The Regional Force of ECOWAS Facing the Jihadist Challenge: Between Strategic Ambitions and Operational Realities

The decision made in February 2026 by the chiefs of staff of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to activate a counter-terrorism brigade of 1,650 soldiers marks a symbolic turning point in the institutional response to the Sahelian security crisis. However, between the announcement and the reality on the ground, the gap remains considerable, and the structural challenges that have paralyzed the region for a decade will not dissolve by mere decree.

Since at least 2004, ECOWAS has been discussing the creation of a credible regional intervention force. The organization had previously mobilized the Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to end civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau in the 1990s, and then in Côte d'Ivoire in the early 2000s. However, this operational precedent was never institutionalized into a permanent capacity, leaving the organization disarmed in the face of the rising power of armed groups in the Sahel. The meeting in Freetown, chaired by Sierra Leonean President Julius Maada Bio, the current ECOWAS chair, formally endorsed an initial mobilization plan of 2,000 soldiers by the end of 2026, well below the initial figure of 260,000 personnel mentioned at the Abuja summit in August 2025, but more realistic given the financial and political constraints of the bloc.

On the ground, the situation has significantly deteriorated. The most emblematic attack of this degradation remains the assault carried out on the night of January 28 to 29, 2026, against the international airbase in Niamey, the capital of Niger. The Islamic State in the Sahel Province (EIPS, formerly known as EIGS), the Sahelian branch of ISIS, claimed this bold act, asserting that it killed several soldiers, a claim contested by the Nigerien army. Armed fighters with RPGs and mortars breached the military compound, damaging several military aircraft and a civilian plane. Heni Nsaibia, a senior analyst at the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), emphasizes that this is an "unprecedented" act for a group that had previously confined its operations to rural areas with light weapons like Kalashnikovs. "They are refining their attacks and gaining experience in guerrilla warfare," he notes, adding that "the ability to infiltrate and penetrate the capital speaks for itself."

This rise in tactical sophistication is accompanied by a concerning phenomenon: the increasing adoption of drones by armed groups. While ISIS affiliates in Nigeria have been using explosive-laden drones in rural attacks for several months, their potential deployment in Niamey would represent a first for Niger. Analysts mention images of nighttime anti-aircraft fire that could indicate the presence of surveillance drones belonging to the EIPS during the assault. This unconfirmed hypothesis raises fundamental questions about the ability of Sahelian armed forces to equip themselves with counter-drone systems suitable for a rapidly changing operational environment.

In Mali, the security situation in Bamako has deteriorated to a critical level. Since September 2025, elements of the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM), affiliated with al-Qaeda, have established a blockade on fuel supplies to the capital, paralyzing mobility and essential services. This hybrid siege strategy, combining armed presence and economic warfare, illustrates the ability of jihadist groups to adapt their operational doctrine well beyond mere military confrontation. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, after expelling French and then American forces, has largely turned to the Russian Africa Corps, the successor to the Wagner Group, to try to plug security gaps. Approximately 2,000 Russian fighters are deployed in these three countries, insufficient to cover such vast geographical areas in the face of mobile and decentralized insurgencies.

The institutional fracture between ECOWAS and the AES further complicates the regional response. Since January 2025, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have officially left ECOWAS, reducing the geographical scope of any regional intervention and creating a de facto security gray zone. Coastal countries—Togo, Benin, Ghana, and Côte d'Ivoire—are now witnessing jihadist groups gradually crossing southward, threatening territories that had previously seemed relatively spared. Benin and Togo have reported a rise in incidents in their northern border areas since late 2025, a worrying sign of a southern extension of the crisis.

For the new ECOWAS force not to meet the fate of its predecessors—the G5 Sahel Joint Force, disintegrated after the withdrawal of AES member countries, and the Accra Initiative, hampered by dependence on external funding—several conditions must be met. The first imperative is financial: member states had committed at the Abuja summit to rigorously apply the community tax of 0.5% on imports outside the ECOWAS zone, a crucial self-financing mechanism to ensure operational autonomy. The second challenge is capacity: the engaged units must have reconnaissance drone systems, counter-drone capabilities, light armored vehicles suitable for the Sahelian terrain, and interoperable logistics among the six contributing states: Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal. Finally, the non-military dimension remains fundamental: according to Beverly Ochieng of Control Risks, the response cannot be reduced to a deployment of soldiers. "We need to think of this not just as a military response but as a holistic operation including social interventions to curb the influence of these groups that allows them to recruit," she insists.

UN Security Council Resolution 2719, which provides for 75% funding of African peace operations through UN contributions, represents a potential lever that ECOWAS is invited to mobilize actively. The continental logistical base of the African Union in Douala, Cameroon, also has unused military equipment belonging to the African Standby Force. These resources could complement the brigade's capabilities in its ramp-up phase. The time has come for demonstration: after two decades of aborted announcements, ECOWAS finds itself at a pivotal moment in its credibility. The question is no longer whether it can mobilize troops, but whether it can equip them, finance them sustainably, and engage them in a coordinated manner against groups that have continued to innovate.