Russian Defense Industry on the International Stage — The Paradox of Sanction Pressure and Production Expansion

The World Defense Show 2026 in Riyadh (February 8-12) became a platform for the Russian defense industry to showcase new weaponry that has undergone "combat testing" in Ukraine. At the same time, an analysis of production capacities shows that Russia continues to expand the production of artillery barrels using Western equipment, despite four years of sanctions. This is not a sign of strength in the Russian industry, but a symptom of its structural dependence and vulnerability to the sanctions regime.

Showcase for Export — New Weapons from the Ukrainian Theater

Rostec presented several systems in Saudi Arabia that had not been previously demonstrated to the public. The main premiere is the 300-mm multiple launch rocket system "Sarma," with deliveries to the Russian army starting in 2025. According to TASS (February 8, 2026), the system is already undergoing "comprehensive practical evaluation" in the special military operation zone. At the exhibition, "Sarma" was shown as part of an intelligence-strike complex together with the Supercam S350 UAV and the fire control system "Tablet-A."

Another new item is the BTR-22 armored personnel carrier, which can be equipped with a manned combat module or a remotely controlled "Ballista" installation. A representative of Kalashnikov also announced the imminent start of serial production of loitering munitions "Rus-PE" (according to Ru1.ru, February 9, 2026).

The logic of the exhibition is clear: Russia is trying to convert its experience in Ukraine into export contracts. However, behind the facade of "battle-tested" equipment lies a more alarming picture of production dependence.

European Machines for Russian Guns — The Failure of the Sanctions Regime

On February 10, 2026, the Institute for the Study of War published data indicating that Russia continues to acquire European machines for the production of artillery barrels and tank guns, despite Western sanctions. According to a study by Frontelligence Insight and the Ukrainian publication Militarnyi, a Russian factory in Volgograd, specializing in barrel production, has modernized its production lines using machines of Western origin.

This is a critical detail: artillery barrels are one of the main bottlenecks in the Russian defense industry. The wear rate of weapons in Ukraine (estimated at up to 10,000 shots for the 152-mm D-20 howitzer against the nominal 7,000) requires mass replacement. However, the production of barrels is impossible without high-precision lathes and boring machines, which Russia does not produce independently at the required technological level.

The procurement of Western equipment — through third countries, shell companies, or smuggling schemes — shows that the sanctions regime has fundamental gaps. Official bans on the export of dual-use goods do not work when Asian or Middle Eastern intermediaries are embedded in the supply chain.

Short-Term Gain, Long-Term Degradation

The paradox of the current situation in the Russian defense industry is as follows: sanctions have not halted production but have frozen technological dependence. Russia can increase the production of barrels, assemble new "Sarmas" and BTR-22s, but it does so based on imported machines and components, access to which is unstable and depends on geopolitical conditions.

A historical analogy arises with the late USSR, when Soviet electronics depended on smuggled Western microchips, and high-precision machines were procured through front companies. This dependence was not noticeable in the short term, but in the 1980s it became one of the reasons for the lag in next-generation military technologies.

In 2026, the situation is repeating itself, but with higher stakes. While the USSR had a buffer due to its massive industrial base, modern Russia has significantly less technological sovereignty. The production of artillery systems is possible today, but the question is — for how long?

Export Strategy as a Compensatory Mechanism

The World Defense Show 2026 is an attempt to use the current moment as effectively as possible. As long as production is operational (even on imported machines), and as long as "Sarma" and Lancet can be presented as "battle-tested," Russia is trying to establish itself in the markets of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

The demonstration of weapons used against Ukrainian forces serves as a marketing argument for countries where "combat reputation" of systems is more important than adherence to international humanitarian law. The BTR-22, equipped with a remote combat module, is positioned as an adaptation to the conditions of UAV dominance — a relevant issue for regional conflicts.

However, export revenue will not solve the main problem: the Russian industry cannot independently produce critical equipment for its own reproduction. This means that any tightening of sanctions (for example, secondary sanctions against Asian machine suppliers) could quickly turn the production growth of 2025-2026 into stagnation.

Forecast — Survival, but Not Development

The Russian defense industry in 2026 demonstrates remarkable resilience under sanction pressure. Production is growing, new systems are being delivered to the troops and exported. But this resilience is not a triumph; it is a temporary adaptation based on exploiting gaps in Western control and technological dependence on imports.

The long-term consequences will not be felt in a year, but in five to seven years, when the current machines break down, and the new generation of weapons requires technologies that are unavailable through smuggling channels. The experience of the 1980s shows that a system dependent on the import of critical components can function for decades, but it never becomes technologically sovereign.

The World Defense Show 2026 is a showcase of what Russia can do today. But it does not answer the question of what it will be able to do tomorrow when European machines become completely unavailable, and its own machine-building base remains at the level of the 1990s.