Pakistan Sells Arms to Saudi Arabia but Cannot Sell Security: The Structural Contradiction in the Defense Partnership

In early February 2026, a former commander in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard made a bombshell statement: "Saudi Arabia is a nuclear state, and the U.S. and Israel know it." Hossein Kanani, the former senior officer, did not stop at this claim but went further, suggesting that Pakistan could be the source. This statement came just six months after Riyadh and Islamabad signed a joint strategic defense agreement in September 2025, stipulating that an attack on one is considered an attack on the other.

The Saudi-Pakistani Agreement: What Does "Mutual Defense" Mean?

On September 17, 2025, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif signed the "Mutual Strategic Defense Agreement" in Riyadh. The document, which is the most ambitious in the history of bilateral relations, includes:

• A commitment to treat any aggression against either party as an attack on both
• Exchange of military intelligence
• Regular joint training exercises
• Cooperation in defense industries
• Possible arrangements for an "extended nuclear deterrent umbrella"

Militarily, this agreement is a Saudi attempt to obtain an "alternative security guarantee" outside the traditional American framework. But the fundamental question is: Is Pakistan really capable of providing strategic security, or is it merely selling arms and promises?

Pakistani Arms Deals: Export Boom and Internal Crisis

In recent weeks, Pakistan has signed massive defense deals in the Middle East and North Africa:

• Libya (February 2026): A $4 billion deal with General Khalifa Haftar that includes 16 JF-17 Thunder fighter jets and 12 Super Mushak training aircraft
• Sudan (2025-2026): A $1.5 billion package that includes 10 Karakoram-8 attack aircraft, over 200 drones, and air defense systems
• Saudi Arabia: A comprehensive strategic defense agreement

This export openness came after the India-Pakistan crisis in May 2025, where the Pakistani Air Force successfully shot down an Indian Rafale fighter jet, enhancing its tactical reputation regionally. However, from an analytical perspective, this export boom conceals a deeper reality: Pakistan itself is in a severe security crisis.

The Contradiction: How Can One Sell Security When They Do Not Own It?

In the first week of February 2026, Pakistan witnessed three catastrophic security events:

1. Balochistan: A wave of simultaneous attacks on administrative centers and security posts in Quetta and other areas, resulting in the deaths of 216 militants, 22 security personnel, and 36 civilians during a week-long military operation
2. Islamabad (February 6): A suicide bombing at a Shia mosque during Friday prayers, killing over 30 people and injuring 170 others. It was claimed by a faction splintered from ISIS
3. Afghan Border: Ongoing cross-border clashes with the Afghan Taliban, which killed 1,034 people in 2025 alone

Any military personnel who has served in the region knows that providing "extended deterrence" or a security umbrella requires surplus capability, meaning forces that can be deployed outside national borders without undermining internal security. Pakistan today struggles to secure its capital and western borders, so how will it secure the Gulf cities?

The Economic Problem: Unequal Interdependence

In 2024-2025, total foreign direct investment in Pakistan from all countries was around $2.5 billion, while its trade with Gulf Cooperation Council countries was about $20 billion. In contrast, India received Gulf investments worth $4.7 billion in 2024 alone, and its trade with the Gulf reached $179 billion.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are not just looking for a military partner; they seek a comprehensive strategic partner that links defense with energy, technology, and investment. India, for example, recently signed a letter of intent for a strategic defense partnership with the UAE, along with a $3 billion gas deal and ambitious commercial goals.

Pakistan, on the other hand, remains a capital seeker, relying on "renewable loans" and deposits from Gulf central banks to stabilize its economy. This "dependency gap" means that Pakistan may be a temporary security guarantor, but it is rarely an equal partner at the economic level.

The Iranian Claim: Is Saudi Arabia Really Nuclear?

Hossein Kanani's statement about Saudi Arabia possessing nuclear weapons deserves attention. The former officer went further, claiming that Washington conditioned any implicit approval of Saudi nuclear capability on Riyadh's recognition of Israel.

Practically, this claim cannot be verified. But what is more important is what it reveals about the strategic environment: Iran is trying to justify the development of its nuclear program by portraying Saudi Arabia as a covert nuclear threat, while Saudi Arabia is attempting to build a "safety net" with Pakistan (an openly declared nuclear power) to compensate for its lack of binding American guarantees.

But the major paradox is: Pakistan, which is supposed to be the "nuclear umbrella," is itself under continuous internal and border threat. How can a country that cannot prevent a mosque bombing in its capital provide reliable nuclear deterrence to a Gulf state two thousand kilometers away?

Conclusion: A Partnership Without Foundation

The Saudi-Pakistani agreement is not without value; it provides intelligence exchange, joint training, and access to moderately priced weapons. However, it suffers from a fundamental structural contradiction: Pakistan sells arms, not security.

Because true strategic security requires three elements: surplus military capability (which is currently unavailable), internal stability (and Pakistan is in a chronic security crisis), and a economic base that links security partnership with deep mutual investment interests (which is absent).

Saudi Arabia, for its part, faces the same dilemma it has encountered for decades: seeking "strategic independence" without the actual ability to achieve it. Buying THAAD from America does not mean the ability to use it independently, and allying with Pakistan does not guarantee a reliable deterrent umbrella.

"In my view, the Saudi-Pakistani agreement is more of a political document than a practical military arrangement. It indicates Riyadh's desire to diversify its security partners, but it does not solve the core problem: reliance on external powers that do not have guaranteed capability for actual intervention when needed."

And the final question that the agreement does not answer: If Saudi Arabia faces a real threat, will Pakistan — which struggles to secure Islamabad itself — be able to deploy forces or provide actual nuclear deterrence? Or is this partnership merely a "reassurance document" that does not withstand field testing?

This is the structural dilemma of Gulf defense: the constant search for strategic independence through partnerships that reproduce the same dependency.