The Deep Impact of Xi Jinping's Military Purge: The PLA Command Structure Faces Serious Deficiencies

In February 2026, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) issued a striking warning in its annual Military Balance report: the anti-corruption purge currently underway in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has caused "serious deficiencies" in its command structure and is likely to affect the overall combat readiness of the military. This assessment marks the first time the international defense community has so directly questioned the substantive impact of Xi Jinping's military rectification campaign on the PLA's operational capabilities.

Since 2022, Xi has initiated a second round of large-scale military purges, the scale and depth of which far exceed any previous rectification campaign. According to the latest data analysis from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) China Power Project, at least 36 generals and lieutenant generals have been officially purged, with the total number—including confirmed and potential purges—reaching an astonishing 101. Behind this figure is a systematic restructuring of the senior leadership of the Chinese military.

Most concerning is the level and position of those being purged. In January 2026, Xi's long-time ally, Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, was subjected to a disciplinary investigation; prior to that, in October 2025, another Vice Chairman, He Weidong, was dismissed. This has left the originally seven-member highest military command body, the Central Military Commission, with only two active leaders: Xi himself and the newly promoted Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin. Such a power vacuum is extremely rare in the modern history of the Chinese military.

Even more noteworthy are the structural characteristics of the purges. CSIS's analysis shows that 61% of officials in the active senior PLA leadership database come from the operational command sequence. Among the purged members of the Central Military Commission, as much as 80% held key operational positions. This means that the current Central Military Commission has no military leaders from the operational sequence—representing a serious capability gap for a military that is advancing modernization and preparing to respond to potential crises.

The scope of the purge extends far beyond the Central Military Commission. It spans theater command headquarters, various military branches, weapons procurement systems, equipment development projects, and defense academic institutions. The IISS report clearly states: "From an organizational perspective, there are serious deficiencies in the PLA's command structure until these vacancies are filled." This assessment directly challenges the Chinese official narrative that "military readiness is not affected."

In early February, when Xi addressed the PLA via video, he unusually acknowledged the existence of the purges, stating: "The past year has been unusual and extraordinary. The people's army has deepened political education, effectively responded to various risks and challenges, and undergone revolutionary tempering in the anti-corruption struggle." This statement serves both as a defense of the purge and an indication of the internal turmoil that indeed exists.

From a strategic perspective, this purge presents three core characteristics. First, political loyalty takes precedence over professional capability. In rebuilding the PLA's senior command, Xi must find a balance between political reliability and military professionalism, and current signs indicate that the former is dominating. Second, there is a dramatic narrowing of the pool of potential candidates. The large-scale purges have significantly reduced the number of qualified senior officers available for Xi to choose from, which may affect the PLA's ability to cultivate experienced operational commanders to respond to modernization and crisis management. Third, the reconstruction process is likely to be long-term. Both IISS and CSIS believe that fully filling these vacancies and rebuilding an effective command structure may take years.

Meanwhile, China's defense spending and military activities have not slowed. IISS data shows that by 2025, China's defense spending accounted for nearly 44% of military expenditures in the Asia-Pacific region, up from an average of 37% between 2010 and 2020. The PLA's deployments in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly around Taiwan, have continued to increase through 2025, demonstrating an aggressive military posture. The contrast between this strategic intent and internal organizational chaos constitutes the core paradox currently facing the PLA.

For international observers, the key question is: if personnel are promoted based on connections rather than capability, or if there are equipment deficiencies and morale issues, then this purge "is almost certain to have near-term effects." Although IISS emphasizes that these effects are "temporary" and believes that the modernization process will continue, the PLA's operational readiness is undoubtedly in a fragile window in the short term.

From a broader geopolitical context, this purge occurs at a time when China faces numerous external pressures: heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait, ongoing border standoffs with India, unresolved disputes in the South China Sea, and intensified strategic competition with the United States. In such an environment, a PLA that is internally undergoing restructuring may have its deterrent effectiveness and actual combat capabilities called into question.

Xi's military purge, ostensibly conducted in the name of anti-corruption and enhancing loyalty, has a deeper logic of consolidating personal absolute control over the military by undermining the existing power structure. However, the cost of this approach is a temporary decline in organizational effectiveness and confusion within the command system. For a military that is in a transitional phase, attempting to shift from quantity to quality, this cost may be heavier than it appears on the surface.

In the coming years, observing how the PLA rebuilds its senior command structure, how it balances political loyalty with professional capability, and how these changes affect its decision-making efficiency at critical moments will be key indicators for understanding the true state of China's military power. For regional security dynamics, an internally unstable PLA may be perceived as an opportunity due to its weakness, or it may take more reckless actions due to a compensatory mindset. This uncertainty is the greatest strategic risk currently at play.