The Alliance of Sahel States Facing the Test of the Unified Force: Between Strategic Ambitions and Operational Challenges

The creation of the Unified Force of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in December 2025 marks a decisive turning point in the security architecture of the central Sahel. Composed of 6,000 soldiers and based in Niamey, Niger, this new joint military structure brings together the armed forces of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in an ambitious attempt to reverse the spiral of violence that has ravaged the region for over a decade. As the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel collapsed following the withdrawal of the three countries in 2022-2023, this new initiative raises a fundamental question: can the AES succeed where its predecessors have failed?

The emergence of the Unified Force comes in a dramatically deteriorated security context. Between January and December 2025, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) recorded 3,737 security incidents resulting in 9,362 deaths in the central Sahel. Armed groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda, primarily Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), and those linked to the Islamic State, notably the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), have significantly expanded their territorial grip. In February 2026, JNIM launched a series of coordinated attacks over a week in eastern and northern Burkina Faso, demonstrating increased operational capacity and mobility over vast territorial expanses. Even more spectacularly, the ISSP carried out an unprecedented attack at the end of January 2026 against the international airport in Niamey, the Nigerien capital, illustrating the insurgent groups' ability to strike at the very heart of urban areas.

The Tillabéri region in southwestern Niger became, in 2025, the deadliest area in the central Sahel according to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). This border region, where the territories of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger converge in the so-called Liptako-Gourma area, concentrates the bulk of the violence. More than 50 civilians were killed in two major attacks in early 2026, primarily attributed to the ISSP, followed by Nigerien military forces and then JNIM. In Mali, violence has recently spread southwest, while the populations of Timbuktu, Gao, Mopti, and Menaka continue to suffer recurrent attacks, kidnappings, and the forced collection of zakat by armed groups.

One of the most devastating tactics employed by JNIM involves blocking fuel supply routes to Bamako since September 2025. This economic strangulation strategy paralyzes mobility and essential services in the Malian capital while undermining government authority. In December 2025, OCHA reported a 155% increase in humanitarian access constraints related to the presence of improvised explosive devices compared to November, particularly in the regions of Ségou, Sikasso, and Timbuktu. The number of violent incidents against humanitarian workers doubled during the same period.

The Unified Force of the AES is structurally distinct from its predecessor, the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel, on several critical points. Unlike the G5 battalions, which were confined to designated geographical sectors with a right of pursuit limited to a radius of 100 kilometers on either side of national borders, the units of the Unified Force are designed to operate across the three member countries without territorial restrictions. The headquarters in Niamey has full operational authority over the troops, allowing for the deployment and movement of forces without prior approval from national staffs – a major structural constraint that had paralyzed the G5 Sahel.

Financial autonomy is another fundamental pillar of this new architecture. While the annual budget of the G5 Sahel, initially set at 423 million euros, far exceeded the contributions of its member states and created a critical dependency on external partners, the AES relies on a self-financing model. The three countries mobilize domestic resources through Burkina Faso's Patriotic Support Fund, Niger's Solidarity Fund for the Safeguarding of the Homeland, and Mali's Fund for Basic Infrastructure and Social Development Projects. In March 2025, the three states instituted a 0.5% import tax intended to finance the confederal institutions, including the Unified Force.

In terms of military partnerships, the AES has adopted a diversification strategy aimed at avoiding the excessive dependence that characterized the G5 Sahel's relationship with France and Operation Barkhane. Equipment and armament now come from Russia, Turkey, Iran, and China. The Russian Africa Corps, controlled by the Russian state and successor to the Wagner paramilitary group, has become the AES's preferred security partner, although the terms of engagement vary significantly by country. In Mali, Russia provides military equipment, and the Africa Corps participates directly in combat operations. In Burkina Faso and Niger, the engagement is primarily limited to training. Approximately 2,000 Russian fighters are deployed across the three countries.

The Unified Force demonstrated its coordination capability during the tripartite Yereko 2 operation, conducted between February and March 2025 in the Liptako-Gourma area. This joint operation targeted groups affiliated with the Islamic State in the tri-border area and served as a real-world test for cross-border coordination mechanisms. The relative success of this mission has fueled the confidence of AES states in their model of an autonomous regional force.

However, the Unified Force faces considerable challenges that could compromise its long-term effectiveness. The first of these concerns human rights violations committed by security forces. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) documented hundreds of extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests, detentions, and enforced disappearances perpetrated by all parties in 2025. UN experts have stated that enforced disappearances could constitute crimes against humanity. In Mali, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and the Russian Africa Corps have been implicated in possible war crimes and crimes against humanity, including summary executions, indiscriminate airstrikes, rape and sexual violence, looting, and torture against civilians. Malian refugees in Mauritania have reported to humanitarian workers and the media accounts of abuses committed by the Africa Corps, including blind killings, kidnappings, sexual violence, and torture.

In Burkina Faso, state-sponsored militias, notably the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), have been involved in serious crimes along ethnic lines. These actions fuel abuses and possible atrocities, exacerbate ethnic tensions, encourage militant recruitment among pastoralists, and contribute to widespread impunity. The increasing reliance on airstrikes and drones, improvised explosive devices, and rocket and mortar fire underscores a shift in the combat tactics of JNIM and the ISSP, contributing to blind violence, civilian harm, and probable war crimes.

The closure of civic and political space represents another major obstacle. At the end of January 2026, the Burkinabè government announced measures to dissolve all political parties. The OHCHR continues to receive allegations of enforced disappearances and arbitrary arrests in Burkina Faso. The investigative journalism outlet The New Humanitarian reported that arrests of humanitarian workers have increased in recent months, targeting both national and international staff, while new policies introduced in 2025 restrict the ability of humanitarian organizations to operate effectively. In Niger, the military government declared a "general mobilization" in December, granting extensive powers to requisition civilians and resources to bolster operations. In February 2026, former Malian Prime Minister Moussa Mara was sentenced to two years in prison for "discrediting the state," among other charges, due to a social media post expressing solidarity with detained political and civil society figures.

The announced withdrawal from the International Criminal Court further weakens avenues for justice and redress for victims of atrocities. This decision, combined with the repression against human rights defenders and civic space in the three countries, has inhibited independent documentation and monitoring of violations and abuses.

Beyond these internal challenges, the effectiveness of the Unified Force will also depend on its ability to cooperate with the armies of neighboring states. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), from which the three AES countries officially withdrew in January 2025, decided at a security meeting of military chiefs in Sierra Leone to mobilize a regional reserve force to combat waves of violence from cross-border armed groups. The plan calls for the initial mobilization of 2,000 soldiers by the end of 2026 to confront armed groups that are expanding their territory and refining their tactics in the region.

This ECOWAS initiative creates a paradoxical situation where two distinct regional forces – that of the AES and that of ECOWAS – could theoretically operate in adjacent or even overlapping geographical areas, without a clear coordination mechanism. The rift between the AES and ECOWAS, caused by the use of sanctions by the regional bloc to try to compel post-coup states to hold elections and restore civilian rule, significantly complicates the cross-border cooperation necessary to effectively combat the networks of armed groups operating across multiple borders.

Beverly Ochieng, an analyst based in Dakar for the intelligence firm Control Risks, emphasizes that "when the AES left, one of their criticisms was that ECOWAS was not supporting the counter-terrorism fight and was overly focused on politics and elections." If ECOWAS continues to develop the friendly ties maintained by Senegal as well as by Ghana and Togo, there may be room for intelligence sharing, joint monitoring, and long-term joint missions.

The illicit supply and smuggling channels of operational resources (weapons, motorcycles, fuel, drones, etc.) to armed groups cross many borders in the region. Despite their political differences with non-AES member states, regional stability requires that the three countries maintain or strengthen military and security cooperation with their immediate neighbors, including Nigeria, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Ghana, Guinea, and Senegal.

The Tarha Nakal exercise, conducted by the armed forces of Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Togo in May 2024 in Tillia, Niger, demonstrates that this pragmatic cooperation remains possible. These countries have shown their ability to pool resources and coordinate operations despite political tensions. The African Union is well positioned to resolve tensions between AES countries and their West African neighbors in the Gulf of Guinea. Politically, mediation efforts could rebuild trust and ease tensions. In terms of counter-terrorism, the AU could promote cooperation between ECOWAS's counter-terrorism force and the Unified Force of the AES. In September 2025, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union established a "Task Force" to support Sahelian countries in the fight against terrorism and to address broader security, socio-economic, and humanitarian challenges.

The main challenge for the Unified Force of the AES remains to prove that a militarized approach to counter-insurgency can succeed where previous international efforts have failed. Armed groups are no longer limited to rural operations in areas with low government presence; they are now targeting large urban areas and using increasingly sophisticated weapons. The ability of JNIM and the ISSP to conduct sieges, use drones, improvised explosive devices, and block vital supply routes demonstrates a level of tactical sophistication that requires a coordinated and multidimensional response.

Analysts agree that counter-terrorism cannot be limited to a military response. Social interventions in rural areas from which armed groups recruit are crucial. These groups often secure local adherence by collecting taxes and providing resources such as fertilizers, building mosques, or promising security. Without addressing the underlying grievances that fuel recruitment – economic marginalization, weak state presence, unresolved inter-community tensions – even tactical military successes are likely to remain ephemeral.

The Unified Force of the AES represents the third attempt in less than a decade to establish a joint security mechanism in the central Sahel. Its success or failure will have profound implications not only for Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, but for the entire West African region. As armed groups continue to expand their territorial grip and refine their tactics, the race against time is on to determine whether this new security architecture can reverse the trajectory of violence that threatens to destabilize the entire Sahel.