Russian Defense Industry Under Sanctions: Growth Limits and 2026 Prospects

Submitted by: Dmitri VolkovDmitri Volkov
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**Russian Defense Industry Under Sanction Pressure: Limits of Growth and Prospects for 2026**

In the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the Russian defense industry is demonstrating unprecedented mobilization dynamics. However, behind the figures of military production growth and ambitious plans for weapon modernization, signs of structural limitations are becoming increasingly evident. An analysis of the current state of the defense-industrial complex (DIC) and programs for 2026 allows for an assessment of the real limits of the Russian military-industrial machine under total Western sanctions.

**Military Keynesianism: Has the Peak of Growth Passed?**

Over three and a half years of full-scale war, Russia's military spending has increased nearly threefold—from 3.6 trillion rubles in 2021 to 13.5 trillion rubles allocated for 2025. This massive injection of state demand has created a new economic model, centered around defense production. According to official data, between 2023 and 2024, the DIC welcomed between 600,000 to 700,000 new workers, bringing the total number of employees in the sector to 3.8 million—about 5% of the country's working-age population.

High salaries at defense enterprises (up to 150,000 rubles per month for assembly line jobs—almost twice the national median) have turned the military industry into a growth locomotive for the entire economy. However, in 2025, this model began to show signs of failure. The Ministry of Economic Development forecasts industrial production growth of only 1%—down from 5.6% the previous year.

The dynamics of key military sectors are telling. The production of metal products used in artillery and ammunition grew by 15.9% from January to October 2025—half of the 31.6% growth seen in 2024. The output of military-purpose computer, electronic, and optical products increased by 13.6% compared to 27.9% a year ago. Only the category "other transport," which includes tanks and UAVs, maintained a growth rate of 33-34%.

Imports of dual-use goods from China—the main supplier of critically important components—decreased by 3.7% year-on-year to $2.6 billion from January to November 2025. This is 14.4% less than in the same period of 2023. The number of job vacancies at defense enterprises fell to 34,500 in the summer of 2025—down from 52,000 a year earlier, returning to levels seen at the beginning of the war.

**Program 2026: Ambitions Amidst Limitations**

Despite signs of a slowdown, the Russian DIC plans to commission a number of strategically important weapon systems in 2026. These programs are expected to serve as indicators of the industry's real capabilities under sanction pressure.

In aviation, the central event is expected to be the first flight of the fifth-generation fighter Su-75 "Checkmate." Introduced in 2021, this single-engine supersonic aircraft with low radar visibility is positioned as a replacement for the MiG-29 in the Russian Aerospace Forces and an export alternative to modernized F-16s in the global market. The transition from prototype to flight testing in 2026 will test the aviation industry's ability to create modern combat platforms under limited access to Western technologies.

In strategic nuclear forces, a key role is played by the completion of tests for the heavy liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile "Sarmat." Capable of carrying hypersonic glide vehicles, it is set to become the flagship of the Strategic Missile Forces. Concurrently, new solid-fuel missile systems equipped with second-generation guided hypersonic warheads are planned to replace the "Topol-M."

In the navy, the main event will be the start of sea trials for the nuclear submarine "Khabarovsk" of project 09851. This special platform, being built at the Sevmash plant in Severodvinsk, will become the primary carrier of the nuclear autonomous unmanned underwater vehicle "Poseidon." Borrowing low-noise technologies from strategic submarines of the "Borei-A" class, the "Khabarovsk" will be able to accommodate six launch systems for "Poseidon" in its bow section.

At the same time, the fleet's hypersonic strike potential is being enhanced. In 2026, the transfer of the submarine K-572 "Perm" to the Navy is planned—this will be the first serial carrier capable of launching "Zircon" missiles from a submerged position. Mass deployment of FPV interceptors with artificial intelligence elements and autonomous ground robots at the unit level is also planned.

President Vladimir Putin stated at the end of January that Russia's defense exports will significantly increase in 2026. In 2025, the volume of supplies exceeded $15 billion, covering more than 30 countries. This provides additional resources for production modernization and R&D.

**Structural Problems: Corruption, Component Shortages, and Cash Gaps**

However, behind the ambitious plans lie serious systemic problems. The prosecutor's office recently initiated the nationalization of the "KIMP" holding, which supplied bearings to defense factories, accusing the owners of enriching themselves "at the expense of the vital interests of society and the state." The United Shipbuilding Corporation has begun layoffs at the Rybinsk shipyard due to a lack of new contracts. The electronics manufacturer "Opttron-Stavropol" and the microelectronics group "Angstrom" reported financial difficulties.

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, at least 34 individuals have been prosecuted for failing to fulfill state defense contracts. A notable protest was the self-immolation of Vladimir Arsenyev, head of the "Volna" research institute, in Red Square in July 2024, who described the state's treatment of defense contractors as "Stalinist."

According to a source in one of the supplying companies, the volume of government orders has indeed sharply increased, but issues with low advance payments, gaps in orders, and delays in final settlements persist. Combined with high interest rates, this creates a chronic cash shortage, leaving some enterprises in a state of limbo.

The main strategic challenge is the erosion of access to advanced components. As noted by Matthieu Bouleg from Chatham House, "over time, under the influence of sanctions, it will become increasingly difficult and expensive for Russia to procure advanced components, such as microelectronics and silicon products, necessary for electronic warfare systems, spacecraft, precision-guided munitions, and so on."

Russia retains sufficient resources to maintain its current, if not higher, level of production of basic types of weapons—drones, tanks, munitions. However, the creation of complex high-tech systems requires a component base that sanctions are gradually cutting off. This raises questions not about the current capacity of the DIC, but about its ability to maintain technological superiority in the medium and long term.

**Conclusions: The Military Machine at the Limit of Sustainability**

In 2026, the Russian defense-industrial complex finds itself in a state of paradox. On one hand, it demonstrates enormous mobilization capabilities, able to saturate the troops with mass types of weapons and plans to commission a number of advanced systems. On the other hand, signs of structural fatigue are becoming increasingly evident: growth is slowing, imports of critically important components are falling, and enterprises are facing financial difficulties and order shortages.

The armament program for 2026 will serve as a litmus test. If the "Su-75" makes its first flight, the "Sarmat" enters combat duty, and the "Khabarovsk" begins sea trials—this will confirm that the Russian defense industry retains the ability to create complex systems in conditions of isolation. However, if deadlines are missed, it will signal that the limits of growth for the military-industrial machine have been reached.

Yet even in the case of success, a key question will remain open: how long can the DIC maintain its pace in the face of depleting human resources, degradation of the technological base, and an increasing shortage of precision components? The answer to this question will determine not only the fate of the conflict in Ukraine but also Russia's long-term military capabilities in its confrontation with the West.

Classification
Region
Russia & CIS
Analytical Domain
Strategic
Primary Category
Political-Military
SALUTE Report
Size
3.8 million workers in the defense sector
Activity
Russian defense industry shows unprecedented mobilization dynamics despite structural limitations and sanctions
Location
Russia
Unit
Russian Defense Industry
Time
2026
Equipment
Sukhoi Su-75 CheckmateSarmat ICBMKhabarovsk submarineZircon missiles
Summary

The Russian defense industry is experiencing significant mobilization dynamics amid ongoing sanctions, with military spending projected to reach 13.5 trillion rubles by 2025. Despite employing 3.8 million workers, the sector faces structural challenges, including a decline in dual-use imports and financial difficulties. Plans for 2026 include the introduction of advanced systems like the Su-75 fighter and Sarmat ICBM, but the industry's long-term sustainability is in question due to component shortages and corruption issues.

Key Facts
  • Russian military spending increased from 3.6 trillion rubles in 2021 to 13.5 trillion rubles planned for 2025.
  • The defense sector employed 3.8 million workers, about 5% of the working population.
  • Production of dual-use goods from China decreased by 3.7% year-on-year.
  • The Russian defense industry plans to introduce several advanced weapon systems by 2026.
  • Structural issues like corruption and component shortages threaten the defense industry's growth.