Kabila Joins the M23 in the DRC — A Political Coalition That Expands the War in Kivu in 2026

Goma, Tuesday, October 13. From his residence in the capital of North Kivu, Joseph Kabila has officially announced the creation of the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN), a political-military coalition that brings together his camp and the armed structures linked to the M23-AFC. It is no longer just a presumed political proximity between the former Congolese president and the rebellion. It is a displayed chain of command.

The statement from spokesperson Claude Ibalanky promises to end the "tyranny by all necessary means, including the use of force." The wording is significant. In an operational theater where statements often precede troop movements, it transforms a legitimacy crisis into an explicit military threat against Kinshasa. However, the details of the mobilization remain incomplete, and no independent verification yet allows for measuring Kabila's actual authority over the M23 units.

A Power Structure, Not Just an Alliance

The FRN assigns each actor a specific role. Kabila takes the political lead. Corneille Nangaa, former president of the electoral commission and head of the Alliance of the Congo River (AFC), becomes his deputy. Bertrand Bisimwa, a political figure of the M23, also occupies a central position, while Sultani Makenga, the military leader of the movement, receives command of the forces. This distribution is designed to connect three different resources: a past presidential legitimacy, a political-diplomatic facade, and an armed force that controls the ground.

For the M23, the benefit is immediate. The movement no longer presents itself solely as a Congolese Tutsi rebellion allegedly supported by Kigali, according to Kinshasa. It can now present itself as the armed wing of a national refoundation project. For Kabila, the calculation is the opposite but complementary: he returns to the center of the game without having to win an election, and he has an already established territorial base.

The Ground Makes the Threat Credible

The M23-AFC controls vast sectors of North Kivu and South Kivu, including Goma, Bukavu, and several border posts with Rwanda and Uganda. This is an exceptional operational position. The two provincial capitals are not just symbols: they command the road axes, airstrips, trade flows, and access to mining areas. A coalition that holds these nodes can negotiate like a government, tax like an administration, and fight like a mobile force.

The geography also explains why this announcement can produce effects even before any offensive. Between Goma and Bukavu, Lake Kivu channels movements while the roads to Rutshuru, Masisi, and Kalehe remain vulnerable to blockades, ambushes, and population displacements. On the ground, a few dozen well-informed fighters can close a road for several hours; a political authority capable of coordinating these actions can extend this pressure across all of Kivu.

The military precedent is heavy. In January 2025, the capture of Goma by the AFC-M23 had triggered deadly fighting and nearly 3,000 civilian deaths according to reports by Al Jazeera. Since then, the rebels have consolidated their presence rather than simply conducting raids. The integration of Kabila thus adds a layer of command to a machine that already possesses positions, frameworks, and supply lines.

The Main Risk is the Collapse of the Doha Process

Kinshasa and Kigali signed a peace agreement supported by Washington in June 2025. In parallel, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the M23-AFC concluded a negotiation framework in Doha last November, with new meetings scheduled for this month. The creation of the FRN makes these discussions more difficult to interpret. Who is negotiating now: the M23, the AFC, Kabila, or a coalition that encompasses them all?

The Institute for Security Studies, cited by Al Jazeera, estimates that Kigali could continue the American-Rwandan channel, while the most immediate danger concerns the Doha process. This makes sense. The Congolese government may agree to talk to a territorial rebellion to achieve a ceasefire. It will be much more difficult for it to deal with a former president sentenced to death by a military court in Kinshasa for treason, war crimes, and alleged collaboration with the M23-AFC.

The FRN thus offers Félix Tshisekedi a politically more dangerous opponent, but not necessarily more coherent militarily. The decisive question will be the loyalty of captured, demobilized, or marginalized Congolese officers and soldiers. Kabila was the head of the army before becoming president. If part of these networks reactivates, the conflict will change in nature. If it cannot, the coalition will remain primarily a political label placed on an already existing armed force.

A Regional War Under National Cover

Accusations of Rwandan support for the M23, made by Kinshasa, the United States, and the United Nations, are rejected by Kigali. Uganda is also accused of having supported the movement, which it denies. Kabila's presence does not eliminate this regional dimension: it makes it more difficult to conceal behind the sole security dispute between Kigali and Kinshasa.

The humanitarian figure gives a measure of the operational theater: the UN estimates that more than 7.8 million people are displaced in the DRC and 28 million are facing food insecurity. These data are not just a backdrop. Each displacement opens a space for recruitment, taxation, or control for armed actors. In territories where the state does not return, the M23 can transform a tactical victory into sustainable administration.

Therefore, three indicators must be monitored in the coming weeks: first, any potential defections within the FARDC; second, the FRN's ability to gain support beyond Kivu; finally, the continuation or interruption of the Doha meetings. The proclamation of a coalition does not yet prove that Kabila commands the war. But it does prove that the war now has a political figure ready to claim it.

On the ground, the next breaking point will not necessarily be Goma. It will likely be a secondary axis towards South Kivu or a garrison whose loyalty is uncertain. If the FRN manages to provoke a defection there, the conflict will no longer be an externally supported insurrection: it will take the form of a Congolese succession war. This is precisely what the negotiators in Doha are still trying to prevent.

Sources

• Al Jazeera, October 14, 2026 — announcement of the creation of the FRN, composition of the coalition, and state of negotiations.
• Al Jazeera Africa — regional follow-up on the crisis in the DRC.
• United Nations — humanitarian data and regional context cited in the report.