The Depth and Impact of the PLA's High-Level Purge: Concerns About Combat Readiness Revealed by Dual Reports from CSIS and IISS

On February 25, 2026, two heavyweight research reports were released almost simultaneously, bringing the unprecedented high-level purge currently underway in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) into the spotlight of international military analysis. The latest studies from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London reveal that since 2022, the scale and depth of the PLA's high-level purge far exceed previous external estimates, profoundly impacting the command structure and operational capabilities of the world's largest standing army.

**Scale of the Purge: Over Half of Senior General Positions Affected**

The report titled "The Internal Purge of the Chinese Military is Deeper Than You Think," released by the CSIS China Power Project, provides the most detailed data analysis to date. The report shows that since 2022, a total of 101 generals and lieutenant generals have been purged or are suspected of being purged, accounting for 52% of senior leadership positions in the PLA. Among them, 36 have been officially announced as purged, while another 65 have been absent from important meetings and public events for an extended period.

The astonishing aspect of this figure lies in its breadth. The purge has affected the Central Military Commission, the command of the five theater commands, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force, as well as various fields such as weapons procurement, research and development projects, and the defense academic community. The Rocket Force has been hit the hardest, closely related to the corruption investigation in equipment procurement that was exposed in 2023. In terms of time distribution, the purge has shown a clear acceleration trend: only 1 person was purged in 2022, reaching 62 in 2025, and 11 in the first two months of 2026.

**High-Level Turmoil: Power Vacuum in the Central Military Commission**

What shocked the outside world the most was the investigation of two members of the Central Military Commission last month. In January 2026, Zhang Youxia, Xi Jinping's deputy and vice chairman of the Military Commission, was investigated for serious violations of discipline and law. As Xi Jinping's lifelong close friend and long-term ally, Zhang Youxia's downfall is seen by analysts as the most significant case of the purge to date. Almost simultaneously, Liu Zhenli, the chief of staff of the Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department, was also investigated.

The symbolic significance of these two cases is profound. In 2022, there were 7 members in the Central Military Commission, and now only Xi Jinping and one other general remain. This level of personnel attrition in the PLA's highest decision-making body is unprecedented. M. Taylor Fravel, director of the Security Studies Program at MIT, pointed out in the CSIS report: "This number is shocking, demonstrating the depth of Xi Jinping's campaign and the unprecedented personnel changes in the PLA leadership."

Even more concerning is that 61% of those purged come from the operational command sequence. In the Central Military Commission, 80% of the purged officials held key operational positions. This means that the current Military Commission has no military leaders from the operational command sequence—an extremely unusual phenomenon for an army that claims to be preparing for potential large-scale combat operations.

**Questioning Combat Readiness: Can They Fight?**

The IISS explicitly stated in its annual "Military Balance" report that the purge has caused "serious deficiencies" in the PLA's command structure and may negatively impact troop readiness. The report believes that while these effects are "temporary," they do indeed exist at this stage.

Of the 52 key military leadership positions, only 11 have currently been filled. This high vacancy rate has raised serious doubts about the PLA's ability to conduct large-scale complex operations, especially regarding potential military actions against Taiwan. Thomas J. Christensen, a professor of public and international affairs at Columbia University, wrote in the CSIS report: "Xi Jinping's apparent distrust of the military is advantageous for deterring invasion from the perspective of the U.S. and Taiwan." However, he also noted that implementing a blockade against Taiwan remains "relatively easy."

Drew Thompson, a senior research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, raised a critical question: "In an army that has had almost no significant combat experience since the 1979 war with Vietnam and is extremely opaque, how do you assess its real combat capability?" "The greater concern is the quality and experience of newly promoted officers," said the former director of China, Taiwan, and Mongolia affairs at the U.S. Department of Defense. "Are they capable of doing the job? Do they have the motivation to do it well? These are all unresolved questions."

**The Dilemma of Loyalty and Capability: Xi Jinping's Military Restructuring**

The CSIS report points out that while corruption is often cited as the official reason for the purge, experts believe other factors are at play, including job performance, policy disagreements, or loyalty issues. Notably, many of those purged were officials personally selected and rapidly promoted by Xi Jinping, as well as lifelong allies like Zhang Youxia.

In a rare public mention of the purge during a video speech this month, Xi Jinping stated that the military has become stronger in the past year due to the anti-corruption struggle, and that grassroots troops are "trustworthy." This statement serves both as a defense of the legitimacy of the purge and as an indication of his heightened concern for rebuilding loyalty within the military.

The IISS report concluded: "The scope and depth of these purges demonstrate Xi Jinping's determination to reshape the PLA." However, the report also acknowledged that understanding internal developments is "at best partial." This opacity itself increases the difficulty of external assessments.

**Future Outlook: How Long Will Reconstruction Take?**

Both reports believe that the purge is not yet over. CSIS researchers point out that Xi Jinping now faces the task of rebuilding the PLA's high command after a large-scale purge. In this process, he is likely to prioritize political loyalty over capability. The sharp reduction in the pool of candidates may also affect the PLA's speed in cultivating experienced operational commanders, which is crucial for military modernization and crisis response.

The CSIS report noted that so far, the leadership purge does not appear to have significantly disrupted the PLA's normal functions or operations. However, the high vacancy rate and personnel turmoil have undoubtedly had a negative impact on morale and trust. Replacing such a large number of experienced leaders will take time, raising questions about China's ability to conduct large-scale military operations.

From a broader perspective, this purge reflects the core contradiction in Xi Jinping's military governance philosophy: on one hand, the need to build a modernized military capable of fighting and winning; on the other hand, the necessity to ensure that this military is absolutely loyal to the Party and to him personally. When these two goals conflict, loyalty clearly takes precedence. The long-term implications of this choice may only become apparent when the PLA truly faces significant military challenges.