The Alliance of Sahel States Strengthens Its Military Strategy Against Growing Russian Influence

During the last week of February 2026, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) reached a decisive milestone in its institutional and operational development. The ministerial delegations from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger met in Ouagadougou from February 24 to 26 to finalize the roadmap for the second year of the alliance, marking an unprecedented consolidation of this Sahelian military coalition. This momentum occurs in a particularly complex regional context, where Russian influence is intensifying while counter-terrorism operations are multiplying across the territory.

The ministerial meeting in Ouagadougou represents the culmination of a strategic planning process initiated several weeks earlier. On February 22, Niger had already validated the draft roadmap submitted by Burkina Faso, which holds the rotating presidency of the AES for the year 2026. Nigerien Prime Minister Ali Mahamane Zeine stated that his government had "provided the necessary guidance, validated certain proposals, made corrections, and formulated additional suggestions." This roadmap is structured around three fundamental pillars: defense and security, diplomacy, and economic development.

The delegations present in Ouagadougou were led by the defense ministers of the three countries – Sadio Camara for Mali and Salifou Modi for Niger, joined by their Burkinabe counterpart Célestin Simporé. Significantly, these delegations also included the foreign ministers and those responsible for trade and infrastructure, reflecting a comprehensive approach that goes beyond the military framework alone. This inter-ministerial dimension reflects the AES's desire to transform into a true regional confederation, as announced during the first summit of heads of state in July 2024.

Operationally, the Defense and Security Forces of the three countries have maintained sustained pressure against armed terrorist groups. In Mali, the General Staff of the Armed Forces confirmed on February 21 the successful conduct of an air operation on February 20. In Niger, the period from February 16 to 22 was marked by several large-scale operations, including Operations Niya and Damissa, aimed at neutralizing insurgent activities across the national territory. This intensification of military operations is part of the gradual deployment of the joint military force of 5,000 men, the launch of which was announced in January 2026.

This joint force, based in Niamey, the capital of Niger, represents a major advance in Sahelian military cooperation. Unlike previous initiatives such as the G5 Sahel, this force is entirely controlled by the three member states, without external interference. During the launch ceremony in December 2025, the leaders of the AES emphasized the need for "large-scale operations in the coming days," a promise that now seems to be materializing through the multiple operations conducted simultaneously in the three countries.

Alongside these military developments, a recent investigation published on February 21 by a consortium of international media, including Forbidden Stories and All Eyes On Wagner, revealed that the Russian foreign intelligence agency SVR has taken control of the influence operations of the Wagner group in Africa following the death of its founder Evgeny Prigozhin in August 2023. This investigation, based on over 1,400 pages of internal documents obtained anonymously, shows that nearly 100 consultants work for Wagner's influence branch, named Africa Politology or The Company.

According to these documents, between 2024 and 2025, teams were deployed in numerous African countries, including Angola, Burkina Faso, Chad, Ghana, Libya, Mali, Niger, and Sudan. The budget allocated for these influence operations for the period from January to October 2024 amounted to nearly $7.3 million, or about $750,000 per month. In Mali specifically, the SVR is tasked with providing intelligence to Africa Politology regarding the military and political plans of France and the United States in the Sahel, as well as offering diplomatic support for the creation of a new military-political union uniting Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and the Republic of Guinea.

This revelation comes in a context where the three AES countries have significantly strengthened their ties with Moscow after breaking with their former colonial power, France. Following the successive coups of 2021, 2022, and 2023, the ruling juntas have gradually ended French operations on their territory and withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in January 2024. This strategic reorientation has been viewed by investigators as "a significant political victory" for Russia in the region.

However, the actual effectiveness of this Russian influence remains debatable. Investigators note that "Russia plays the long game, but results do not always materialize quickly." Lou Osborn, co-author of the investigation, emphasized that "on the African continent, Russia signs many memoranda of understanding but fails to convert these non-binding agreements into profitable enterprises." This observation is particularly relevant in the Sahelian context, where despite the growing presence of Russian advisors and mercenaries, the security situation continues to deteriorate.

Indeed, recent statistics indicate a marked increase in attacks perpetrated by armed and terrorist groups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger in recent months. The main insurgent organizations active in the region – notably the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) – have significantly expanded their operational area, doubling their geographical footprint in recent years. This expansion is accompanied by an intensification of violence, with recurring kidnappings, attacks against security forces, and civilian populations.

In the face of this persistent threat, ECOWAS, from which the three Sahelian countries have withdrawn, is attempting to develop its own security response. The ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security, Abdel-Fatau Musah, confirmed in September 2025 the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Force of 1,650 personnel, planned for 2026. However, this initiative is largely seen as symbolic and insufficient to reverse the short-term security trend, especially in the absence of the three countries most affected by terrorism.

The establishment of the AES thus represents an ambitious attempt by these three states to take control of their security destiny, freeing themselves from both traditional regional structures and Western partners. The institutional consolidation observed in February 2026, with the validation of the multi-year roadmap and increased coordination between the ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Development, suggests a desire to transform this tactical alliance into a sustainable political and economic structure.

Nevertheless, several major challenges remain. First, the military capabilities of the three countries remain limited, despite the acquisition of new equipment and the strengthening of personnel. The Niya and Damissa operations in Niger, as well as the Malian airstrikes, certainly demonstrate sustained operational activity, but the strategic effectiveness of these interventions remains to be proven against insurgent groups that master asymmetric warfare and possess in-depth knowledge of the terrain.

Second, the growing dependence on Russia, although presented as a diversification of partnerships, carries its own risks. The recent investigation into the SVR's influence operations reveals the extent of Russian penetration into the decision-making structures of these countries, raising questions about the actual sovereignty of these states. Moreover, unlike France, which maintained a substantial military presence with Operation Barkhane, Russia seems to favor a more economic approach in terms of force deployment while maximizing its political and informational influence.

Third, the break with ECOWAS and the resulting regional isolation could have significant economic consequences for these countries, already among the poorest in the world. The creation of an alternative Sahelian confederation will not be able to compensate in the short term for the advantages of the West African common market and the cooperation mechanisms established within ECOWAS for decades.

In conclusion, the ministerial meeting in Ouagadougou in February 2026 marks an important symbolic step in the construction of the Alliance of Sahel States. The finalization of an ambitious roadmap covering defense, diplomacy, and development reflects a medium-term strategic vision. However, the operational reality on the ground remains concerning, with a persistent terrorist threat and an increasingly pervasive foreign influence – notably Russian. The coming months will be crucial in assessing whether this Sahelian alliance will succeed in translating its institutional ambitions into tangible security results, or if it merely represents another step in the political and security fragmentation of this crucial region of West Africa.