Russian losses in the war have exceeded 1.25 million — the rate of decline is accelerating contrary to forecasts

According to the General Staff of Ukraine, the total combat losses of Russian forces since the beginning of the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, up to February 15, 2026, amount to approximately 1,253,270 people. Just in the last 24 hours — 1,250 people. These figures require clarification, but even accounting for possible inaccuracies, they indicate a troubling trend for Russia: the rate of losses is not decreasing. In February 2026, the Russian army is losing more people per day than at the peak of the summer offensive in 2024. This should not have happened.

The mathematics of a war of attrition

The average daily losses of Russian troops in February 2026 are around 1,200-1,500 people, comparable to the most intense periods of fighting for Bakhmut and Avdiivka. However, in 2022-2023, peaks in losses were followed by declines when troops withdrew for reorganization. There are no such pauses now. A monthly decline of around 40-45 thousand people means that the Russian army must replenish losses equivalent to four motorized rifle divisions every month just to maintain the current number of combat personnel.

For comparison: during the entire decade-long Afghan campaign (1979-1989), the Soviet Union lost about 15,000 servicemen killed. This is less than what modern Russia loses in three weeks in Ukraine. Even the First Chechen War (1994-1996), which became a traumatic event for Russian society, claimed the lives of about 5,600 servicemen of the Russian Ministry of Defense over two years. What is happening in 2026 is an order of magnitude larger.

Loss structure: degradation of personnel

Losses of equipment provide additional context. Since February 2022, the Russian armed forces have lost, according to Ukrainian data:

• 11,672 tanks (+4 in the last 24 hours)
• 24,037 armored vehicles (+6)
• 37,293 artillery systems (+11)
• 134,858 operational-tactical UAVs (+552)
• 78,485 units of automotive equipment and tankers (+97)

The figures for tanks (over 11,500) exceed Russia's total active reserves according to The Military Balance for 2022 by about three times. This means that deep reserves of conservation, vehicles with expired resources requiring major repairs, have been sent into battle. But the main point is not this: the loss of such a number of armored vehicles means the death or injury of crews — professional tankers, driver-mechanics, gunners. Training a new specialist takes at least six months. Russia lacks not so much equipment as people capable of effectively using it.

Mobilization potential: where is the limit?

The Russian system for replenishing losses in 2026 is based on three components: contract service with high financial incentives, covert mobilization in the regions ("house visits" and military enlistment office raids), and replenishment from among prisoners and marginalized groups. All three sources show signs of exhaustion. According to Western analysts, by the end of 2025, Russia was attracting about 30-35 thousand new contract soldiers monthly — with a need for 40-45 thousand to compensate for losses.

The gap of 10-15 thousand people per month seems small, but it is cumulative. Over a year, this is a deficit of 120-180 thousand fighters, equivalent to twenty motorized rifle brigades. The demographic base of conscription age in Russia is shrinking: about 700 thousand young men reach conscription age each year, but 30-40% of them receive deferments for health, education, or other reasons. The war is progressing faster than the population is growing.

Why the rates are not decreasing: tactical inertia

Common sense suggests that an army suffering such losses should switch to a less costly tactic — defense, maneuver warfare, active use of UAVs to minimize contact. However, the Russian command continues to apply assault tactics in small groups ("waves"), especially in the Pokrovsk (51 attacks in one day according to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on February 14) and Kupiansk directions. Why?

The answer likely lies in the realm of politics rather than military art. The Kremlin needs territorial gains as proof of the success of the "special military operation". Even a slight advance of 300-500 meters in the area of Chasiv Yar or Toretsk is presented by propaganda as a strategic victory. This logic requires constant offensive pressure, regardless of the cost in human lives. The Russian army in 2026 operates not according to the laws of military efficiency, but according to the laws of the political calendar.

Comparison with Ukrainian losses: asymmetry of strategies

Ukraine does not publish detailed data on its losses, but Western estimates (RUSI, ISW) indicate a loss ratio of about 1:2.5-3 in favor of the defending side on most sections of the front. This is a classic rule of war theory: the attacker suffers greater losses. However, for Russia, this ratio is acceptable, as its population base is three times larger than Ukraine's. The problem lies elsewhere: the quality of Russian reserves is declining faster than they are being sent into battle.

Ukrainian units receiving Western weapons and undergoing training in Germany, Poland, and the UK are increasing their combat capability. Russian units are degrading, replacing fallen officers with sergeants, experienced contract soldiers with mobilized individuals, and professional tankers with former civilians who have undergone a two-week course. This is a war of attrition, where the winner is not the one who has more, but the one who can maintain the coherence of the system longer.

Long-term consequences: demographic pit of the 2040s

1.25 million losses are not just killed. According to standard military estimates, the ratio of killed to wounded in modern warfare is 1:3 or 1:4 with access to medical assistance. This means that out of 1.25 million losses, approximately 250-300 thousand are killed, while the rest are wounded to varying degrees of severity. A significant portion of the wounded returns to service, but no less than 200-300 thousand people become disabled, unfit for further service.

These individuals — mostly men aged 20-35 — fall out of the economically active population, from the demographic reserve. Russia has already faced the "pit of the 1990s" (a sharp decline in birth rates after the collapse of the USSR). The war in Ukraine is creating a second pit, which will become critical by 2040, when the generation born after 2022 enters the working age. This is not a military problem — it is a problem of national survival.

Forecast: inertia or breakthrough?

The Russian army can continue offensive operations at the current intensity for another 12-18 months, provided that the mobilization pace is maintained and there is no internal political crisis. However, signs are already visible that the system is operating at its limit: there have been increased cases of mass desertion (especially among mobilized individuals from national republics), the percentage of refusals to renew contracts is rising, and there is a shortage of instructors for training new recruits in rear garrisons.

The paradox is that Russia is winning tactically (slowly advancing in eastern Ukraine), but losing strategically: every captured settlement costs thousands of lives that cannot be returned. A war that began as a "special military operation" lasting three days has turned into a protracted war of attrition, where the winner will not be the one who captures more territory, but the one who retains the ability to fight the longest.

Sources: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (data as of 15.02.2026), Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Mezha.net, analytical materials from RUSI.