The Depth and Cost of the PLA's High-Level Purge: CSIS Report Reveals 52% of Leadership Positions Affected

On February 25, 2026, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington released a new research report revealing the unprecedented scale of high-level purges occurring within the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China. This report, co-authored by nine prominent Chinese military experts, indicates that since 2022, at least 101 PLA generals have been purged or are suspected of being purged, with the breadth and depth of the impact beginning to have a substantial effect on the PLA's operational readiness and command structure.

The report points out that among the 176 high-level leadership positions in the PLA, the proportion of affected positions reaches as high as 52% when considering instances of multiple purges in certain roles. This figure is shocking and fully demonstrates the depth of Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign and the unprecedented personnel turmoil within the PLA leadership. M. Taylor Fravel, director of the Security Studies Program at MIT, wrote in the report: "This number is astonishing and extraordinary, showcasing the depth of Xi Jinping's campaign and the unprecedented personnel turnover in the PLA leadership."

Since 2022, 36 generals and lieutenant generals have been officially purged, with an additional 65 officers listed as missing or suspected of being purged. These numbers do not include lower-ranking officers. In January of this year, Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign even reached the highest levels of the military—Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia and Chief of Staff of the Joint Operations Command Center Liu Zhenli were both announced to be under investigation. Zhang Youxia is one of Xi Jinping's most trusted generals, and his downfall marks a significant deepening of the purge into the core of power.

The impact of the purges on the PLA's theater command structure is particularly significant. The report shows that 56 deputy commanders of the theater have been purged, reducing the talent pool available to succeed the five theater commanders by over 33%. This substantial loss of high-level command talent directly weakens the PLA's ability to execute complex military operations. Bonny Lin, one of the report's authors and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, noted that this impact may already be reflected in the PLA's state of readiness. She observed that the military exercises conducted by the PLA in 2025 regarding Taiwan's "problematic behavior" took 19 days and 12 days from decision-making to execution, while similar exercises in 2024 only required 4 days.

For Taiwan Strait security, this report contains both positive signals and warnings. In the short term, the large-scale purges severely weaken the PLA's ability to launch complex military operations, particularly amphibious assaults on Taiwan. Such "extremely complex and risky" operations require a highly coordinated command structure and experienced generals, both of which the PLA currently lacks. John Culver of the Brookings Institution wrote: "Xi Jinping's evident lack of confidence in his military is a good thing from the perspective of deterring invasion by the U.S. and Taiwan."

However, the authors of the report also caution against underestimating the PLA's capabilities. For the Taiwan issue, less complex military options—such as maritime blockades and limited strikes—remain within the PLA's capabilities. Culver pointed out: "If Taiwan or the U.S. crosses the red line for military action, China has many options to punish, teach a lesson, and declare its victory, and these options do not require highly coordinated command and control." CSIS analyst Thomas Christensen also warned: "China remains very capable of taking action to attack Taiwan and could ruin an entire day for the U.S. in the process."

Even more concerning is the potential "information distortion" effect that the purges may bring. Newly promoted generals may hesitate to report bad news upwards for fear of repeating the mistakes of their predecessors, which is extremely dangerous in crisis management. Christensen wrote: "This is dangerous for crisis management because it may lead Xi Jinping to have unrealistic confidence in his military capabilities during future emergencies." This phenomenon is not new in Chinese history—when decision-makers are surrounded by information that only reports good news, they often make catastrophic misjudgments.

From a longer-term perspective, the negative impacts of the purges may be alleviated by the late 2020s. Joel Wuthnow, a senior researcher at the National Defense University, believes that by then, newly promoted officers will have accumulated more experience within Xi Jinping's modernization equipment and training system, and their cooperation with Xi will become more tacit, potentially boosting their confidence and expected success rates. At that time, China's adversaries may need to be more vigilant.

Notably, some experts believe that Xi's decision to conduct large-scale purges at this time also has strategic considerations. The current U.S. government's attention is not focused on the Taiwan issue, with its security priorities elsewhere in the world, providing Xi with a rare strategic window to reorganize the military. Meanwhile, the CIA also released a recruitment video on February 12, specifically targeting Chinese officers, attempting to develop intelligence sources amid the PLA's internal purges.

This unprecedented military purge reflects Xi Jinping's pursuit of absolute control but also exposes deep-seated corruption issues within China's military modernization process. Corruption has permeated multiple levels of the PLA, from equipment procurement to promotion systems. While the anti-corruption campaign has weakened the PLA's combat capabilities in the short term, if a cleaner and more efficient military system can be established, it may enhance China's military strength in the long run. However, this all hinges on whether the new leadership can avoid the cultural traps of "one-man rule" and "reporting only good news"—which is not an easy task in China's political environment.

Currently, the PLA is undergoing a critical transformation period. On one hand, the chaos in the command structure and the experience gap caused by large-scale personnel changes will take time to repair; on the other hand, Xi's military modernization agenda has not stalled due to the purges. This contradictory state makes the regional security situation in the coming years full of uncertainty. For the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, and other relevant parties, it is essential to seize the current window of opportunity presented by the PLA's declining readiness to strengthen defensive preparations while also preparing for a potentially more confident and combat-ready PLA by the late 2020s.