The Houthi Attack on Taiz and the Al-Mokha Port Reshapes the Bab al-Mandab Battle in 2026

On September 10, the Houthis seized control of the Al-Mokha port on Yemen's western coast, and after weeks, the battle reached the roads and southwestern highlands of Taiz city. What was revealed by a field visit from the BBC on September 27 is not just a new round in an old civil war, but a Houthi attempt to build a land and military connection between their areas of influence in the north and the Red Sea, while keeping the Bab al-Mandab Strait under direct pressure. Practically, the fall of Al-Mokha not only gives the group a port but also places them operationally closer to the shipping lanes connecting Europe to Asia.

Taiz is the Unpassable Knot

The government forces maintain control of central Taiz, while Houthi positions are spread to the north and east of the city, with the fiercest battles concentrated in the western highlands overlooking the road heading south. If the Houthis tighten their grip on these highlands, the ability of government forces to launch an attack to retake Al-Mokha will be significantly weakened. Taiz, with a population nearing one million, is not just a symbolic city; it is a junction between Houthi areas in the north and government areas in the south, and thus surrounding it puts military and political pressure on the government simultaneously.

BBC correspondents reported that drones sometimes precede shelling by minutes, and that government fighters spoke of the bodies of 18 of their comrades remaining in an area that is under fire and inaccessible. These small details explain the nature of the fighting more than military data: the Houthis use reconnaissance and drone attacks to pin down the enemy, then leverage the high ground and mortars to force them to stay in their positions.

Cheap Drones Impose an Expensive War

The Houthis have cumulative experience in combining drones, missiles, and mortars, while the government side relies on a force distributed among local units and competing leaders. The road from Aden to Taiz passes through about 30 checkpoints belonging to different formations, which is a sign of leadership and control issues before it is a problem of weapon shortages. The Saudi-led coalition can provide ammunition and air support, but it cannot create a cohesive Yemeni military institution in a single day.

Here, the triangle of capability that Gulf purchases often overlook emerges: equipment, training, and institution. The kingdom possesses aircraft, missiles, and reconnaissance networks, but the forces expected to retake the land need unified command, regular supply, and the ability to hold positions after capturing them. Otherwise, airstrikes become a means to delay Houthi advances rather than a plan to end the war.

Bab al-Mandab Has Become a Hostage to Yemeni Geography

The importance of Al-Mokha does not come from the size of the port alone. Control of the coast and the highlands overlooking it gives the Houthis the ability to monitor land and sea corridors and threaten ships or extort powers that rely on the safety of Bab al-Mandab. The fear of supply disruptions has already reflected on oil prices. If pressure on Bab al-Mandab coincides with the closure or disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf countries will face a double choke in energy arteries, no matter how many Patriot and THAAD batteries they possess.

This point does not receive enough attention in Western analysis. Air defense protects a specific facility from a missile or drone, but it does not guarantee freedom of navigation nor does it prevent a small adversary from planting mines or threatening ships near a long coastline. The security of Bab al-Mandab requires coastal intelligence, light naval forces, continuous monitoring, and a Yemeni partner capable of operating after the withdrawal of foreign forces. Purchasing a new platform does not address this gap.

Iranian Support and Saudi Response

Saudi Arabia, Western countries, and UN experts accuse Iran of providing weapons, funding, and advice to the Houthis, while Tehran denies supplying weapons and claims it offers political support. This equation does not need to resolve all its details to be impactful; the Houthis have proven that unequal lines of support can transform a local group into a player that threatens facilities, cities, and ships at great distances.

Meanwhile, Riyadh supports the Yemeni government with weapons and air cover, and Britain has provided support for air refueling for Saudi fighters conducting defensive operations against Houthi attacks. However, the expansion of external assistance does not necessarily equate to an improvement in local capability. Unless the issue of division among the forces is resolved, Saudi Arabia will remain tasked with guarding its borders and facilities and Bab al-Mandab simultaneously, while the Houthis retain the advantage of choosing the time and place.

Civilians Pay the Price of the Equation

The United Nations reported that more than 130,000 people were displaced within Yemen during September alone, on top of 5.2 million displaced due to the war. In Al-Thawra Hospital in Taiz, beds were filled with fighters and civilians, including a twelve-year-old girl who was injured by shrapnel from a mortar while tending goats. This is not a humanitarian backdrop separate from military calculations; displacement empties areas of their populations, gives fighters more room to maneuver, and increases families' dependence on armed groups that control aid and routes.

The truce that largely held for four years has effectively ended with the Al-Mokha attack. There are currently no indications that either side possesses the strength or incentive to impose a settlement. The Houthis want to turn coastal gains into political depth, the government wants to retake Taiz city before it is besieged, and Saudi Arabia wants to prevent the fire from spreading to its borders and energy corridors.

In my estimation, the real question is not whether the Houthis can occupy Taiz tomorrow, but whether they can make the city, Al-Mokha, and Bab al-Mandab a permanent war of attrition. If they succeed, Riyadh may have purchased a lot of weapons but will remain unable to buy geography. In the region's wars, whoever controls the road, the port, and the time possesses a negotiating power that sometimes exceeds that of those who own the most expensive aircraft.

Sources

• BBC News, Inside Yemen's front-line city as Houthis battle for control, September 27, 2026.
• Al Jazeera, Iran war live Tehran open to real diplomacy, ready for apocalyptic war, September 28, 2026.
• UNHCR, displacement data within Yemen referenced in the BBC report.