The JNIM Strangles Central Mali — Three Offensives in Ten Days Target the War Economy

Between January 29 and February 7, 2026, the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) group conducted three major operations in central Mali, revealing a strategy of economic strangulation and destabilization of local defense networks. The offensive on January 29 against a fuel convoy near Kayes, the attack on February 4 against Dozo militiamen in Kendié, and the airstrikes on February 7 by the Malian army in the Ségou region outline a worrying operational map: the Ségou-Mopti corridor, a vital artery for Mali, is under pressure.

The Kayes Convoy Attack — Economic Warfare

On January 29, a convoy of fuel tankers transporting fuel from the Senegalese border to Kayes was ambushed by JNIM fighters. The official toll reports at least 15 dead and dozens of trucks destroyed. This attack is not an act of banditry — it is a calculated economic warfare operation.

Fuel is the lifeblood of war in the Sahel. Without diesel, military vehicles, base generators, and even village water pumps do not function. By targeting this convoy, the JNIM is not only seeking to kill civilians or soldiers — it aims to cut the supply lines of the Malian state and demonstrate its ability to paralyze the regional economy.

Kayes, located in western Mali, is normally far from the usual combat zones of the JNIM. That the group can strike so far west shows the extension of its operational range. The Kayes-Bamako road is a critical commercial artery, and its vulnerability highlights the weakness of the Malian army's territorial control in rural areas.

Kendié, February 4 — JNIM Breaks Local Militias

Five days later, on February 4, JNIM militants attacked Dozo militiamen in the village of Kendié, killing five people and injuring four others. The Dozo, traditionally hunters and community defenders, have over the years become a pillar of local resistance against jihadism in central Mali.

This attack is not isolated. The JNIM has systematically targeted self-defense militias to break local intelligence networks. Without the Dozo, the Malian army loses its eyes and ears on the ground. Civilian populations, caught between jihadists and government forces, find themselves unprotected.

The timing is significant. By eliminating local militias before launching broader offensives, the JNIM is laying the groundwork. It is a tried-and-true tactic: isolate communities, terrorize local defenders, and then consolidate territorial control.

February 7 Airstrikes — Late Response

On February 7, the Malian army announced three successful airstrikes near the Niger River in the Ségou region, killing 35 JNIM militants. It is a response, but a late response.

Airstrikes, while effective for inflicting short-term losses, do not replace ground control. The JNIM operates in an environment where it can quickly disperse after an attack, blend into the population, or retreat to hard-to-reach areas. Killing 35 fighters is a tactical victory, but it does not change the strategic reality: the JNIM controls vast rural areas between Ségou and Mopti, and the Malian army cannot reclaim them with helicopters alone.

The Ségou region, located along the Niger River, is an agricultural and commercial crossroads. It is also a corridor that the JNIM uses to move fighters and weapons between the north (Tombouctou, Gao) and the center (Mopti, Bandiagara). The strikes on February 7 indicate that the Malian army detected a concentration of militants — likely in preparation for a new offensive.

The Ségou-Mopti Corridor — The New Front Line

These three operations within ten days reveal a reality that the official statements from Bamako do not acknowledge: central Mali is becoming the new main theater of war. The JNIM has understood that to strangle the Malian state, it is not enough to control the desert north — it must cut trade routes, fuel supplies, and break community defense networks.

The Ségou-Mopti corridor is vital. It connects Bamako to the north and serves as the main route for military and commercial convoys. If the JNIM manages to make this road impassable, it splits the country in two.

Experience shows that strategic maps are read from the roads. When convoys no longer pass, it means territorial control has changed hands. The three attacks from January to February are not isolated incidents — they are symptoms of a coordinated offensive to transform central Mali into a gray zone.

Conclusion — The Malian State on the Defensive

The Malian army, despite its airstrikes, remains on the defensive. It reacts to JNIM attacks but does not prevent them. The Dozo militias, a pillar of local resistance, are systematically decimated. Fuel convoys, the arteries of the war economy, are destroyed.

The JNIM does not need to conquer Bamako to win. It only needs to make Mali ungovernable. And in the center of the country, between Kayes, Kendié, and Ségou, that is exactly what is happening.