The Alliance of Sahel States in the Face of the Intensification of the Terrorist Threat: Between Territorial Reconquests and Structural Fragilities

The military developments of February and March 2026 in the Sahel reveal a contradictory dynamic that now characterizes the counterterrorism struggle in this region, which has become the global epicenter of jihadist violence. On one hand, the security forces of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are showing remarkable tactical successes. On the other hand, the terrorist groups Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Sahel Province of the Islamic State (ISSP) demonstrate a capacity for resilience and adaptation that calls into question the promises of stabilization put forth by the military juntas in power.

The territorial reconquest in Burkina Faso represents one of the most significant developments in recent weeks. According to the Burkina Information Agency, the Burkinabè armed forces have regained control of several strategic localities in the Sahel region that had been occupied by armed groups since 2019. Operations conducted in February 2026 led to the liberation of Tongomayel, Béléhédé, and Pobé Mengao, three towns whose loss symbolized the gradual collapse of state authority in the northern part of the country. These coordinated operations, carried out with the support of the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland, involved intense fighting according to military officials, but ultimately forced the militants to abandon several strongholds they had controlled for seven years.

On February 16, soldiers from the BIR 29 unit operating in the village of Pini neutralized several fighters and recovered weapons and equipment. On the same day in Kantchari, militants fled their positions, abandoning equipment. Other operations were conducted in the areas of Diapaga, Djembédé, Lankoué, Koro, Lei, and Bantoro near the Mouhoun region. Later in the month, security forces also repelled an attack by militants in Kombouari in the eastern part of the country, near Fada N'Gourma. These successes reflect increased military pressure on armed groups and demonstrate the determination of Burkinabè forces to restore control over the entire national territory.

In Mali, the armed forces also conducted intensive airstrikes that reportedly eliminated more than a hundred militants in the Sikasso province and the Djibo area in Burkina Faso. These operations are part of a coordinated regional strategy within the Sahel States Alliance (AES), established in 2023 by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger after their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The AES, which has its headquarters at Air Base 101 in Niamey, aims to pool the military capabilities of the three countries in the face of a common terrorist threat.

However, this apparent military buildup should not obscure the persistent structural vulnerabilities. The attack on January 29, 2026, against the Dori Hamani International Airport in Niamey starkly illustrates the capacity of terrorist groups to strike at the very heart of strategic infrastructures. Thirty fighters from the Sahel Province of the Islamic State used armed drones, light weapons, and mortars to assault the airport and the adjacent military airbase, which houses Nigerien drone operations as well as the AES headquarters. According to African Security Analysis, this two-hour nighttime attack, although repelled with the elimination or capture of all assailants, was deliberately aimed at undermining state authority and testing the response capability of security forces.

The analysis of this assault reveals a notable operational escalation on the part of the ISSP. The objective was not so much to conquer the infrastructure as to demonstrate that terrorist groups remain an active threat despite the intense counterterrorism operations being conducted across the Sahel. This psychological warfare tactic proves particularly effective in a context where the three military juntas of the AES have justified their respective coups by their supposed superior ability to defeat the terrorist insurgency.

In Burkina Faso, the situation remains particularly concerning. According to the SITE Intelligence Group, the JNIM conducted over 500 attacks in 2025, and extremist groups are believed to control up to 60 percent of the national territory. The deadly attack in Titao in mid-February, which claimed the lives of 80 soldiers and militia members as well as at least 20 civilians, underscores the persistent vulnerability of government forces. The JNIM targeted a military camp, a market, and communication facilities, demonstrating sophisticated operational planning. Nighttime attacks on military supply lines and the intensive use of improvised explosive devices have effectively confined security forces and volunteer militias to areas close to their bases in the rural regions of the Center-North, East, and Sahel.

Researchers from African Security Analysis predict that these dynamics will continue in the coming months, particularly in border areas with Mali and Niger, where the presence and mobility of armed groups remain structurally entrenched with no signs of slowing down. This assessment sharply contrasts with the optimistic statements from the military juntas. As a senior professor at the University of Legal and Political Sciences of Bamako anonymously told The Africa Report, out of fear of reprisals, the juntas seem to have no response to the terrorist expansion, not even from their counterparts in Niger and Burkina Faso.

In Mali, the economic blockade imposed by the JNIM from September 2025 to early 2026 has left deep psychological scars. For three months, the group intercepted and burned fuel convoys coming from Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal destined for the capital Bamako. In one incident, a dozen fuel trucks were set ablaze. Although the JNIM loosened its grip without explanation at the beginning of 2026, the psychological impact lingers. "And tomorrow?" wonders Aissata, a vendor in a supermarket in Bamako interviewed by The Africa Report. "What if the blockade returns or if the terrorist group decides to attack the market or any infrastructure in the city?"

This economic and psychological vulnerability contrasts with the theoretical military capabilities of the AES countries. Niger has deployed a fleet of Turkish TB2 drones based in Tahua, whose airport was attacked in February by ISSP militants on motorcycles. Nigerien security forces repelled this assault attempt, demonstrating their immediate response capability, but the incident underscores the persistence of the threat even against facilities housing advanced military technologies.

Moreover, major diplomatic developments are on the horizon. According to Reuters, the United States is close to concluding an agreement to resume its intelligence operations in Mali. This rapprochement comes after the expulsion of American troops from Niger in 2024 and travel bans imposed in December by Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The change in American policy, which no longer demands immediate elections in the Sahel, has been welcomed in Bamako. If this agreement materializes, it could mark a turning point in regional security cooperation, as American intelligence capabilities could significantly enhance the effectiveness of operations against terrorist groups.

However, regional fragmentation complicates counterterrorism efforts. The withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from ECOWAS and the decline of multilateral frameworks such as the G5 Sahel and the Multinational Joint Task Force have hindered progress on crucial issues, including the right to cross-border pursuit, joint military operations, intelligence sharing, and the fight against illicit financing. At a conference at Chatham House in early March 2026, experts emphasized that despite the establishment of the AES, these states remain "indispensable to the regional security and counterterrorism strategy."

Analysts Djiby Sow and Hassan Koné from the Institute for Strategic Studies of South Africa believe that despite their success in controlling a large part of the Burkinabè countryside, the terrorists lack the manpower and firepower necessary to conquer the capital Ouagadougou. This analysis offers a glimmer of strategic hope: terrorist groups excel in asymmetric warfare and controlling rural areas but remain incapable of overthrowing states through direct military force.

The current situation in the Sahel thus reflects a precarious balance. Government forces are recording significant tactical gains, as evidenced by territorial reconquests in Burkina Faso and coordinated air operations. Simultaneously, terrorist groups maintain remarkable operational capacity, striking symbolic targets and exerting constant economic and psychological pressure on populations and governments. For the military juntas of the AES, which have based their legitimacy on the promise of eradicating the terrorist insurgency where their democratic predecessors failed, this situation represents an increasing existential challenge. The continued deterioration of security conditions despite the intensification of military operations raises fundamental questions about the long-term viability of their counterterrorism strategy.