The Russian military accelerates transformation by learning from combat experience in Ukraine.

Reference News Network, November 6 report The Swiss newspaper "Neue Zürcher Zeitung" published an article on November 2 titled "The Speed at Which the Russian Army is Learning from the Ukrainian Battlefield Exceeds Its Own Transformation Speed," authored by Marco Zelig. The translation is as follows:

The Finnish National Defence University in Helsinki recently released a report in which experts from the military and academia studied the Russian military-industrial complex, the army, the experiences drawn from the Ukrainian battlefield, and the changes in Russian military doctrine.

Advantages of Battlefield Adaptation Emerge

The war in Ukraine has shown that conducting military operations has become very difficult. On a battlefield increasingly monitored by drones and other sensors, large-scale troop movements are often quickly detected and subsequently attacked. Offensives may be thwarted even before they begin.

Since the conflict erupted in February 2022, the Russian army has lost a significant amount of military equipment. The Russian military-industrial complex is attempting to compensate for these losses by producing new weapons, repairing equipment, and activating older weapon systems (especially tanks).

However, the role of traditional weapon systems in this war is continuously diminishing, as their operational status has been replaced by new weapon systems, primarily including drones and electronic warfare systems.

The Russian military-industrial complex has demonstrated adaptability in these areas. It has responded to developments on the Ukrainian side and achieved advantages in certain technologies, such as jet drones.

Additionally, the Russian army has learned to protect positions and weapons from drone attacks, conceal command posts and ammunition depots, and more quickly detect and strike targets. These changes reveal a paradox in the Ukrainian war: an army, even when weakened in terms of equipment and supplies, can still enhance its combat capabilities in certain areas.

For example, the number of drones deployed by Russia is increasing. On one hand, there is the issue of how to utilize the information provided by these drones. Once enemy positions are discovered, their coordinates must be quickly relayed to the operational units best suited to strike that target. The shorter the interval between reconnaissance and attack, the harder it is for the opponent to evade the strike.

This is known as the "sensor-to-shooter" chain, which connects reconnaissance with firepower strikes. Over the past few years, both Russia and Ukraine have significantly improved this chain.

Overall Transformation Still Has Shortcomings

However, the Russian army still has shortcomings.

The "sensor-to-shooter" chain operates effectively on individual fronts, but this does not mean that the entire army has achieved modernization. Tactical adjustments and the overall transformation of the army are vastly different.

To achieve overall transformation, Russia needs a command system capable of reliably processing information, commanders who can make decisions, and soldiers who have received appropriate training. However, the Russian military faces old problems in these areas: a rigid command hierarchy and a lack of autonomy, while the military-industrial complex must both support the war effort and develop new technologies.

Tanks, artillery, and mechanized infantry will continue to form the core of the Russian army, but their methods of operation may change. Smaller, more dispersed units may receive more comprehensive drone reconnaissance support and electronic defense system protection. Meanwhile, the importance of long-range precision strike weapons and unmanned systems for targeting enemy reserves, command structures, and supply lines behind the front lines may further increase.

Pressuring NATO to Strengthen Combat Power

NATO is also learning lessons from the war in Ukraine. It must be prepared to deal with a Russian army that may detect enemy forces more quickly and strike from greater distances. During the war, merely keeping Russian tanks at the border is not enough. NATO forces must also be able to maneuver and assemble without being prematurely detected and attacked.

Therefore, NATO is focusing on strengthening air defense and missile defense capabilities. At the same time, NATO hopes to gain the ability to strike Russian attack systems using long-range precision strike weapons. Defense cannot rely solely on intercepting incoming drones and missiles. NATO cannot stockpile enough missiles for this purpose and may find it difficult to produce them at the necessary speed.

However, NATO has a significant capability gap, particularly regarding long-range precision strike weapons. In July, six NATO member countries agreed to jointly develop ground-based systems for long-range strikes. Germany is also advancing similar projects with other European partners. However, it will take several years to develop weapons that are ready for use and in sufficient quantities.

What does all this mean for a potential Russian offensive against NATO? The military competition between the two sides cannot simply be reduced to a numbers game of tanks, drones, and missiles. The key lies in who can better connect reconnaissance with firepower strikes and maintain combat capability when under attack.

Russia's advantage lies in its direct combat experience. NATO, on the other hand, possesses far greater economic and technological resources. However, these factors alone do not determine which side can more quickly and successfully adjust its military to adapt to changes in combat methods.

For Finland, this is a more pressing issue. Facing a border of approximately 1,350 kilometers with Russia, Finland must prepare, alongside NATO, to confront an opponent that may be overall weakened in the war against Ukraine but has enhanced certain combat capabilities. (Translation by Jiao Yu)