Merz promises 70 billion euros for Ukraine — Europe's NATO now bears the risk

The figure sounds like strategic determination: 70 billion euros in additional support for Ukraine in the years 2026 and 2027. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced the package on November 7 before the NATO summit in Ankara. At the same time, he already indicated 11.6 billion euros in bilateral Ukraine aid in the German budget draft for 2027. Europe's political message is clear. The military statement is not.

Crucial is the construction. Merz spoke of "new additional financing" that European NATO states are to provide together. The agreement is to include military equipment, support, and training. Thus, Europe is effectively taking on the larger part of the ongoing security burden for Kyiv. This is logical given the withdrawal of American aid. However, it does not yet represent a new European defense capability.

70 billion euros are a political promise, not a delivery

The announcement must be measured against three different criteria. First, the political commitment; second, the actual budgetary funds approved; and third, the delivered capabilities. These three dimensions are regularly mixed in European summit declarations. This is precisely where the illusion arises that a larger financial framework already equates to a larger military effect.

Ukraine does not primarily need another declaration but reliable inflows of air defense, drones, electronic warfare, artillery ammunition, and long-range munitions. The NATO-related assessment that Kyiv has a limited time window of six to nine months to stabilize its situation makes the temporal contradiction visible. A two-year financial promise can politically soothe. However, it does not answer the question of which systems will be operationally ready at the front in the coming six to nine months.

The Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker is particularly important because it records commitments and material contributions separately and makes state aid flows comparable. Its methodology reminds us of an uncomfortable truth: The value of a promised weapon system is not identical to its availability. For large equipment, ammunition, and air defense, there are often months or years between budget decisions, orders, production, training, and operational capability.

Europe's new role in NATO

Merz articulated the goal of a "more European NATO" in Ankara so that the alliance can remain transatlantic. This is the right institutional direction. A European pillar that waits for American funding or American approvals during every major crisis remains strategically incomplete. However, the political responsibility is now shifting faster than the industrial capacity.

This is particularly evident in air defense. According to Agence Europe, Patriot deliveries for Ukraine continue to be heavily dependent on the PURL initiative; a significant portion of the required PAC-2 and PAC-3 ammunition has been financed through this mechanism. Europe is thus increasingly paying for the American production chain instead of building its own production chain in the short term. This may be necessary in wartime. It is not strategic autonomy.

The difference between financing and capability is also evident in the German commitment. 11.6 billion euros in the budget draft is a strong signal, but not yet proof of additional production capacity. Germany must decide whether these funds should primarily purchase American systems, utilize European factories, or finance long-term joint programs. Each option has a different military timeline. A government that promises all three goals simultaneously risks ending up with an expensive mix without priority.

The burden-sharing becomes European — the dependence remains transatlantic

The new European responsibility is politically unavoidable. Washington has been expecting for years that Europe will do more for its own security. The war in Ukraine now forces European states to translate this demand not only into NATO percentage figures but also into ammunition, air defense, and industrial endurance. This is the positive core of the Merz initiative.

The negative core lies in the institutional asymmetry. Europe bears more costs while critical technologies, production rights, intelligence, and certain air defense systems continue to be controlled outside of Europe. A European NATO contribution can thus become larger without Europe's decision-making scope growing at the same rate. More money and more responsibility are then not the same as more sovereignty.

For Berlin, this results in a clear priority. The 70 billion euros must be translated into transparent delivery plans, multi-year ammunition contracts, and verifiable production targets. Each tranche should specify what has been financed, ordered, produced, and delivered. Otherwise, Europe repeats the familiar mistake of confusing political unity with military effect.

The Ankara test

The "spirit of Ankara" will not be measured by the size of the number but by the speed of its implementation. If European states provide air defense and ammunition in the coming months, a capability will emerge from the promise. If they initially only produce credit lines, national reservations, and lengthy tenders, the number remains a diplomatic signal.

Europe's dilemma is thus precise: It must supply Ukraine now while simultaneously building its own defense industry for the coming years. Those who only buy remain dependent. Those who only wait for European production lose time. The 70 billion euros can strengthen Europe's NATO pillar — but only if they are treated as a production and delivery program. Otherwise, Europe is merely financing its growing responsibility without possessing the capabilities that this responsibility demands.

Sources

• Ukrinform, November 7, 2026
• Agence Europe, Report on NATO Declaration and PURL
• Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker