PLA 2026 Annual Training Launch: Upgrading Joint Combat Capability and Transforming into Intelligent Warfare

On January 2, 2026, the People's Liberation Army of China launched a large-scale joint military exercise across the entire military on the first training day of the year, covering the Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and Armed Police Forces. This marks the comprehensive commencement of military training in the first year of the "14th Five-Year Plan." The exercise utilized J-20 stealth fighters, Type 055 destroyers, DF-17 hypersonic missiles, and various unmanned combat platforms, showcasing in-depth drills of multi-domain joint combat capabilities under realistic conditions.

According to reports from China Central Television's military channel, the 79th Group Army conducted ground drills centered on seizing enemy positions through small unit combined operations, extensively employing unmanned equipment, including reconnaissance drones, bomb-dropping drones, smoke screen deployment drones, and first-person view loitering munitions, establishing a complete unmanned combat system from reconnaissance to strike. Liu Wenyu, a soldier from the brigade, pointed out in an interview that the PLA has formed a "reconnaissance-strike-obscuration-loitering" four-in-one collaborative tactic for drones, indicating that ground combat is accelerating its transformation from traditional mechanized models to intelligent unmanned approaches. Notably, the frequent appearance of quadruped robots in this exercise further indicates that unmanned ground platforms have moved from the technical verification stage to tactical application.

On the naval front, a destroyer flotilla based in a military port in Qingdao dispatched the Type 055 destroyer Nanchang, the Type 052D destroyer Xining, and the Type 054A frigate Weifang to conduct exercises at sea. The Type 055 destroyer has a full-load displacement of approximately 12,000 tons and is equipped with a 128-cell vertical launch system, making it the largest and most powerful surface combat platform in the PLA Navy. The training subjects included ship maneuvers in complex sea conditions, live-fire shooting against sea and shore targets, deceptive interference launches, anti-saboteur defense, and emergency damage control operations under power loss and damage conditions, comprehensively testing the flotilla's survivability and sustained combat capability in high-end conflicts. CCTV footage showed that the flotilla also practiced communication support and coordinated strikes in an electromagnetic countermeasure environment, reflecting the PLA's profound understanding of the complexities of maritime operations under informationized conditions.

In the air force, multiple J-20 stealth fighters entered beyond-visual-range air combat training on the first training day of the new year. The J-20, developed by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group, is equipped with two WS-10B engines, has a maximum speed of about Mach 2, and a combat radius of approximately 6,000 kilometers. CCTV noted that the J-20 units have incorporated nighttime aerial refueling, long-endurance cruising, and distant maritime border patrols into regular training, indicating that this type of aircraft has fully formed combat capabilities and is evolving from a single air superiority platform to a systematic node role. The core of this transformation lies in the J-20 no longer solely undertaking air combat tasks but serving as an information hub within a distributed kill network, achieving real-time data link interactions with early warning aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft, and ground radar systems.

The most strategically significant training comes from the Rocket Force. CCTV footage showed the DF-17 hypersonic missile conducting simulated launch procedures at a field training ground. The DF-17 is a road-mobile, solid-fuel medium-range ballistic missile equipped with the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle, utilizing a 10×10 truck chassis, with a missile length of about 11 meters and a launch weight of approximately 15,000 kilograms, with an estimated range of 1,800 to 2,500 kilometers. Its core penetration advantage lies in its ability to maneuver at high speeds within the atmosphere during the glide phase, exceeding Mach 5, and its ballistic trajectory is much lower than that of traditional reentry warheads, significantly compressing the opponent's missile defense system's warning and interception window. The DF-17 can carry conventional or nuclear warheads, with a reported circular error probable of only a few meters, primarily used to strike high-value targets such as forward air bases, command centers, and maritime formations in the Western Pacific region. The integration of this weapon system from parade displays to regular training indicates that it has surpassed the initial combat capability stage and is officially embedded in the Rocket Force's conventional readiness system.

From a broader perspective, the opening situation of the 2026 training aligns closely with the strategic direction of the "14th Five-Year Plan" (2026-2030). In March 2026, China announced a defense budget of approximately 1.94 trillion yuan (about 281 billion USD), a year-on-year increase of 7%, continuing the stable growth rate of about 7% over the past six years. Official statements emphasize the "integrated development of mechanization, informationization, and intelligentization," and the continued use of this terminology reveals important information—despite previously announcing that mechanization would be basically achieved by 2020, the reality is that the PLA is still in a historical stage of addressing mechanization shortcomings, advancing informationization, and exploring intelligent combat.

In terms of intelligentization, the PLA's transformation is advancing simultaneously across multiple dimensions. The emergence of drone swarm tactics, tactical applications of quadruped robots, AI-assisted target recognition and firepower allocation, and big data-based battlefield situational awareness—these capability elements appearing in the 2026 training exercises indicate that the future form of warfare is transitioning from "platform-centric warfare" to "system-centric warfare" and even "algorithm-centric warfare." Behind this transition is the deep support of China's military-civilian integration strategy. According to an analysis report released by the U.S. think tank "Foundation for Defense of Democracies" in May 2026, the PLA is systematically introducing the technological capabilities of commercial robotics, artificial intelligence, and other tech enterprises into the military domain, rapidly blurring the boundaries of dual-use technologies.

However, beneath the surface of technological optimism, the PLA's modernization process also faces significant structural challenges. An analysis by the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) in India points out that although China's defense budget has doubled from $145 billion in 2015 to $281 billion in 2026, the joint combat capabilities pursued since 2004 have still not been fully achieved. The continued appearance of phrases like "promoting the large-scale development of new domain and new quality combat forces" in official documents reflects ongoing shortcomings in joint command systems, inter-service collaboration, and talent development. Additionally, the internal political restructuring within the military is deepening, adding institutional variables to the modernization process.

In summary, the opening training of 2026 sends a clear signal: the PLA is in a critical leap from "large" to "strong," and during the "14th Five-Year Plan," it will accelerate the complete realization of mechanization, comprehensive coverage of informationization, and breakthroughs in intelligentization. Against the backdrop of ongoing strategic pressures in hotspots like the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, this triad of military modernization is not only reshaping China's own defense capabilities but also profoundly altering the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific region and globally. For neighboring countries and regions, each capability leap of the PLA signifies a corresponding adjustment in strategic assessment frameworks, and the urgency of this adjustment is increasing day by day.