American Strikes in Sokoto Reveal AFRICOM's New Strategy in the Sahel

On December 25, 2025, in the Bauni forest, at the Niger-Nigeria border, American bombers struck what AFRICOM described as positions of the Islamic State. More than 100 fighters were killed, according to local sources. However, Bauni does not harbor ISIS. It is the sanctuary of Lakurawa, a hybrid jihadi-criminal group linked to the JAS faction of Boko Haram — the rival of ISWAP.

One Strike, Two Narratives

The operation in Sokoto is not a simple targeting error. It embodies the contradiction between what AFRICOM claims to be doing (fighting the Islamic State) and what it is actually doing (reaffirming its military presence in Africa under Trump's mandate). The American president justified the strikes by the need to stop an alleged "genocide of Christians" in Nigeria — a claim denied by all credible observers.

Sokoto is a state with an overwhelming Muslim majority. The victims of the attacks there are primarily Muslims, killed by bandits or criminal groups. ISIS does not operate there. Yet, Washington chose this theater for its first kinetic intervention on Nigerian soil in decades.

Lakurawa: When Crime Drapes Itself in Jihad

Emerging in 2017-2018 in the border areas of Sokoto and Kebbi, the fighters that locals call "Lakurawa" (likely a Hausa distortion of the French "les recrues") are Sahelian militants from Niger. Unlike ISWAP, they do not pledge allegiance to the global caliphate. Their operational pragmatism brings them closer to JAS, the historical faction of Boko Haram led by Bakura Modu.

On the ground, Lakurawa operates as a hybrid: economic predation (taxing villages, controlling roads), community recruitment (marginalized Fulani), and Islamist rhetoric. This flexibility allows them to survive where more rigid groups fail.

The Bauni forest, 15 km from the Nigerien border, serves as a rear base. From there, Lakurawa launches raids on villages in Sokoto and Kebbi, imposes "taxes," and recruits. The links with JAS are documented: shared fighters, weapons circulating from the Lake Chad basin to the northwest, tactical coordination against Nigerian forces.

The Forceful Return of AFRICOM

But why now? And why Sokoto? The answer lies in three words: loss of influence. In 2024, the Nigerien junta expelled American forces from Air Base 201 in Niamey, AFRICOM's drone surveillance hub for the entire Sahel. Meanwhile, Russia is expanding its footprint: Wagner in Mali, Central African Republic, military cooperation with Burkina Faso.

Under the second Trump administration and new Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, AFRICOM gained more autonomy for kinetic operations. The strikes in Sokoto were a signal: America is back, and it will be "much more aggressive" in Africa, according to the command's own words.

The choice of Nigeria is not trivial. It is Africa's most populous power, a strategic ally, and a country where insecurity has reached a level that even the Muslim populations in the north are beginning to accept the idea of foreign intervention. The Nigerian government, caught between American threats of sanctions and the risk of humiliation if Washington acted alone, yielded.

Jabo, or the Blind Spot of the "Precision Strike"

But there was Jabo. This village has no documented history of terrorist activity. Yet, it was hit. Nigerian authorities quickly spoke of "debris," trying to minimize what looks like a targeting error or the application of faulty intelligence.

For the Muslim communities in Sokoto — whose sultan is the spiritual leader of Nigerian Muslims — the impact on Jabo confirmed their worst fears: that American rhetoric about "Christian genocide" masks an anti-Islam hostility. This is exactly the type of perception that fuels jihadi recruitment and fractures local cooperation — essential for any sustainable counter-terrorism strategy.

What Sokoto Tells Us About the Future

From experience, I know that an airstrike without a follow-up ground operation only disperses the enemy. Lakurawa lost personnel, but the group has already intensified its attacks against civilians in the weeks following the strikes. Without a permanent Nigerian presence in the Bauni forest, the effect will be temporary.

More broadly, the operation in Sokoto marks AFRICOM's return to an interventionist posture. After Nigeria, the United States has intensified its strikes in Somalia (23 operations in 27 days in early 2026) and resumed discussions with Mali — a country that had shifted towards Moscow. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, security cooperation talks took place in January.

This forceful reaffirmation carries risks. African governments, under diplomatic or economic pressure, may accept operations that undermine their internal legitimacy. Targeting errors — real or perceived — fuel sectarian tensions. And the use of simplistic narratives ("ISIS" everywhere, "Christian genocide") obscures the complexity of local conflicts, making sustainable solutions more difficult.

Sokoto is not Barkhane, but it is a warning. When great powers treat Africa as a battleground for geopolitical competition, it is the civilians who pay. And the jihadists who recruit.