Sahel: The rivalry between the Sahel States Alliance and ECOWAS in the face of jihadist escalation

The security architecture of West Africa is undergoing a profound reconfiguration phase, marked by the emergence of two competing visions to combat the jihadist insurgency that has plagued the Sahel for over a decade. On one side, the Sahel States Alliance (AES), comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, officially announced in December 2025 the deployment of a Unified Force of 5,000 to 6,000 fighters. On the other side, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is announcing an even more ambitious project: a regional counter-terrorism force of 260,000 soldiers, supported by an annual budget of $2.5 billion.

This institutional duality is not trivial. It reflects the political fracture that has crystallized between the military juntas in power in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey, and the rest of the ECOWAS space. Since their respective coups, these three nations have gradually broken away from their traditional Western partners, expelling French forces and pivoting towards new alliances, notably with Russia. The AES, established in September 2023, quickly transformed from a simple mutual defense pact into an autonomous political project, culminating in the announcement of the Unified Force during the second summit of the Alliance in December 2025.

The figures testify to the security urgency underlying these initiatives. According to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), the first quarter of 2026 saw a dramatic resurgence of jihadist attacks in the Sahel region. In Burkina Faso, where nearly 10% of the population is now displaced, groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) are multiplying assaults against the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) and the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP). The attack carried out in early February 2026 by the EIGS against Niamey International Airport and a strategic military base in Niger serves as a brutal reminder of the persistent operational capacity of these armed groups.

In Mali, despite the now well-established Russian military support, the situation remains precarious. While Malian forces, supported by elements of the Wagner Group, managed to reopen several roadways by the end of 2025, temporarily alleviating fuel shortages in Bamako, insecurity persists along the country's main arteries. Jihadist groups, particularly Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, launched an intensive campaign in February 2026. This offensive focused on the Eastern, Central-Northern, and Northern regions of Burkina Faso, targeting both regular forces and civilian militias. On February 4, JNIM attacked a Nigerien military base in Makalondi, in the Boni area, illustrating the porosity of borders and the cross-border coordination of insurgents.

In the face of this deterioration, ECOWAS has outlined a large-scale response. The plan announced in August 2025 provides for the creation of a 260,000-strong counter-terrorism force, with an initial deployment of 2,000 soldiers by the end of 2026. The ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security, Abdel-Fatau Musah, confirmed in November 2025 the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Force of 1,650 personnel, expected to be operational in 2026. However, observers remain skeptical about the actual capacity of this architecture to reverse the security trend in the short term. Precedents, notably the failure of the G5 Sahel Joint Force (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad), which never reached its full operational capacity despite significant international support, fuel these doubts.

The rivalry between the AES and ECOWAS extends beyond the strictly military domain. It reflects a competition for political legitimacy and regional leadership. The juntas of the AES brandish the discourse of national sovereignty and a break with foreign interference, finding a favorable echo among significant segments of their respective public opinions. In contrast, ECOWAS, whose positions on coups have often been perceived as aligned with Western interests, struggles to impose its moral authority in a context where external military interventions (notably French) are widely discredited.

The American intervention adds another dimension to this complex picture. On December 25, 2025, President Donald Trump ordered airstrikes against Islamic State positions in northwestern Nigeria, promising "many more" similar operations. This unilateral action, taken less than a week after the commissioning of the AES Unified Force, raises questions about the coordination—or lack thereof—between the various actors engaged in the counter-terrorism fight in the Sahel. The United States, through AFRICOM (United States Africa Command), has invested over $3.3 billion in security assistance in the region over the past two decades, with results largely deemed disappointing.

Tactically, the two architectures present distinct approaches. The AES Unified Force relies on the pooling of existing military capabilities, increased interoperability between the armies of the three countries, and a logic of collective defense. Its relatively modest size (5,000 to 6,000 men) suggests a focus more on targeted operations and rapid interventions than on extensive territorial control. In contrast, the ECOWAS force project, with its 260,000 soldiers and its colossal budget, resembles a classic regional army, theoretically capable of conducting large-scale counter-insurgency operations and holding territory.

Yet, the logistical, financial, and political challenges facing ECOWAS are considerable. How to effectively coordinate contingents from fifteen member states, with heterogeneous military doctrines, equipment, and levels of preparedness? How to mobilize and sustain an annual budget of $2.5 billion in a region where resources are already constrained? And above all, how to avoid the pitfalls that have doomed previous initiatives, such as the G5 Sahel, whose de facto dissolution in 2023 marked the failure of a similar approach?

Jihadist groups, for their part, skillfully exploit institutional divisions and the tactical weaknesses of their adversaries. JNIM and the EIGS have demonstrated remarkable adaptability, expanding their operational areas, refining their tactics, and intensifying their attacks on critical infrastructure. The attack on Niamey airport in February 2026, one of the most secure installations in the region, serves as both a political and military message: no capital is safe. This operational boldness reflects a growing confidence in their ability to challenge Sahelian states, whether they are members of the AES or ECOWAS.

Beyond the immediate military stakes, the fragmentation of the West African security architecture raises structural questions about the future of regional multilateralism. ECOWAS, created in 1975 with an economic vocation but gradually becoming an essential security actor, sees its authority contested from within. The AES, although still embryonic institutionally, represents a credible political alternative for military regimes seeking legitimacy. This bipolarization risks paralyzing existing regional cooperation mechanisms at a time when the jihadist threat demands a coordinated and unified response.

The coming months will be decisive. The effective deployment of the ECOWAS Rapid Deployment Force by the end of 2026 will be a crucial test of the organization's ability to move from rhetoric to action. Similarly, the first operations of the AES Unified Force will allow for an assessment of the viability of this initiative. In the meantime, the civilian populations of the Sahel continue to pay the heaviest price, caught between jihadist violence, abuses by security forces, and mass displacements.

The tragic irony of the current situation lies in the fact that, while institutional actors multiply and compete, the jihadist insurgency continues its methodical expansion. More than fifteen years after the first manifestations of this crisis, none of the multiple interventions—French, American, UN, regional—have managed to sustainably reverse the security dynamic. The increasing militarization of the Sahel, symbolized by these two competing force projects, risks exacerbating violence without addressing the root causes: failing governance, marginalization of peripheries, criminalized informal economies, and a lack of prospects for a demographically overflowing youth.

The region thus stands at a crossroads. Either regional actors manage to overcome their political divisions to forge a truly coordinated and multidimensional response, integrating security, development, and governance. Or the current fragmentation persists, providing jihadist groups with a conducive environment for their durable entrenchment and expansion into the coastal states of West Africa, already facing increasing pressure in their northern regions.