The historic offensive of April 25 in Mali: the FLA-JNIM alliance shatters the myth of the Russian-Malian security model

On Saturday, April 25, 2026, just before dawn, Mali plunged into what many observers are already calling the most coordinated and devastating offensive the country has experienced since at least 2012. At 5:20 AM GMT, two explosions were heard near Kati, the military base that is the nerve center of the ruling junta, located about fifteen kilometers north of Bamako. Within the same hour, automatic gunfire and detonations were reported at Bamako's Modibo-Keïta International Airport, in the northern cities of Kidal and Gao, as well as in Sévaré and Mopti in the central part of the country. In just a few minutes, Mali found itself simultaneously at war on five distinct geographical fronts, revealing an unprecedented degree of operational planning and inter-group coordination in the recent history of the Sahel.

The uniqueness of this offensive lies in the unprecedented tactical alliance between two movements that had previously followed parallel trajectories: the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a Tuareg-dominated rebel coalition pursuing independence for northern Mali, and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the Sahelian branch of Al-Qaeda and the most formidable jihadist formation in West Africa. FLA spokesperson Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane confirmed to the BBC that this operation had been long in preparation in consultation with JNIM. This coordination between an ethno-nationalist separatist movement and a global jihadist network represents a major geopolitical turning point, the ramifications of which extend far beyond Mali's borders.

The fall of Kidal undoubtedly represents the hardest blow dealt to the regime of General Assimi Goïta. This city in the northern desert, the spiritual capital of the Azawad movement, had been recaptured by the Malian army and Russian Africa Corps forces in November 2023 after violent fighting. This recapture was celebrated by Bamako as irrefutable proof that the partnership with Moscow was yielding concrete results where Western approaches had failed. However, on April 25, the FLA regained control of Kidal, forcing the Africa Corps units to retreat. The provincial governor and his staff took refuge in the former MINUSMA compound, the UN mission from which the junta had demanded departure in December 2023. Images circulated on social media, corroborated by several open-source intelligence monitors, showed FLA fighters patrolling the streets of Kidal and seizing abandoned military positions. A Malian Mi-35 helicopter was reportedly shot down over Gao, which, if confirmed, would signify a significant degradation of Bamako's air capabilities in the north.

The most strategic dimension of this offensive, however, plays out around Kati and Bamako. Kati is not just a military base: it is the political and symbolic heart of the junta's power. It was from Kati that the coups d'état of 2020 and 2021 were launched. It is where General Goïta maintains his private residence and where the highest military and intelligence officials of the country are stationed. Residents of Kati described sustained exchanges of gunfire and explosions of deafening intensity that lasted throughout the morning. It was precisely during the assault on Kati that the Minister of Defense, General Sadio Camara, lost his life. At 47 years old, a former student of Russian military academies, Camara was considered the architect of Bamako's strategic pivot towards Moscow and the ousting of the former colonial power, France. He was killed when a truck bomb was driven into his residence in Kati. His death was confirmed by the Malian government spokesperson on April 26. Official funerals were held on April 30 in Bamako, attended by the defense ministers of Niger and Burkina Faso, Mali's partners within the Sahel States Alliance (AES), during which General Goïta, in combat uniform, bowed before the coffin draped in the Malian flag.

Moscow's reaction was swift but revealing of underlying tensions. On April 30, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian forces would remain in Mali and continue to fight against extremism, terrorism, and other negative manifestations. However, the withdrawal of the Africa Corps from Kidal, confirmed by the Russian paramilitary unit itself on April 27, fueled speculation about a potential broader disengagement. Malian officials accused Russian forces of betrayal following the fall of Kidal, according to RFI. The Africa Corps, a unit of the Russian Ministry of Defense that replaced the Wagner Group after the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023, was estimated to have between 200 and over 400 personnel in Mali. Faced with a rebel and jihadist coalition whose combined numbers are estimated to be between 10,000 and 12,000 fighters, according to the Africa Corps itself, the ground balance of power appears increasingly unbalanced.

Territorially, Malian losses are considerable. In addition to Kidal, now under FLA control, JNIM has claimed total or partial control of Mopti, Sévaré, and Gao, three strategic cities in the center and north. Tessit, in the Gao region, fell into JNIM hands on April 27. Meanwhile, the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) took advantage of the chaos to seize Labbezanga, a border post between Mali and Niger, and to amass forces around Ménaka. The Malian army claimed to have repelled attacks on Kati and Bamako, asserting the neutralization of several hundred assailants, figures that are independently unverifiable. A curfew from 9 PM to 6 AM was imposed in the capital for three consecutive nights, and the international airport was temporarily closed.

The international community reacted with an intensity proportional to the scale of the crisis. UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed deep concern and called for coordinated international support to address the growing threat of violent extremism in the Sahel. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, condemned the attacks in the strongest terms. The U.S. State Department did the same, calling for solidarity with the Malian people. France, through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, urged its citizens to leave Mali.

Beyond the security emergency, this offensive raises a fundamental question: is the Russo-Sahelian security model viable? The Malian junta came to power in 2020 on the promise of restoring security. Six years later, after the expulsion of French forces, the UN, and the European training mission, the country finds itself in a worse situation than ever. The Sahel States Alliance, formed by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in 2023, has not demonstrated its ability to contain jihadist expansion. Joint operations between Senegal and Mali in Kayes and Diboli in 2025, as well as mutual interventions between Niger and Burkina Faso, suggest that bilateral regional cooperation could be more effective than large institutional alliances, but these initiatives remain fragmented in the face of an adversary that, as demonstrated by the April 25 offensive, has achieved a remarkable level of coordination.

The immediate future of Mali now hinges on the junta's ability to rebuild a credible strategy after the trauma of Kati and the loss of its Minister of Defense. Will Moscow's promise to maintain its forces on the ground reassure a traumatized population? Nothing is less certain. The offensive of April 25, 2026, will likely be remembered as the moment when the security edifice built by the junta and its Russian allies showed its deepest flaws, revealing the illusion of stability achieved solely through military force without underlying political resolution.