Regional offensive of JNIM in the Sahel: the defection of a commander triggers an unprecedented escalation

The defection in February 2026 of Sadou Samahouna, senior commander of Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) to the Sahel Province of the Islamic State (ISSP), triggered a wave of coordinated military operations of exceptional scale across central Sahel. This offensive, which primarily targeted Burkina Faso but extended to Mali, Niger, and even Benin, illustrates the growing fragility of the security situation in the region and reveals internal tensions within the jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda.

Sadou Samahouna, who controlled operations in the Eastern region of Burkina Faso and is none other than the younger brother of Abu Hanifa, the emir of JNIM for Niger, took with him only a small group of fighters during his defection. Yet, the symbolic impact of this alignment with the Islamic State has been considerable. According to analysts from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), this defection raised serious concerns within JNIM's leadership regarding the internal cohesion of the group and the risk of further defections. These concerns evidently motivated the scale and intensity of the military campaign that followed.

On February 4, 2026, JNIM launched the first large-scale attack of this offensive by striking a Nigerien military base in Makalondi, near the Boni area where Sadou had defected. This inaugural attack set the tone for a series of operations that would multiply in the following weeks. The offensive then moved to Burkina Faso, which became the main theater of operations. JNIM conducted over 30 attacks specifically targeting the Burkinabè army and the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), the pro-government militias, particularly in the Eastern, Central-North, and Northern regions.

The human toll of this campaign is heavy: more than 120 soldiers, forest guards, and VDP fighters have been killed in Burkina Faso alone. The deadliest attack occurred in mid-February in the locality of Titao, in the north of the country, where JNIM killed 80 soldiers and militia members as well as at least 20 civilians during a complex operation targeting simultaneously a military camp, the local market, and communication facilities in the area. This multi-target attack tactic demonstrates a sophisticated operational capability and a willingness to inflict maximum damage on both security forces and civilian infrastructure.

What is particularly concerning about this offensive is JNIM's adoption of mass violence tactics generally associated with the ISSP. This tactical evolution seems to respond to the expectations of part of JNIM's fighting base, as evidenced by audio recordings released on February 16, 2026, by the defecting commander known as Saaʿd. In these messages, he criticizes Al-Qaeda's leadership for not implementing sharia "in its entirety" and accuses JNIM of engaging in peace negotiations with Benin and Côte d'Ivoire, a move he deems incompatible with jihadist principles. Saaʿd also claims that his defection was motivated neither by money nor by glory—he held a lucrative position within JNIM—but by his conviction that the actions of the ISSP align with its words, unlike JNIM.

Meanwhile, the ISSP has not remained idle. On February 9 and 10, the group launched its own offensive in the Sahel region of Burkina Faso, attacking and taking control of JNIM positions in several villages. These clashes resulted in the deaths of more than 40 JNIM fighters, highlighting the persistent challenge that the ISSP poses to JNIM's regional dominance. This inter-jihadist rivalry adds an additional layer of complexity to an already extremely fragile security situation.

JNIM's offensive is set against a broader context of deteriorating security across the countries of the Sahel States Alliance (AES) - Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. These three nations, all led by military juntas since successive coups, had promised to defeat terrorism in a manner that their democratic predecessors had failed to achieve. However, the reality on the ground contradicts these promises. In Burkina Faso, JNIM conducted over 500 attacks in 2025 according to the SITE Intelligence Group, and extremist groups now control up to 60% of the national territory, effectively encircling the capital Ouagadougou. Nighttime attacks on military supply lines and the extensive use of improvised explosive devices have confined security forces and volunteer militias to areas close to their bases in the rural regions of Central-North, East, and the Sahel.

In Mali, the situation is hardly more encouraging. The country is barely recovering from the months-long blockade that JNIM imposed around Bamako between September 2025 and early 2026. During this period, JNIM intercepted and destroyed fuel convoys coming from Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, making daily life extremely difficult for residents of the capital. Although JNIM lifted this blockade in early 2026 without explanation, the psychological impact lingers. As Aissata, a vendor in a supermarket in Bamako, told The Africa Report: "And tomorrow? What if the blockade returns or if the terrorist group decides to attack the market or any infrastructure in the city?" A senior lecturer at the University of Legal and Political Sciences of Bamako, speaking on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals, stated that the Malian army is exhausted by the persistent terrorist attacks and by defections to JNIM, adding: "The junta does not seem to have a response to the terrorist expansion, not even its counterparts in Niger and Burkina Faso."

In Niger, the attack on January 29, 2026, against the Dori Hamani International Airport in Niamey and the military airbase 101 starkly illustrated the threat posed by Sahelian extremist groups. Thirty fighters from the Sahel Province of the Islamic State used armed drones, light weapons, and mortars to attack this strategic facility that houses the Nigerien army's drone operations and the headquarters of the Sahel States Alliance. Although all assailants were killed or captured after a two-hour battle, the attack achieved its main objective, according to analysts from African Security Analysis: undermining state authority, testing the response capacity of security forces, and demonstrating that terrorist groups remain an active threat despite intensive counter-terrorism operations throughout the Sahel.

Analysts Djiby Sow and Hassan Koné from the Institute for Strategic Studies in South Africa note that despite their success in controlling a large part of the Burkinabè campaign, terrorist groups lack both the manpower and firepower necessary to conquer the capitals. However, this consolidation of rural territorial control creates a sanctuary from which they can launch increasingly bold attacks, as demonstrated by the assault on Niamey airport and repeated attacks on strategic targets.

The current situation contrasts sharply with the promises of the three military juntas of the AES, which justified their respective coups by the inability of their democratic predecessors to manage the jihadist threat. Not only has violence not decreased, but it has intensified and geographically expanded. Jihadist groups demonstrate remarkable adaptability, exploiting gaps in regional coordination and the limited resources of national security forces.

JNIM's offensive in February 2026 also reveals the complex dynamics within the Sahelian jihadist movement. The rivalry between JNIM, affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and the ISSP, loyal to the Islamic State, creates competition for recruits, territory, and ideological legitimacy. This competition can lead to escalations of violence, with each group seeking to prove its operational and ideological superiority. The defection of high-ranking commanders like Sadou Samahouna suggests that these ideological tensions are not merely rhetorical but reflect genuine divisions over strategy, tactics, and the application of Islamic law.

For the civilian populations of the Sahel, this escalation means increasing insecurity, mass displacements, and a deterioration of humanitarian conditions. Attacks on markets, such as the one in Titao, show that civilians remain vulnerable targets, caught between the operations of armed groups and the often brutal responses of security forces and pro-government militias. JNIM's operations aim not only to militarily weaken governments but also to demonstrate their inability to protect populations, thereby undermining state legitimacy.

In the long term, the situation in the Sahel requires much more than a military response. As analysts from African Security Analysis point out, "these dynamics are likely to continue in the coming months, particularly in border areas with Mali and Niger, where the presence and mobility of armed groups remain structurally entrenched and show no signs of slowing down." Local governance, economic development, community reconciliation, and addressing the legitimate grievances of marginalized populations must complement security efforts to break the cycle of violence that has afflicted the region for over a decade.