The Alliance of Sahel States Facing the Test of Fire: When the Promises of the Juntas Collide with the Terrorist Reality

The spectacular attack carried out against Dori Hamani International Airport and Air Base 101 in Niamey on January 29, 2026, marks a symbolic turning point in the security crisis shaking the Sahel. Thirty fighters from the Sahel Province of the Islamic State orchestrated a coordinated assault using armed drones, light weapons, and mortars against strategic facilities that house not only Nigerien military drone operations but also the headquarters of the Sahel States Alliance (AES). This offensive, which resulted in the elimination or capture of all assailants after two hours of intense fighting, reveals a concerning operational escalation from jihadist groups, even as the military juntas in power in the region promised to eradicate the terrorist threat.

Experts from African Security Analysis emphasize that this attack was not a mere security breach but a deliberate operation targeting high-value military and strategic infrastructures. The terrorists' objective far exceeded immediate tactical gains: it was about undermining state authority, testing the response capability of security forces, and, above all, demonstrating that armed groups remain an active threat despite intensive counter-terrorism operations conducted throughout the region. This show of force comes at a time when the Sahel States Alliance, created in 2023 by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger after their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), struggles to realize its security ambitions.

The AES did announce in December 2025 the creation of a joint military force of 5,000 men, modeled after the Atlantic Alliance and named the United Force of the Sahel States Alliance (FU-AES), tasked with combating the Islamist insurgents ravaging the region. However, the facts on the ground cruelly contradict the promises of the military regimes. In Mali, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, has demonstrated its ability to paralyze the country's economy by orchestrating a months-long blockade starting in September 2025. JNIM fighters systematically intercepted fuel convoys coming from Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, even going so far as to set fire to a dozen tankers in a single operation. This blockade, which was only lifted in early 2026 without a clear explanation, plunged Bamako into a fuel shortage that severely affected the daily lives of residents. More worryingly, the psychological impact persists long after the blockade was lifted, as evidenced by Aissata, a vendor in the Malian capital: "And tomorrow? What if the blockade returned or if the terrorist group decided to attack the market or any infrastructure in the city?"

In Burkina Faso, the security situation is even more alarming. JNIM conducted over 500 attacks in 2025 according to the SITE Intelligence Group, and extremists now control up to 60% of the national territory, practically encircling the capital Ouagadougou. Burkinabè security forces and volunteer militias find themselves confined to the outskirts of their bases in the rural areas of the Center-North, East, and Sahel regions, paralyzed by nighttime attacks on their supply lines and improvised explosive devices that line the roads. This situation allowed terrorists to carry out a devastating attack in Titao, in the north of the country, in mid-February 2026, killing 80 soldiers and militia members as well as at least 20 civilians. The assailants simultaneously targeted a military camp, the local market, and communication facilities in the area, demonstrating increasing tactical coordination and audacity. Analysts from African Security Analysis predict that "these dynamics are likely to continue in the coming months, particularly in border areas with Mali and Niger, where the presence and mobility of armed groups remain structurally entrenched and show no signs of slowing down."

Paradoxically, despite their grip on a large part of Burkinabè territory, terrorist groups lack both the manpower and firepower necessary to conquer Ouagadougou, according to analysts Djiby Sow and Hassan Koné from the South African Institute for Strategic Studies. This reality highlights a strategy of gradually weakening the state rather than an ambition for immediate total control. The terrorists seek to erode the legitimacy of the authorities, destroy the population's trust in the army's protective capabilities, and economically suffocate the country by disrupting trade routes and agricultural activities.

The constant deterioration of the security situation in the three AES countries starkly contrasts with the promises made by the leaders of the military juntas, all of whom justified their respective coups by the inability of their democratic predecessors to contain the terrorist threat. As a lecturer at the University of Legal and Political Sciences in Bamako confides anonymously, for fear of reprisals: "The Malian army is exhausted by persistent terrorist attacks and defections to JNIM. The junta does not seem to have a response to the terrorist expansion, nor do its counterparts in Niger and Burkina Faso." This harsh observation reflects an increasingly shared sentiment in the region: the military in power, despite their martial rhetoric and new alliances, have failed to reverse the security trend, and in some cases, the situation has even worsened since they came to power.

The AES now finds itself at a crossroads. Its withdrawal from ECOWAS in January 2025 and the recent announcement of its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court reflect a desire for strategic autonomy and a growing distrust of traditional Western partners. However, this posture of independence is accompanied by increasing security pressure and diplomatic isolation that limit the available strategic options. The United States has also imposed a travel ban on nationals from these three countries starting January 1, 2026, citing national security concerns, terrorist risks, and information-sharing issues, a decision to which the AES responded with reciprocal measures.

In light of this situation, ECOWAS announced the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force of 1,650 to 2,000 personnel that should be operational by the end of 2026. However, as observers point out, this initiative, while symbolically important, is unlikely to be sufficient to reverse the security dynamics in the short term in a region where insecurity has become structural and transnational. The threat extends from the Lake Chad basin to western Mali, and terrorist groups have demonstrated remarkable adaptability and resilience in the face of successive military offensives.

The security future of the Sahel will depend on the ability of the AES governments to develop a truly integrated approach that goes beyond purely military responses. Counter-terrorism operations, no matter how intensive, cannot alone resolve a crisis whose roots lie in failing governance, the marginalization of certain communities, endemic poverty, and the lack of economic prospects for a large and vulnerable youth susceptible to radicalization. As long as these structural factors are not addressed, terrorist groups will continue to find fertile ground for their expansion, and Sahelian capitals will remain under the constant threat of attacks like the one in Niamey, reminding everyone that the war against terrorism in the Sahel is far from won.