Gerans and "Shaheds" in 2026 — 2597 drones demonstrate a new logic of the Russian air campaign

In just one week, the Russian army launched 2597 strike drones at Ukraine, while the Ukrainian air defense reported neutralizing nearly 2300 targets, which is over 87 percent. At first glance, this looks like a success for the defense. But for a military analyst, another figure is more important: on average, Russia sent about 371 devices into the air per day. This is no longer a series of individual raids, but an industrially organized mode of combat application.

Scaling instead of precision

On the night of October 22–23, the Ukrainian Air Forces recorded the launch of 176 drones. Among them were 92 jet "Shaheds," as well as "Gerbers" and "Parody" imitators. By morning, the Ukrainian side reported shooting down or suppressing 140 devices, with another ten remaining in the air. On the night of October 24, Kyiv was already talking about 126 drones, of which 101 were neutralized. The differences in counting methodology are natural: some targets are suppressed by electronic warfare, some change course or fall on their own. However, the overall trend is indisputable — Russia is increasing not only the number of launches but also the diversity of aerial targets (according to Ukrinform and the Air Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, October 23–24, 2026).

This resembles the late Soviet logic of missile and aviation planning: effectiveness is assessed not by one ideal missile, but by the ability to create continuous pressure on the opponent. A cheap drone forces the expenditure of expensive anti-aircraft missiles, the deployment of aviation, the activation of mobile fire groups, and the readiness of electronic warfare systems. Even intercepting 87 percent does not mean that the attack failed. If the remaining 13 percent hit energy facilities, warehouses, residential areas, or transport hubs, the economic exchange may remain favorable for the attacking side.

The jet component changes the air defense task

The appearance of 92 jet devices in one night attack is more significant than yet another record of the total number of targets. The classic "Shahed-136" with a piston engine creates a threat with its range and low cost, but its speed gives the defender more time for detection and interception. The jet version reduces the time interval, complicates the work of mobile groups, and forces the distribution of air defense resources across a wider range of speeds and altitudes.

The Russian system is gradually building a combined wave. In it, strike "Gerans" carry the bulk, "Gerbers" and "Parodies" overload radars and calculations, while faster devices exploit opened corridors. This is not a revolution in the technical sense. It is an evolution of the organizational model, where the main resource is not the perfection of an individual product, but the resilience of the production, assembly, launch, and route adjustment chain. For the Russian defense industry, such an approach is particularly convenient: complex components can be saved for missiles, while the mass part of the raid can be provided by relatively simple platforms.

Ukraine's response goes beyond the front line

An important piece of news on October 24 came not only from Ukrainian cities. Ukrainian sources reported a fire at the "Tolyattikauchuk" plant in the Samara region following a drone attack. The enterprise produces synthetic rubber, which is used, among other things, in solid rocket fuel. One cannot automatically assert that the fire halted production or deprived the Russian army of a specific volume of ammunition. But the very logic of the strike is indicative: Kyiv is trying to impact not on the launch position, but on the material basis of a prolonged air campaign.

At the same time, the Ukrainian side reported power outages in occupied Crimea after damage to energy infrastructure. In the Belgorod region, according to Ukrinform, a telecommunications facility used by Russian troops for communication, drone control, and maintaining a stable signal was destroyed. These episodes form a unified picture: the drone war is turning into a competition between Russia's ability to produce and saturate the airspace and Ukraine's ability to destroy the supply, communication, and energy network.

Why the numbers do not indicate an immediate turning point

181 combat engagements on October 23, the heaviest fighting in the Konstantinovka direction, and ongoing advances by Russian units near Kupiansk and in the Kharkiv region show that the air campaign does not exist separately from the ground one. Drones create pressure on the rear, but the result is determined by whether the army can use this pressure for artillery fire, redeployment of reserves, and gradual infantry advancement. The Russian army still retains the ability to connect mass raids with constant attacks on the front, although the cost of such a pace is reflected in losses, ammunition expenditure, and personnel wear.

Official Ukrainian estimates of Russian losses — about 1,576,600 servicemen since the beginning of the full-scale war — should be perceived as an estimate from one side of the conflict, rather than as independent statistics. But even without fully accepting this figure, the intensity of the fighting confirms: Moscow compensates for the lack of rapid operational success by increasing pressure. This is a familiar feature of Russian military culture — when maneuver fails, increase the mass of fire and hope that the opponent will first encounter the limits of resources.

Forecast for 2026

In the coming months, the crucial question will not be whether Ukraine can shoot down individual "Gerans." It has already proven capable of doing so in large quantities. The outcome will depend on three factors: the cost of one interception, the resilience of Ukrainian energy, and the ability to strike at the Russian production chain. If Moscow maintains a pace of several hundred devices per day, and Kyiv does not receive cheaper interception means and does not expand its own production of long-range drones, the statistical advantage of air defense may coexist with increasing damage to infrastructure.

The Russian air campaign does not demonstrate sudden technological superiority. It demonstrates the discipline of mass production and the readiness to turn limited technical capabilities into a constant depletion of the opponent. Russia is likely to maintain this mode in 2026, but at the cost of increasing dependence on imported components, vulnerable factories, and the expenditure of resources that can no longer be directed to other areas of the war. This is the limit of the strategy: the "Geran" is cheap individually, but a war built on thousands of "Gerans" is no longer cheap.

Sources

• Ukrinform — data on 2597 drones in a week and over 87% neutralization
• Ukrinform — attack with 126 drones on the night of October 24
• Ukrinform — fire at the "Tolyattikauchuk" plant
• Fakty ICTV — 176 drones, including 92 jet "Shaheds"
• Military Affairs — overview of changes in the Kupiansk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia directions