Mozambique and the Islamic State after nine years — Cabo Delgado remains the forgotten front of 2026

Macomia, Cabo Delgado province, northern Mozambique. Since the insurgents began striking on October 5, 2017, nine years of foreign training have not given the Mozambican army sustainable control over roads, villages, and coastlines. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) estimates that the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM) are losing the decisive battle of counter-insurgency: that of local intelligence and the trust of the inhabitants.

A better-trained army, but still poorly supplied

The paradox is now difficult to mask. The European Union training mission has trained over 1,600 military personnel within 11 rapid reaction companies, with modules on command, civil-military cooperation, and humanitarian law. Rwanda has helped Maputo regain useful positions for the logistics of TotalEnergies' gas project. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has also contributed to dismantling insurgent bases before the withdrawal of its SAMIM mission in mid-2024.

On the ground, the effect remains less than the investment. The ISS reports aging weapons, insufficient vehicles, and difficult medical evacuations. One unit may hold a position in Mocímboa da Praia; it cannot necessarily resupply that position, evacuate an injured person, or escort a truck on the next road. In a province where distances are long, seasonal tracks and fragile communications, this is an operational weakness, not an administrative detail.

The armed group does not need to defeat the army

The adversary is generally referred to as the Islamic State in Mozambique, or the Central Africa Province of the Islamic State (ISCAP). Its method is not that of an army seeking to hold a provincial capital. Small mobile bands attack routes, kidnap drivers, take food, and impose ransoms. They then retreat to rural and wooded areas where the state's presence is intermittent.

Recent attacks on roads demonstrate the logic of the theater of operations. The group does not need to destroy a brigade. It is enough to make a journey dangerous enough to disrupt markets, isolate a community, and force government forces to disperse their escorts. The ISS reports that ambushes have killed police, soldiers, and civilians despite the establishment of joint patrols.

The important point is control, not the border. A map that colors Cabo Delgado green or red does not indicate whether a civilian vehicle can pass without negotiating a checkpoint, whether a local leader relays information to the police, or whether a displaced family dares to return home. In this conflict, the ability to move is almost as valuable as the ability to shoot.

The human cost undermines intelligence

The ISS also documents repeated accusations against Mozambican military personnel: executions of civilians suspected of collaborating with the insurgents, violence against detainees, and sexual exploitation of displaced women. These facts must be distinguished from allegations made by the fighters and require independent investigations. However, the uncertainty surrounding each case does not change the strategic problem: a population that fears the military post more than the insurgent patrol no longer provides actionable intelligence.

The proliferation of foreign doctrines further complicates the chain of command. The European Union emphasizes human rights, the United States focuses on small units and planning, Algeria on counter-terrorism training, while the equipment remains partly of Russian or Chinese origin. This aid is not useless. It becomes incoherent when not accompanied by a clear Mozambican doctrine, credible justice, and a complaint mechanism that works in isolated districts.

Gas will not replace trust

The capture of several district capitals had already forced the government to seek external assistance and contributed to the suspension, in 2021, of TotalEnergies' $20 billion gas project. The recovery of areas near energy infrastructure has therefore been presented as a strategic success. However, protecting a logistics corridor is not enough to secure its hinterland. A convoy passing under escort does not prove that the state administers the province; it only proves that it can concentrate forces for a few hours.

The recent establishment of a national counter-terrorism center offers a possibility for coordination between intelligence, police, and military. It will only produce results if village information is relayed without exposing informants to reprisals. The army's neighbors must become sensors, not permanent suspects.

The next test will be on the roads

Mozambique does not need a new training promise. It must demonstrate that a patrol can hold, resupply, and protect a road for several weeks, then leave behind an accepted administration. In Cabo Delgado, the Islamic State retains the advantage of a low-cost war: a few fighters, a motorcycle, an ambush, and fear are enough to close a route.

The available data remains incomplete, particularly regarding insurgent numbers and exact losses. But the operational signal is clear. If the FADM continues to treat each village as an enemy position, the next nine years will replicate the previous nine. The most vulnerable area will be where a newly reopened road strays too quickly from its escort: this is where the true recovery of Cabo Delgado is measured on the ground.

Sources

• Institute for Security Studies, October 5, 2026 — training, logistics, abuses against civilians, and road attacks.
• ACLED, Conflict in the Sahel — regional comparison of armed groups and territorial control logic.
• BBC — context of Rwandan support for Mozambican operations.