the evolution of the trilateral game between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and the United States.