From the Service of the Fujian Ship to the Type 004 Nuclear Power: The Leap of China's Navy Aircraft Carrier Strategy and Global Maritime Power Competition

In November 2025, the People's Liberation Army Navy of China officially received its third aircraft carrier, the Fujian. This 003-class carrier, with a displacement of over 80,000 tons, is not only China's first fully self-designed and built flat-deck aircraft carrier but also the first Chinese carrier to adopt the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS). The commissioning of the Fujian marks a historic leap in China's carrier technology from ski-jump takeoff to catapult launch, making China the second country after the United States to master electromagnetic launch technology and apply it to aircraft carriers. However, this is just one chapter in the grand narrative of China's carrier strategy.

According to the latest satellite imagery from February 2026, the fourth aircraft carrier, the 004-class, is being constructed at the Dalian Shipyard at a rapid pace. More importantly, several defense analysts have identified layout features of two shielded reactor compartments and multiple engine rooms within the ship using high-resolution images provided by the SkyFi commercial satellite platform, which closely match the structures of the early construction phases of the U.S. Ford-class and Enterprise-class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. Former U.S. Navy submarine officer and defense analyst Tom Shugar stated that this evidence has raised his confidence in the ship's nuclear power capability to a level of "very likely."

If the 004-class indeed adopts nuclear power, it will be a milestone event in the development history of the Chinese Navy. Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers do not require frequent refueling and can operate at high speeds at sea for years, meaning the Chinese Navy will have the capability for sustained, high-intensity operations far from its homeland. Compared to the conventionally powered Fujian, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier can maintain higher speeds for longer periods, generate more electricity to supply aircraft launches and onboard equipment, significantly enhancing the sortie rates of carrier-based aircraft and overall combat effectiveness.

From a technical perspective, the electromagnetic launch system of the Fujian has already accumulated valuable experience for the design of the 004-class. Compared to steam catapults, electromagnetic launch systems have higher energy conversion efficiency, lower maintenance costs, and more precise launch control, allowing for the launch of heavier payloads and accommodating a wider range of carrier-based aircraft types. The long-term testing currently underway on the Fujian is expected to reach initial operational capability within 2026, at which point it will be equipped with the J-35 stealth carrier-based fighter jet and the KJ-600 early warning aircraft developed by the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation. This combination will enable Chinese carrier strike groups to possess all-weather, long-range early warning and stealth strike capabilities similar to those of the U.S. Navy for the first time.

The nuclear power design of the 004-class indicates that China is transitioning from a regional navy to a global navy. This transformation is not sudden but follows the "three-step" strategy formulated by the late Admiral Liu Huaqing in the 1980s: the first step is to establish control within the first island chain, the second step is to extend operational capabilities to the second island chain, and the third step is to achieve a global maritime presence by the middle of this century. The construction of the 004-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier shows that China is advancing this long-term strategy as planned.

The U.S. Department of Defense's 2024 "China Military Power Report" assesses that the People's Liberation Army Navy has over 370 warships and submarines, making it the largest navy in the world. More concerning is that China's shipbuilding capacity is approximately 230 times that of the United States, a staggering production gap that allows China to expand its fleet at a pace far exceeding that of the U.S. The U.S. Navy currently has 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and plans to maintain a fleet of 287 ships in fiscal year 2026, while China is expected to have up to 9 aircraft carriers by the mid-2030s, including several nuclear-powered models.

In the destroyer domain, China is also demonstrating strong development momentum. From 20 destroyers in 2003 to 42 in 2023, and projected to reach 50 by early 2026, the number of Chinese destroyers has more than doubled in less than a quarter of a century. The large-scale commissioning of advanced vessels such as the 055-class large destroyer and the 052D destroyer has elevated the Chinese Navy to new heights in regional anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. These destroyers are equipped with advanced phased array radar, vertical launch systems, and long-range anti-ship missiles, posing a serious threat to any potential adversary within the first island chain.

However, the value of an aircraft carrier lies not only in its combat power but also in its strategic significance as a platform for maritime power projection. Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers can maintain a presence far from their homeland for extended periods, which is crucial for protecting maritime trade routes, supporting overseas interests, and participating in international affairs. China's Belt and Road Initiative involves substantial overseas investments and infrastructure projects, and nuclear-powered carrier strike groups can provide robust protection for these interests. Additionally, with China's establishment of its first overseas military base in Djibouti and the expansion of its military presence in the Indian Ocean, Pacific, and potentially the Atlantic, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers will become key assets supporting this global layout.

From a strategic perspective, China does not need to engage in comprehensive competition with the U.S. Navy on a global scale. China's core interests are concentrated in the Western Pacific, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and East China Sea. In these areas, China is building a multi-layered maritime power system: anti-ship ballistic missiles and long-range sensor networks form the outer deterrent, advanced destroyers and submarines create mid-layer defense, while carrier strike groups provide long-range projection and flexible response capabilities. This "inside-out" strategic layout maintains an A2/AD defensive posture while also possessing the ability to project power outward.

However, the Chinese Navy also faces significant shortcomings. The most critical is the lack of combat experience. The U.S. Navy has a 250-year history of naval warfare and rich combat experience, while the Chinese Navy has experienced almost no real maritime conflict since the late 1970s. Carrier operations are an extremely complex system engineering challenge, involving numerous aspects such as aircraft takeoff and landing, fleet coordination, damage control emergencies, and logistical support. These capabilities require long-term training and real-world testing to truly form combat effectiveness. The Fujian is still undergoing a lengthy testing phase, indicating that the Chinese Navy is cautious about mastering new technologies and will not hastily deploy unverified equipment.

Additionally, the Chinese carrier strike group needs to address the issue of supporting logistics systems. A complete carrier strike group typically includes various vessels such as destroyers, frigates, submarines, and supply ships, as well as multi-dimensional operational capabilities like airborne early warning, anti-submarine warfare, and electronic warfare. Although China has made significant progress in these areas, it still requires time to form a mature carrier strike group operational system similar to that of the U.S. Navy. Particularly in areas such as long-range logistics, damage control rescue, and overseas base networks, China is still in the early stages of construction.

From a geopolitical perspective, the construction of the 004-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier will have far-reaching implications for regional and global security dynamics. For the United States and its allies, this means that maritime dominance in the Western Pacific will face further challenges. Although the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has 4 cruisers, 34 destroyers, and helicopter carriers capable of carrying F-35s, and the South Korean Navy has 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers, if China can achieve a fleet of 9 aircraft carriers by the mid-2030s, its power projection capabilities in the near seas of East Asia will be significantly enhanced.

The U.S. Department of Defense is currently facing a severe shipbuilding capacity crisis. U.S. shipbuilding capacity is only about 1/230 that of China and is beset by maintenance delays, extended construction cycles, and budget pressures. The Congressional Budget Office's analysis for 2025 indicates that the U.S. Navy plans to expand its fleet to nearly 390 ships by 2054, with an average annual shipbuilding cost of about $40 billion (in 2024 dollars). However, there is significant uncertainty about whether this plan can be realized, especially in the context of current fiscal pressures and domestic political divisions.

Meanwhile, China's shipbuilding industry is advancing at full speed. In addition to aircraft carrier construction, China is also mass-producing 055-class and 052D destroyers, 054A frigates, 075 amphibious assault ships, and various submarines. This "dumpling boiling" pace of shipbuilding allows the Chinese Navy to quickly compensate for technological and experiential deficiencies, narrowing the gap with the U.S. through numerical advantages and rapid iteration. More importantly, China's shipbuilding plan has clear strategic goals and long-term planning, which will not be significantly adjusted due to government changes or budget fluctuations.

It is noteworthy that the shift in aircraft carrier strategy also reflects China's profound understanding of maritime power theory. The "maritime denial" strategy proposed by British naval strategist Julian Corbett emphasizes that a weaker party does not need to seek complete maritime control but can prevent the enemy from using the sea through submarines, missile boats, and air power. China's long-adopted A2/AD strategy embodies this idea. However, as China's national power grows and its interests expand, it is moving beyond mere maritime denial to a shift toward "maritime control." Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are key tools for achieving this transition—they can provide strong defensive capabilities in near seas while also projecting power at sea, protecting maritime routes, and supporting overseas interests.

Regarding the Taiwan issue, the enhancement of carrier capabilities undoubtedly increases China's military options. Although the Taiwan Strait is very close to the Chinese mainland, where land-based air forces and missile units can cover, aircraft carriers can play an important role in blockades, deterrence, and potential conflicts, especially in responding to external interventions. If the U.S. and its allies attempt to support Taiwan, they must traverse the multi-layered defensive network formed by Chinese carrier strike groups and A2/AD systems, significantly increasing the risks and costs of intervention.

From a broader perspective, the evolution of China's aircraft carrier strategy is a microcosm of its transformation from a regional power to a global power. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the only country capable of projecting maritime power globally. With the growth of China's economic strength, the expansion of overseas interests, and the broadening of strategic ambitions, establishing an ocean-going navy capable of protecting these interests has become an inevitable choice. The construction of the 004-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, along with the expanding overseas base network and increasingly frequent long-range training and escort missions, indicates that China is steadily advancing toward this goal.

However, this process also comes with significant challenges and risks. Aircraft carriers are high-tech, high-cost, and high-risk assets that require substantial resource investment for construction and operation. China needs to maintain this massive military modernization plan against the backdrop of economic slowdown, an aging population, and intensifying technological competition. At the same time, as China's naval power grows, strategic competition with neighboring countries and the United States will become more intense, and how to manage risks and avoid escalation of conflicts will test China's strategic wisdom and diplomatic capabilities.

The construction of the 004-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier may still take several years to complete, but its symbolic significance is already evident. It represents China's transition from a "learner" of aircraft carriers to an "innovator," from a regional navy to a global navy, and from maritime denial to a strategic upgrade toward maritime control. For the international community, this means that a new center of maritime power is rising in the Western Pacific, and the global maritime power structure is undergoing the most profound reconstruction since the end of the Cold War. In this process, how to maintain regional stability, promote great power cooperation, and avoid zero-sum games will be significant issues facing all relevant parties.