Terrorist Escalation in the Sahel: The Niamey Attack Reveals the Limits of the Unified Force of the G5 Sahel

The bold attack on Niamey’s Diori Hamani International Airport on January 29, 2026, marked a turning point in the security dynamics of the Sahel. This nighttime operation, carried out by the Sahel Province of the Islamic State (ISSP), demonstrated the persistent capability of terrorist groups to strike at the very heart of Sahelian capitals, despite the intensification of counter-terrorism operations in the region.

The two-hour assault, which mobilized 30 ISSP fighters equipped with armed drones, light weapons, and mortars, simultaneously targeted the civilian airport and the military airbase 101. This military infrastructure hosts Nigerien drone operations as well as the headquarters of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), the union created in 2023 by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger after their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Although all assailants were neutralized or captured, the attack inflicted substantial damage on the Nigerien Air Force's infrastructure and several aircraft, while leaving four Nigerien soldiers injured and 20 assailants dead.

According to African Security Analysis, this attack is not merely a security breach but a deliberate high-value operation targeting Niger's military and strategic infrastructure. The assault represents a notable operational escalation by the Islamic State in the Sahel. More concerning, a video released by Amaq, the Islamic State's media agency, shows fighters speaking Kanuri, a language more commonly used in the Lake Chad basin. This observation suggests that a deployment of fighters from the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) may have occurred in support of this large-scale attack, indicating an increasing interregional coordination among Islamic State affiliates.

The Niamey offensive is part of a broader ISSP campaign aimed at projecting violence into more densely populated and strategically important areas. The Tillabéri region remains the epicenter of ISSP operations, particularly in the administrative departments of the northwest. In February, the group continued this momentum with an attack on a National Guard camp in the departmental capital of Ayorou. This extension into urban centers raises major concerns about the ISSP's growing ability to reach urban targets, its interregional collaboration with other Islamic State affiliates, and the evolution of its tactical capabilities, including the presumed use of drones for the first time in Niger.

In the face of this persistent threat, the three AES countries launched the Unified AES Force in December 2025, a joint force of 6,000 men based in Niamey. This initiative represents the third attempt by the Central Sahel states to establish a joint security mechanism, following the failure of the Multinational Joint Force to secure the Liptako-Gourma region announced in January 2017, and the G5 Sahel Joint Force established in July 2017.

Unlike its predecessors, the Unified AES Force benefits from strong political alignment and close coordination among the three military governments. The force builds on the effective coordination demonstrated during the tripartite Yereko 2 operation, conducted between February and March 2025 in the Liptako-Gourma area, where the borders of the three countries converge. The AES states appear to have learned lessons from the experience of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, which, during its five years of existence, never succeeded in establishing a decisive operational presence.

The G5 Sahel Force conducted 25 security operations that, according to its commander in 2021, General Oumarou Namata, led to the neutralization of hundreds of terrorists and the seizure of significant amounts of equipment. However, the force ultimately failed to stem the expansion of the terrorist threat or reduce its intensity. It was hampered by chronic underfunding: its annual operating budget, initially set at 423 million euros, far exceeded the contributions from its member states, making the force heavily dependent on external partners. The lack of adequate air assets and a functional intelligence system—critical elements for counter-terrorism operations—significantly undermined its capabilities.

The AES states are determined to preserve the independence of their new force. Although details on the individual financial contributions of the three countries have not been made public, they are mobilizing national resources through three main mechanisms: Burkina Faso's Patriotic Support Fund, Niger's Solidarity Fund for the Safeguarding of the Homeland, and Mali's Support Fund for Basic Infrastructure and Social Development Projects. In March 2025, the three countries agreed to introduce a 0.5% levy on imports to finance the confederal institutions, including the Unified AES Force.

Simultaneously, the AES countries are diversifying their military cooperation partnerships, thus avoiding excessive dependence on a single external country. Equipment and armaments are being acquired from Russia, Turkey, Iran, and China. The Russian Africa Corps has become the AES's preferred security partner, although the terms of engagement vary significantly. In Mali, Russia provides military equipment, and the Africa Corps participates in combat operations. In Burkina Faso and Niger, the engagement is limited to training.

Operationally, unlike the battalions of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, which were confined to designated geographical sectors with pursuit rights limited to a radius of 100 kilometers on either side of national borders, the units of the Unified AES Force are intended to operate across the three countries. The headquarters has full operational authority over the troops, allowing it to deploy and move forces without prior approval from the national general staffs—a major structural constraint for the G5 Sahel.

However, the security situation remains concerning in the three countries. In Mali, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, has maintained a months-long blockade aimed at strangling the capital Bamako and disrupting the Malian economy. Between September 2025 and early 2026, JNIM intercepted fuel convoys entering Mali from Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, burning a dozen tankers in one incident. Although the blockade was eased in early 2026 without explanation, its psychological impact persists.

In Burkina Faso, JNIM conducted over 500 attacks in 2025, according to the SITE Intelligence Group. Extremists control up to 60% of the country, essentially surrounding the capital Ouagadougou, while public trust in the government continues to erode. Nighttime attacks on military supply lines and improvised explosive devices have confined the army and volunteer militias to territory close to their bases in the rural areas of the Centre-North, East, and Sahel regions. In February, terrorists launched a deadly attack in the northern community of Titao, killing 80 soldiers and militia members and at least 20 civilians.

The effectiveness of the Unified AES Force will depend on its ability to cooperate with the armies of neighboring states—many of which also face threats from violent extremism and criminal networks. Illicit supply and smuggling channels for operational resources (weapons, motorcycles, fuel, drones, etc.) to armed groups cross many borders in the region. Despite their political differences with non-AES states, regional stability requires that the three countries maintain or strengthen military and security cooperation with their immediate neighbors, including Nigeria, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Ghana, Guinea, and Senegal.

For its part, ECOWAS announced the deployment in 2026 of a Rapid Deployment Force of 1,650 personnel, with a proposed annual budget of $2.5 billion for logistics and frontline support. However, this force remains symbolic and insufficient to reverse insecurity in the short term in a region where terrorist groups have demonstrated remarkable resilience and adaptability.

The current situation is deteriorating in the AES countries, in stark contrast to the claims of the three junta leaders who asserted they could master the terrorists in a way that their democratic predecessors had failed to do. The Malian armed forces are stretched by persistent terrorist attacks and defections to JNIM. The Sahel remains at a critical juncture where the militarized approach to counter-terrorism continues to escalate and increase violence within communities, without offering a sustainable solution to the security crisis that has plagued the region for over a decade.