Military Senior Cadre Class Graduates in June, PLA Takes Stock of Cadres Before Its Centenary

On June 16, the first session of the military senior cadre training class graduated at the National Defense University. On the surface, this news appears to be political, but I am more concerned with two details: first, the attendance and speech by Zhang Shengmin, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission; second, the official release places "political education" and "military training and preparation, planning and construction" in the same sentence. For the modernization of the PLA, this is not just a matter of the order of slogans, but a recalibration of the equipment, training, and procurement systems as the military approaches its centenary.

Xinhua News Agency and the People's Daily reported that Zhang Shengmin called for consolidating and deepening training results, continuously strengthening revolutionary forging, earnestly fulfilling political responsibilities in party governance, and solidly advancing military training, preparation, and planning work. The South China Morning Post subsequently interpreted this training class in the context of military anti-corruption and high-level rectification, considering it a rare concentrated training for senior military officers across the entire army. When these two threads are viewed together, the focus is not merely on "holding another meeting," but rather that the military leadership is addressing cadre management, anti-corruption, combat readiness, and the five-year plan as interconnected issues.

Why Focus on Senior Cadres First

The PLA has updated its equipment rapidly in recent years. The J-20, Type 055 destroyer, DF-17, Fujian aircraft carrier's electromagnetic catapult system, and various unmanned platforms have all raised the hardware threshold significantly. However, the faster the hardware is updated, the greater the pressure on the management chain. Who decides procurement priorities, who inspects complex systems, who bears training risks, and who is responsible for maintenance support and ammunition stockpiles—these questions ultimately fall on senior cadres.

In simple terms, modernization does not end with piling new equipment at the unit's doorstep. If a brigade replaces its air defense system but continues to train and assess using old methods, the coordination between radar, command vehicles, launch vehicles, and data links will become mere theoretical capability. If a fleet acquires more long-range platforms but the budget for supplies, crew rotations, and equipment maintenance is not synchronized and transparent, the operational rate will quickly decline. Political education may sound far removed from technology, but it actually touches on the organizational issue of "who is responsible for combat effectiveness."

Anti-Corruption Affects Procurement and Training Rhythm

This round of training, set against the backdrop of military anti-corruption, should not be understood merely as a personal investigation. In recent years, the Rocket Force, equipment development system, and military academies have all experienced varying degrees of personnel upheaval. Public information is limited, and the outside world should not interpret every adjustment as a conspiracy, but one thing is certain: large equipment projects fear not slow progress, but an unreliable decision-making chain.

If there are gray areas in the procurement process, the troops will receive unsuitable equipment; if the inspection process only looks at documents, problems will be exposed on the training ground; if the budget is fragmented, ammunition, spare parts, and simulators will often be in shorter supply than the main equipment. Li Minghui has consistently emphasized that military industrial capability should be assessed not only by production capacity but also by post-delivery support capability. What anti-corruption and training truly affect are precisely those aspects that are not easily showcased in promotional videos.

Three Observable Signals

• First, observe whether the military procurement announcements in the second half of 2026 emphasize the entire life cycle, maintenance support, and training compatibility, rather than just individual equipment metrics.
• Second, see if the public training reports of new equipment units reduce "showcase" displays and increase cross-service, complex electromagnetic environment, and logistics support subjects.
• Third, examine whether the personnel arrangements in the military a century ago continue to regard discipline inspection, training, and equipment management experience as important qualifications for senior positions.

These signals are more explanatory than slogans. For example, a set of unmanned swarm systems can be promoted with discussions of intelligent algorithms and swarm numbers, but what truly determines combat value is the anti-jamming link, low-cost consumable supply, on-site maintenance, and whether commanders are willing to use them. If the cadre system only rewards "no accidents" and "good-looking data," unmanned equipment is likely to become a demonstration project; if assessments genuinely target real combat closed loops, the supply chain and training methods will change accordingly.

The Centenary of the PLA Is Not Just a Simple Parade Milestone

2027 is often oversimplified by outsiders as a timeline for the Taiwan Strait, but this characterization is too crude. For the PLA internally, the centenary is more like a milestone for phased acceptance: to what extent have mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization been integrated, can the military branches share target data, and can the Rocket Force, Navy, Air Force, and strategic support forces form stable joint operational processes?

The issue is that the more joint operations are conducted, the more they rely on the horizontal coordination capabilities of the cadre level. In the past, a single service could solve most problems within its own system; now, a long-range strike chain may simultaneously involve satellite reconnaissance, electronic suppression, drone relays, ship launch units, and land-based firepower. If any link retains data for departmental interests, falsely reports training results, or understates failure rates, it will ultimately reflect on battlefield efficiency.

I believe that the most noteworthy aspect of Zhang Shengmin's speech is not the word "loyalty" itself, but its simultaneous appearance with "planning and construction." Political loyalty is a prerequisite in the official context, but from a technical management perspective, it also means that the Central Military Commission needs to tighten control over dispersed equipment, budgets, and training authority. This process may improve execution consistency but could also lead to new conservative tendencies. Cadres, fearing mistakes, may be less willing to try new tactics; those fearing accountability may hide real failures behind polished reports.

Shortcomings Still Exist at the Organizational Level

China's military industry currently does not lack breakthroughs at individual points. What is lacking is the organizational capability to turn these breakthroughs into sustainable combat effectiveness. Technical shortcomings such as engine lifespan, chip reliability, composite material consistency, and long-range maintenance capabilities already exist; if opaque procurement and formalistic training are added, these shortcomings will be magnified. Conversely, if training can enforce responsibility, reduce ineffective projects, and encourage troops to report real problems, its contribution to combat effectiveness may be greater than the outside world imagines.

Therefore, the graduation ceremony on June 16 is not a minor political news item. It reminds us that when observing the PLA's modernization, we cannot focus solely on new aircraft, new ships, and new missiles. What truly determines the state of the PLA around 2027 may be more mundane matters: how budgets are spent, how cadres are selected, how failures are reported, and whether training data is inflated. The unanswered question is whether political education can make the troops more willing to expose problems rather than better at hiding them.

Source Explanation

This article synthesizes reports from Xinhua News Agency on June 16 regarding the graduation ceremony of the first session of the military senior cadre training class, the People's Daily's reprinted press release, the Ministry of Defense's information on the opening of the senior cadre training class on April 8, and the South China Morning Post's report on the background of high-level rectification in the PLA on June 17.