Sahel 2026: Two Military Architectures Facing the Persistent Jihadist Threat

The security reconfiguration in the Sahel is entering a critical phase at the beginning of 2026, as two competing regional military architectures seek to demonstrate their effectiveness against a jihadist insurgency that shows no signs of weakening. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) now embody two opposing visions of Sahelian security.

On February 26, 2026, the defense ministers of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger met in Ouagadougou to finalize the roadmap for the second year of the AES. This meeting came two months after the official commissioning of the Unified Force of the AES in December 2025, initially composed of 5,000 soldiers, increased to 6,000 personnel in February 2026. This integrated force combines air power, intelligence sharing, and coordinated ground operations, representing the ambition of these military juntas to demonstrate their ability to ensure security autonomously after breaking with France and leaving ECOWAS.

In response to this initiative, ECOWAS announced in August 2025 an ambitious plan to deploy 260,000 soldiers to combat terrorism, with a proposed annual budget of $2.5 billion. More modestly, the regional organization plans a Rapid Deployment Force of 1,650 personnel in 2026, with an initial deployment of 2,000 soldiers by the end of the year. Abdel-Fatau Musah, ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, confirmed these plans in September 2025.

However, the results on the ground remain concerning. In early February 2026, the Islamic State in the Sahel launched a bold attack on Niger's main airport and military base, demonstrating the persistent operational capacity of jihadist groups. This two-hour offensive aimed to undermine state authority and test the responsiveness of security forces, according to African Security Analysis.

The situation is particularly critical in Burkina Faso, where up to 10% of the population is now displaced. The Tillabéri region in Niger has seen a marked increase in terrorist attacks. In September 2025, 22 people were killed in an attack during a baptism ceremony in this border region. In Mali, government forces, supported by Russian troops, managed to reopen several main roads by the end of 2025, alleviating fuel shortages in Bamako, but insecurity persists along the main roadways.

Experts emphasize that the groups Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) have consolidated their grip on rural areas, gradually approaching secondary cities and tightening economic blockades. This strategy of gradual encirclement represents a concerning escalation.

The international dimension has seen a resurgence with American intervention. On December 25, 2025, Donald Trump launched strikes against ISIS in northwestern Nigeria, promising more similar operations. These strikes reflect a renewed American approach in a region where Washington has invested over $3.3 billion in security assistance over two decades.

The failure of the G5 Sahel, whose joint military force launched in 2017 never took off, looms as a warning. Will the Unified Force of the AES succeed where the G5 has failed? Analysts point out that relations with neighboring countries will need to be rebuilt, a considerable challenge given the current tensions.

The exclusively militarized approach is facing increasing criticism. Experts warn that militarization alone will not defeat terrorism. The root causes—weak governance, economic marginalization, lack of basic services—remain largely unaddressed.

The upcoming period will be crucial for assessing the viability of these two security architectures. The AES must demonstrate tangible results, while ECOWAS must prove its mobilization capacity despite internal political divisions. In the meantime, civilian populations continue to pay the highest price, with millions displaced and entire areas under de facto control of armed groups.