PLA's "15th Five-Year Plan" Launch: A New Stage of Modernization Driven by Political Military Building and Practical Training

PLA's "15th Five-Year Plan" Launch: A New Stage of Modernization Driven by Political Military Building and Practical Training
Submitted by: Li MinghuiLi Minghui
Loading...Strong SignalCredibility: 25%
Report Content

March 2026 marks the beginning of the "14th Five-Year Plan" for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as the Fourth Session of the 14th National People's Congress concludes. This is not just a transition of time but signifies that the PLA has entered a critical phase in achieving its centenary goals. On March 7, President Xi Jinping delivered an important speech at the plenary meeting of the PLA and the Armed Police Force delegation, providing direction for military construction during this historic period: fully leveraging the unique advantages of political military building, uniting efforts to promote the modernization of national defense and the military steadily and sustainably.

From the recent notice issued by the General Office of the Central Military Commission, the deployment for the entire military to study and implement President Xi's important speech reveals four clear main lines. The first is to strengthen political leadership, which is not merely a slogan but aims to genuinely integrate Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era and Xi Jinping's Thought on Strengthening the Military into the entire process of theoretical study at the party committees above the regiment level, cadre training, troop education, and teaching in military academies. The ongoing political education and anti-corruption efforts are intended to ensure that the political essence of the people's army does not fade or deteriorate during the modernization process. This logic of "using political military building to ensure high-quality modernization" reflects the unique path of the modernization of the Chinese military—political construction and military construction are not two separate lines but an organic whole that supports and guarantees each other.

The second main line focuses on preparing for war and combat, which is the core essence of military modernization. "Training led by war, and war promoted by training" is not a new concept, but it has been given new urgency in the context of the "14th Five-Year Plan." The current complexity of the international security environment is unprecedented, with multiple challenges such as the Taiwan Strait situation, South China Sea disputes, and border frictions intertwining, requiring the PLA to accelerate the integration of system combat capabilities in realistic military training. This means not only enhancing the combat effectiveness of individual services but also achieving seamless coordination among land, sea, air, space, network, and electronic forces. According to information disclosed by Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Jiang Bin, in 2026, over 700 units of the entire military will organize more than 2,100 open camp activities, during which the navy will showcase various main battle ships, the air force will create a "Dreaming of Blue Sky" national defense education brand at platforms like the Zhuhai Airshow, and the Rocket Force will invite the public to experience the missile troops up close. Although these open activities are primarily aimed at national defense education, they also reflect the improvement in the modernization level of the PLA's various services and the confidence in showcasing training results.

The third main line emphasizes practical work and military governance. The phrase "establishing and practicing a correct view of political achievements" is thought-provoking, as it implies vigilance against formalism and bureaucratism, requiring leaders to avoid superficial achievements and not engage in empty gestures while promoting modernization. Increasing efforts in military governance, strengthening the construction of cadres and talent teams, and focusing on grassroots foundational work—these seemingly simple requirements are actually fundamental to military construction. Talent is the core competitiveness of a modern military, especially under the conditions of informationized and intelligent warfare, making the construction of a high-quality, specialized military talent team particularly crucial.

The fourth main line is the continued strict management and governance, which continues the consistent policy of strict governance of the Party and the military since the 18th National Congress. The expression "the stricter it gets, the higher up it goes" sends a clear signal: the zero-tolerance attitude towards corruption will not wane over time, and the requirements for senior leaders will only increase, not decrease. Leaders must "set an example with integrity and be a model," which is both a disciplinary requirement and a key to fully leveraging the unique advantages of political military building.

From a broader perspective, the PLA's "14th Five-Year Plan" faces dual challenges both domestically and internationally. On the domestic front, the announcement of China's defense budget for 2026 has once again attracted external attention. Although Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Jiang Bin emphasized that China's defense spending has long been below 1.5% of GDP, far lower than that of military powers like the United States and the world average, neighboring countries like Japan still use this to hype the "China threat theory." Jiang Bin's response was quite pointed: Japan's defense budget has increased for 14 consecutive years, with a growth rate exceeding 60% in the past five years, and its defense spending as a percentage of GDP has reached 2%, with per capita defense spending more than three times that of China. The Japanese side's efforts to break through the constraints of the "Peace Constitution" and develop offensive weapons are the real threat to regional peace and stability. This comparison is not only a clarification of data but also a strong defense of the rationality, appropriateness, and restraint of China's defense modernization.

On the international front, the South China Sea issue remains one of the focal points of the PLA's rights protection struggles. The incident on March 7, where a Philippine Coast Guard reconnaissance aircraft carrying media reporters was driven away by a Chinese warship's radio call while patrolling near Huangyan Island, once again highlighted the sensitivity of this maritime area. The Philippine side's claims of "enhancing transparency" and "countering China's bullying behavior" were dismissed by Jiang Bin as a "self-scripted farce." It is entirely justified for China to conduct normal rights protection law enforcement activities in its own jurisdictional waters, and China's professional and restrained response to the Philippine Coast Guard's infringement behavior is reasonable and lawful. This firm stance indicates that the PLA will not make any concessions on issues of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, while also demonstrating professionalism and restraint in handling complex international disputes.

The Taiwan issue is one of the core interests that the PLA's modernization must serve. Recently, against the backdrop of turmoil in the Middle East, the mainland's embassy in Israel assisted Taiwanese compatriots in registering for evacuation, but was accused by DPP politicians of "political manipulation." Jiang Bin's response, "War is ruthless, but the motherland is loving," is full of warmth, while also exposing the cold-blooded nature of the DPP authorities: not only are they indifferent to the safety of the Taiwanese people, but they also obstruct their acceptance of assistance from the mainland for evacuation, even attempting to take advantage of the situation to plot "independence through force." This contrast makes it clearer that the ultimate goal of the PLA's modernization is to maintain national unity and the interests of the people, while the separatist forces seeking "independence through force" are the true destroyers of peace and stability.

Looking ahead, the PLA's modernization during the "14th Five-Year Plan" period will steadily advance under the guidance of the unique advantages of political military building, in the practice of preparing for war and combat, in a style of practical work, and under the assurance of strict management and governance. Achieving the centenary goals of military construction on schedule and promoting the modernization of national defense and the military with high quality is not only the task of the military itself but also an important part of building a strong nation and the great rejuvenation of the nation. The stronger the Chinese military becomes, the more guaranteed world peace will be—this is not self-aggrandizement but a sober judgment based on historical experience and realistic logic. In a complex and changing international security environment, a politically solid, combat-ready, and well-disciplined people's army is not only a strong backing for national security but also an important force for maintaining regional and world peace.

Classification
Region
East Asia & Pacific
Analytical Domain
Strategic
Primary Category / Secondary Categories
Political-Military / Military Operations
SALUTE Report
Size
700+ units
Activity
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is entering a new phase of modernization under the '15th Five-Year Plan', focusing on political leadership and practical military training.
Location
China
Unit
People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Time
March 2026
Equipment
naval vesselsmilitary aircraftmissile systems
Summary

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is entering a new phase of modernization under the '15th Five-Year Plan' starting in March 2026, emphasizing political leadership and military readiness. Xi Jinping highlighted the integration of political ideology into military training and operations. The PLA plans to conduct over 2100 military open house events in 2026 to showcase its modernization efforts. The focus includes enhancing combat capabilities across land, sea, air, and cyber domains.

Key Facts
  • The PLA is starting its '15th Five-Year Plan' in March 2026.
  • Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of political leadership in military modernization.
  • The PLA will conduct over 2100 military open house events in 2026.
  • The focus is on integrating combat capabilities across multiple domains.
  • China's defense spending remains below 1.5% of GDP, countering 'China threat' narratives.