Joint military exercises shrink, verification plan fails, can South Korea regain wartime operational control by 2030?

[Global Times Special Correspondents in South Korea and the United States: Huang Yuanzai, Xiao Da, Global Times Special Correspondent: Wang Yi] The South Korea-U.S. joint military exercise "Eulji Freedom Shield" has entered its third day. On the 19th, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that, in accordance with U.S. President Trump's directive to reduce the scale of the joint exercise, the South Korean and U.S. military will conclude the exercise early on the 21st. South Korean media reported that it is the first time that a fully launched South Korea-U.S. military exercise has been halted midway at the request of the U.S. side. This move not only highlights the internal contradictions within the South Korea-U.S. alliance but also disrupts South Korea's plan to use the exercise to validate the South Korean military's Full Operational Capability (FOC), a key indicator for the transfer of wartime operational control, casting a shadow over South Korean President Lee Jae-myung's announcement the previous day to reclaim wartime operational control by 2030. Since the 1950s, when the South Korean military transferred command authority to the U.S., reclaiming this power has become the primary demand from various sectors in South Korea, but it has been repeatedly postponed for over 20 years. Some analysts believe that the complex game of conditions and exchanges between the U.S. and South Korea not only concerns the South Korea-U.S. alliance but will also profoundly affect the security landscape of the Korean Peninsula.

Reduction of the exercise disrupts South Korea's plans

According to a report by Yonhap News on the 19th, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that at the suggestion of the U.S. side, the South Korean and U.S. militaries have made partial adjustments to the timing and scale of the "Eulji Freedom Shield" exercise, deciding to conclude the exercise on the 21st. The exercise was originally scheduled to take place from the 17th to the 27th. This adjustment means that the overall exercise duration has been shortened by half compared to the original plan. As a result, the scale of the exercise will inevitably be reduced.

This adjustment to the exercise has also disrupted the Lee Jae-myung government's original plan to complete the verification of the key indicators for wartime operational control and formally finalize the transfer year this year. South Korean media believe that while Lee Jae-myung emphasized the need to complete the transfer of wartime operational control during his term, the decision on whether South Korea can achieve this by 2030 does not solely rest in South Korea's hands.

The South Korean "Chosun Ilbo" reported that the South Korean side originally planned to include content promoting FOC verification in the exercise statement, but this was opposed by the U.S. side. Ultimately, the statement only retained a principled expression of "continuing to advance preparations for a conditions-based transfer." Although South Korea proposed a 2030 target, it cannot unilaterally decide the transfer timeline.

The South Korean "Economic Daily" pointed out that this exercise was originally a key exercise to complete FOC verification and pave the way for determining the transfer year in the fall. Former South Korean Deputy Minister of Defense and Senior Research Fellow at the Sejong Institute, Shin Beom-cheol, stated that this could severely hinder the verification of the transfer. While the U.S. does not oppose South Korea pushing for the transfer, it will not accept South Korea lowering conditions or rushing the timeline.

The calculations behind the U.S. "commitment"

Since entering the 21st century, as South Korea's national power has risen to become one of the world's top ten economies, national autonomy awareness has surged, making the reclamation of wartime operational control one of the most important political demands across South Korea. In 2007, the Roh Moo-hyun government reached an agreement with the U.S. to complete the transfer by 2012. However, in 2010, during the Lee Myung-bak administration, the U.S. postponed the transfer to 2015, citing "tensions on the peninsula." In 2014, during the Park Geun-hye administration, the U.S. and South Korea changed the transfer model to "conditions-based," causing the transfer process to fall into indefinite waiting. The Moon Jae-in administration vowed to complete the transfer during its term in 2022 but ultimately failed to overcome numerous obstacles from the U.S. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration has almost shelved this issue. It was not until the Lee Jae-myung government took office in 2025 that reclaiming wartime operational control was once again elevated to a core national agenda.

In reality, South Korea's defense is deeply reliant on the U.S.: the vast majority of South Korea's strategic and tactical intelligence relies on the U.S. intelligence system; core equipment of the South Korean military, such as the Aegis system and F-35 fighter jets, is also controlled by the U.S. Some analysts believe that the U.S. is merely using the superficial commitment of "conditions-based transfer" to make South Korea a "burden-sharer" (in terms of military spending, etc.), binding it more deeply to the U.S. war machine.

The "Asia Economy" reported on the 19th that with the reduction of the joint military exercise, the transfer process is likely to be postponed again. The report also expressed concern that Trump may link the transfer of wartime operational control to cooperation on nuclear submarines and defense cost-sharing in the future. Shin Jong-woo, Secretary-General of the South Korea Defense Security Forum, stated that the U.S. move not only sends a message to North Korea but also carries the implication of pressuring South Korea to cooperate with the U.S. Whether South Korea can complete the transfer by 2030 will depend on whether Seoul can meet Washington's demands.

The situation on the peninsula may fall into turmoil again

The sudden adjustment of this military exercise has also stirred the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The "Wall Street Journal" quoted U.S. officials on the 18th as saying that Trump is privately considering a meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during his visit to Asia in November. Trump also stated on the 18th that North Korea had responded to his "dialogue" proposal, but North Korea has not actually heeded the U.S. proposal.

On the 19th, the Korean Central News Agency published an editorial, severely condemning the South Korea-U.S. "Eulji Freedom Shield" military exercise as a "direct threat" to North Korea and regional security, bringing the situation on the peninsula to the "critical point" of potential war. The editorial emphasized that North Korea will respond with further upgraded new forces.

South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin revealed on the 19th that regarding President Trump's statements about reducing the scale of the exercise and other related matters, not only the South Korean government but even relevant U.S. officials were unaware in advance. The South Korean Report website stated that although South Korea and the U.S. officially deny that there are cracks in the alliance, South Korean society generally criticizes its government for being excluded from key decision-making. Many military experts believe that this U.S. move once again proves that U.S. security support for South Korea is heavily transactional. The security landscape of the peninsula may fall into severe turmoil due to the U.S.'s sudden policy changes.