The Alliance of Sahel States in the Face of the Failure of the Russian Partnership: Analysis of a Failed Security Transition

The spectacular withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2024 to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) was enthusiastically hailed by Moscow as a major geopolitical victory. Two years later, in March 2026, the assessment of this strategic partnership reveals a growing gap between Russian promises and operational reality on the ground, in a context where the jihadist threat continues to intensify across the Sahel region.

According to a recent analysis published by Frederic Wehrey and Andrew Weiss of the Carnegie Endowment in Foreign Affairs, Moscow's support for the AES has proven to be "rich in theatrics but poor in resources and real capabilities." This particularly harsh assessment is based on several concrete indicators that testify to Russia's inability to fill the void left by the departure of French and American forces from the region.

The most emblematic case of this failure concerns the joint 5,000-strong counter-terrorism battalion, composed of contingents from the three AES member states. Although Moscow has publicly embraced this cross-border cooperation initiative, Russian operational commitment has remained minimal. The Africa Corps, which succeeded the Wagner Group after the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, has proven incapable of providing the type of institutional support and training that Western partners had developed over decades. More than 80 percent of its personnel are former Wagner fighters, lacking the necessary experience to establish the lasting personal relationships that formed the foundation of Western security engagement in the region.

The absence of effective regional coordination has resulted in dramatic consequences on the ground. The lack of intelligence sharing and insufficient joint patrols among Sahelian states has provided jihadist groups with considerable space to reorganize and expand their operations along the region's porous borders. Between March 7 and 20, 2026, Malian armed forces conducted strikes against militant positions in the Mopti region, while Niger suffered a terrorist attack targeting a school and a customs post. In Burkina Faso, militants attacked a military camp, killing 14 soldiers. These incidents illustrate the persistence of jihadist violence despite changes in geopolitical alliances.

Russian forces themselves have paid the price for this fragmented approach. The deadly ambush at Tinzaouaten in northern Mali in the summer of 2024, which claimed the lives of 46 soldiers, remains emblematic of the vulnerabilities created by the lack of effective regional coordination. This tragic event highlights the contrast with previous American and French approaches that, despite their well-documented flaws, sought to enhance regional integration while confronting terrorist groups affiliated with ISIS and Al-Qaeda.

Russian attempts at regional cooperation have primarily been limited to high-level exchanges between senior military officials. As Wehrey and Weiss note, "much is discussed, but little is delivered." This superficial approach stands in stark contrast to the integrated training programs, joint exercises, and shared communication systems that Western partners had established over the years.

Moreover, the jihadist threat continues to evolve with increasing clashes between ISIS militants and those of the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM, also known by its Arabic acronym JNIM). This internal rivalry within the jihadist movement adds an additional layer of complexity to an already fragmented security landscape. On March 23, 2026, Guinean authorities announced the dismantling of a suspected terrorist network linked to GSIM, arresting several individuals during this operation. This action reflects the geographical extension of the threat beyond the three AES countries, with GSIM being one of the most active jihadist coalitions in the Sahel, responsible for numerous attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

The global track record of the Wagner Group offers little reason for optimism regarding the capabilities of the Africa Corps. Nowhere it has been deployed has Wagner recorded major successes in training local fighters or developing unit cohesion—a pattern that the Africa Corps seems to have inherited with the majority of Wagner personnel.

This situation raises fundamental questions about the long-term viability of the AES security model. The three member countries find themselves in a paradoxical position: having broken with their former Western partners in the name of sovereignty and operational efficiency, they are left with a Russian partner that cannot provide the resources, expertise, and coordination necessary to confront an ever-growing jihadist threat.

The relative failure of the Russian-Sahelian partnership also occurs within a broader geopolitical context marked by mutual travel restrictions between the United States and the AES countries, implemented in early 2026 for national security and terrorist risk reasons. This diplomatic escalation illustrates the growing isolation of the AES from the West, with Russia failing to offer a credible alternative.

For the civilian populations of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the consequences of this failed security transition are tangible and dramatic. Attacks on schools, civilian infrastructure, and security forces continue at a sustained pace. Jihadist groups continue to exploit the vacuums created by the reconfiguration of alliances, while promises of enhanced security under the AES banner have yet to materialize.

The future of security cooperation in the Sahel remains deeply uncertain. If AES leaders maintain their current pro-Russian orientation without substantial adjustments, the region could experience a continued deterioration of its security situation. The alternative—a potential return to some form of cooperation with Western partners or a diversification of partnerships including other actors like China—seems politically unlikely in the short term but could become a strategic necessity if current trends persist.