The jihadist offensive of April 25, 2026 in Mali: a strategic break for the Sahel and its external partners

Since April 25, 2026, Mali has been the scene of the most significant jihadist offensive since the Tuareg rebellion of 2012. Coordinated attacks, jointly led by the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), struck simultaneously in Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Gao, Sévaré, Mopti, and Bourem. These synchronized operations inflicted an unprecedented strategic setback on the Malian junta and its Russian partners from Africa Corps, while exposing the structural fragilities of the Sahelian security model.

The offensive began shortly before 5:20 AM, when explosions and heavy gunfire echoed in the Mamaribougou neighborhood of Kati, the heart of Malian military power located about fifteen kilometers from the capital. A car bomb was detonated against the residence of Defense Minister Sadio Camara, resulting in his death along with that of family members. The head of intelligence services, General Modibo Koné, was seriously injured. Simultaneously, Bamako's Modibo Keita International Airport, which houses the base of Africa Corps elements, was struck, and fighting spread to the cities of Gao and Sévaré. In Kidal, JNIM and FLA regained control of the city from Malian forces and Russian mercenaries, who were also forced to withdraw from Aguelhok, Tessalit, and Tessit.

The material and human toll is heavy. The Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) acknowledge over 200 enemy fighters killed, while Africa Corps claims over 1,000 deaths in its opposing ranks — figures that are independently unverifiable. On the government side, 23 soldiers were killed in Kati and 16 others injured, according to Malian authorities. An Africa Corps Mil Mi-35 helicopter was shot down with its entire crew near Kidal. The FLA claims to hold over 200 prisoners and inflicted several dozen deaths on loyalist forces during the city's capture.

The most striking aspect of this offensive lies in the unprecedented coordination between JNIM, a Salafist jihadist organization led by Iyad Ag Ghali and Amadou Koufa, and the FLA, a Tuareg rebel coalition led by Alghabass Ag Intalla and Bilal Ag Acherif. These two historically rival groups — JNIM advocates for the establishment of Sharia while the FLA defends an autonomy-centered agenda focused on Azawad — have tactically converged against common adversaries: the junta of Colonel Assimi Goïta and its Russian supporters. As early as March 2025, signs of rapprochement had been detected by observers, and according to journalist Wassim Nasr, a specialist in jihadist movements, negotiations for a joint action reportedly began as early as December 2024. Since April 28, the Islamic State's Sahel Province (EIGS) has also launched its own attacks under the cover of JNIM-FLA operations, adding a third asymmetrical force to the conflict.

This opportunistic convergence recalls the dynamics of 2012, when Tuareg rebels and jihadist groups initially cooperated before splitting over ideological differences. The recapture of Kidal, which FAMA and Wagner had reclaimed in 2023 in what was then presented as a historic victory by the junta, represents a particularly symbolic setback. It undermines the narrative on which Assimi Goïta's regime had based its legitimacy since the coup d'état of May 2021: the promise of regained sovereignty through a partnership with Russia presented as structurally superior to the French presence.

On April 28, JNIM announced the start of a "total siege" aimed at Bamako, urging Russian forces to permanently leave Malian territory. The following day, its spokesperson declared that the regime would fall and that the group intended to "liberate" Gao, Timbuktu, and Menaka. This maximalist rhetoric comes as a truce, supposedly signed at the end of March 2026 between JNIM and the Malian government, provided for the release of jihadist prisoners in exchange for the lifting of the fuel blockade imposed on Bamako since September 2025. Whether this agreement existed or not, it was not enough to halt the offensive momentum.

The response from the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) — comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger since September 2023 — has been surprisingly muted. While a condemnation statement was issued on April 27, neither Niger nor Burkina Faso intervened militarily, despite Article 6 of the Liptako-Gourma Charter, which provides for a mutual assistance clause, including the use of armed force, in the event of an infringement on a member state's sovereignty. This inertia raises questions about the effectiveness of the AES Unified Force, launched in December 2025 and expanded to 6,000 personnel in February 2026, whose operational capacity remains to be demonstrated.

On the Russian side, Moscow quickly reaffirmed its support for the Bamako regime. The Russian ambassador was received by Assimi Goïta in the days following the attacks, and Africa Corps' Telegram channels deployed intensive communication showing images of fighting to try to regain control of a narrative that is slipping away from them. However, the withdrawal of Russian mercenaries from Kidal and Gao exposes the limits of a contingent estimated at between 200 and 400 men, far from the air superiority that French forces had during Operation Barkhane. While Vladimir Putin could theoretically send reinforcements, a complete withdrawal from Mali — a showcase of the Russian security model in Africa — would constitute a major admission of geopolitical defeat.

This offensive occurs in an increasingly deteriorated regional context. According to the 2026 report of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy published on May 12, West Africa, the Sahel, and the Lake Chad basin are among the most dangerous centers of terrorist activity in the world and pose a direct threat to American interests. The report warns of the movement of Islamic State fighters from Iraq and Syria to West Africa. Burkina Faso, led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré since 2022, has been ranked as the most affected country by terrorism in the latest Global Terrorism Index: jihadists operate with relative freedom over 80% of the territory, and the number of civilians killed has increased by 87% compared to the previous three years.

In the face of this deterioration, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is attempting to activate a regional counterterrorism force. In March 2026, the organization announced the deployment of 1,650 personnel from its Standby Force, the first component of a broader framework ultimately planning for 260,000 men with an annual budget of $2.5 billion. However, the rift between ECOWAS and the AES countries, which slammed the door on the West African organization in January 2024, significantly limits the scope of this initiative.

The strategy of JNIM, estimated to have between 5,000 and 6,000 fighters, does not seem to aim for a military takeover of the capital in the short term, an unlikely objective given its capabilities against an urban area of 3.2 million inhabitants that concentrates most of the security forces. The group is instead pursuing a war of psychological and economic attrition, combining disruption of logistical routes, strangulation of fuel supplies, and symbolic targeting of regime figures. In the rural areas under its control, JNIM has developed a parallel administrative structure — Islamic justice, taxation, regulation of exchanges — which allows it to present itself as an alternative governance to an absent state.

As pressure intensifies, Ankara, present in Mali since 2024 through the private company SADAT for the close protection of the junta and the training of special forces, may be called upon to play an increasing role. On May 1, the FLA spokesperson indeed called on Turkey to "reevaluate the nature of its engagement alongside the junta in power in Bamako, in order to play a positive role in Mali." The reconfiguration of the French military presence in Africa, hailed as "a major strategic success" by some analysts, now leaves regional powers and new external partners facing their responsibilities, in a Sahel that is more fragmented and violent than ever.