The Reality of the East China Sea Blockade Exercise Demonstrated by 1,400 Chinese Fishing Vessels

On January 11, the rectangular formation stretching 320 kilometers that appeared in the East China Sea was not merely a fishing activity. An analysis of vessel tracking data by The New York Times revealed that approximately 1,400 Chinese fishing boats had suspended their normal operations to deliberately form this massive formation. Some cargo ships were forced to take detours and had to pass through in a zigzag manner. This indicates that the mobilization capability of the Chinese maritime militia has reached a level beyond our expectations.

What the 200 Nautical Mile Wall Means

This gathering follows a larger exercise conducted on Christmas Day, December 25, last year. At that time, about 2,000 vessels were arranged in an inverted L-shape, forming parallel lines spaced 290 nautical miles (approximately 467 kilometers) apart. This scale, equivalent to the distance from New York to Buffalo, was significant enough for Professor Andrew Erickson of the U.S. Naval War College to evaluate it as a "maritime mobilization exercise of the maritime militia."

The vessel position data indicates that these fishing boats did not follow any normal operational patterns (such as looped or round-trip routes) and maintained a relatively stationary formation. This level of control suggests that China has significantly improved its command and control capabilities over civilian vessels.

Effectiveness in a Taiwan Blockade Scenario

Former U.S. intelligence officer Ronnie Henry points out that Chinese fishing vessels are too small to enforce a blockade on their own. However, if mobilized in the thousands, they could physically obstruct the movements of U.S. Navy ships. Furthermore, former U.S. Navy officer Thomas Shugart notes that these vessels could serve as "decoys for missiles and torpedoes, overwhelming radar and drone sensors with excessive targets."

The exercise on January 11 occurred immediately after the military exercises (including blockade training) conducted by China around Taiwan on December 29-30. This timeline is not coincidental. Gregory Poling, director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), analyzes that it was likely an exercise to confirm responses in the event of a large-scale mobilization of civilians to support quarantine, blockade, and other pressure tactics against Taiwan.

Implications for Japan's Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC)

What concerns me most is the fact that the exercise area was near major shipping routes branching off from Shanghai. In the event of U.S.-China tensions or a Taiwan crisis, China would have the capability to mobilize tens of thousands of civilian fishing vessels to block sea lines of communication.

In the defense scenario envisioned by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force for the Nansei Islands, this "maritime barrier created by militia" becomes a new variable. When the escort fleet deploys to the eastern waters of Taiwan, they would have to pass through the East China Sea, and if thousands of civilian vessels were densely packed there, the need to slow down or divert to avoid collisions would significantly reduce operational tempo.

Moreover, there is the troublesome issue of rules of engagement (ROE). The use of weapons against civilian fishing vessels presents extremely high hurdles under both international and domestic law. China is skillfully exploiting this "gray zone" to offset the military advantages of Japan and the U.S.

Technological Evolution of the Maritime Militia

What is noteworthy about this exercise is the possibility that the mobilized fishing vessels are equipped with advanced navigation and communication technologies. Jason Wang, COO of the vessel position data analysis company ingeniSPACE, stated, "I have never seen such a scale and clear formation," emphasizing the improvement in command and control capabilities.

Cross-referencing reports from Chinese state media, it has been confirmed that some of the vessels that participated had previously engaged in maritime militia activities. However, since China has not disclosed the names of most vessels belonging to the maritime militia, it is difficult to grasp the overall picture.

Japan's Perception Gap

The Japanese Ministry of Defense and the Japan Coast Guard have refrained from commenting on the recent gathering of Chinese fishing vessels. The reason given is "protection of information-gathering capabilities," but I cannot help but feel a serious perception gap here.

While U.S. think tanks and private companies are capturing and analyzing this scale of exercise using satellite imagery and vessel tracking data, the Japanese government, as a party involved, has not officially said anything, which may be seen as a dereliction of its responsibility to inform the public. At the very least, minimal communication such as "we are aware" or "we are analyzing" is necessary.

Conclusion: The Threat of an Invisible Blockade Line

The large-scale mobilization exercise of the Chinese maritime militia is rewriting the concept of "blockade" in the event of a Taiwan crisis. In addition to traditional long-range blockades by naval vessels, the addition of "close barriers" created by civilian fishing boats makes multi-layered sea denial feasible.

The true challenge for Japan is to not underestimate this threat by thinking "they are just fishing boats, so they are not a threat." The level of control demonstrated by 1,400 vessels moving simultaneously has already entered the realm of military operations. While the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force is proficient in countering anti-ship missiles and torpedoes, training to deal with a "moving minefield" formed by thousands of civilian vessels is likely insufficient.

Does the joint response plan in the Japan-U.S. alliance include countermeasures for this "invisible blockade line"? In my view, the answer to this question will determine the success or failure of the defense of the first island chain.