The Sahel at a Crossroads: Washington Reconnects with Military Juntas in the Face of Jihadist Rise

The Trump administration is making a major strategic shift in the Sahel, a region that has become the epicenter of terrorist insecurity in Africa. After three years of diplomatic rupture following military coups in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, Washington is quietly negotiating its return to an area now dominated by Russian influence and marked by an alarming resurgence of jihadist violence. This reorientation comes as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), a military bloc formed by the three countries, consolidates its common security architecture and as American losses in terms of intelligence and influence become unsustainable.

The signing of a cooperation agreement on intelligence with Mali represents the cornerstone of this rapprochement. According to several consistent sources, the United States is on the verge of obtaining permission to resume surveillance drone flights over Malian territory, which have been suspended since the coup in August 2020. This agreement also includes the gradual lifting of sanctions imposed on officials of the Bamako junta and the restoration of certain counter-terrorism cooperation programs. The American administration justifies this evolution by the ongoing deterioration of the regional security situation, marked by territorial expansion of groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

The French withdrawal and the reconfiguration of Western partnerships have created a security vacuum that Moscow has rushed to fill. Russian forces, through the deployment of the Africa Corps—successor to the Wagner Group—are now providing direct military support to the three AES countries. This support includes training military instructors, delivering weapons, and deploying troops for specific operations. Moscow has also provided political support to the AES joint force, announced in February 2026 during a meeting in Ouagadougou. This common defense architecture aims to coordinate cross-border counter-terrorism operations among the three countries, thus supplementing defunct multilateral mechanisms like the G5 Sahel.

On the ground, the operational results of this new dynamic remain mixed. Nigerien forces recently announced the successful conduct of operations Niya and Garkuva, carried out from March 3 to 8, 2026. These offensives resulted in the elimination of a significant number of fighters and the destruction of two logistical centers for the manufacture of improvised explosive devices. In Burkina Faso, the army claims to have regained control of several localities occupied by jihadist groups for seven years, notably with the support of the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), civilian militias integrated into the national war effort. However, these tactical gains should not obscure the persistence of structural challenges.

The situation in Nigeria, a regional giant and traditional partner of Washington, illustrates the ongoing complexity of the Sahelian counter-terrorism struggle. Despite the arrival in February 2026 of an advanced team of 100 to 200 American soldiers tasked with training and advisory missions, jihadist attacks have intensified. The Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP) has multiplied assaults on Nigerian military positions, killing at least four officers in recent weeks and seizing weapons and vehicles. Operation Hadin Kai, deployed in Borno State, struggles to maintain a lasting presence in conflict areas, allowing armed groups to regroup after each offensive.

Analysts point out that Sahelian security forces suffer from a chronic lack of capacity for sustained operations. After initial successes, military units quickly redeploy to other critical areas, leaving the ground vulnerable to re-infiltration by fighters. This operational shortcoming partly explains why violence persists despite announced territorial gains. The absence of effective governance in peripheral regions, combined with endemic poverty and community grievances, creates fertile ground for jihadist recruitment.

The American rapprochement with the Sahel juntas raises major strategic and ethical questions. On one hand, Washington seeks to preserve its security interests in a region where the terrorist threat continues to grow and where Chinese and Russian influence is taking root. The aerial intelligence capabilities provided by MQ-9 Reaper drones are considered irreplaceable for monitoring transnational jihadist movements. On the other hand, this normalization with regimes resulting from coups and accused of human rights violations undermines the credibility of the American discourse on democracy and the rule of law.

At the same time, traditional frameworks for regional cooperation are collapsing. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been deeply divided since the withdrawal of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso in January 2024. Nigeria and Ghana are trying to maintain a dialogue with the Sahelian juntas, as illustrated by the Chatham House conference held on March 9, 2026, but progress on essential issues—cross-border prosecution rights, intelligence sharing, combating illicit financing—remains stalled. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), operating around Lake Chad, survives but functions with limited resources.

The AES, for its part, seeks to assert itself as a credible alternative to West African structures dominated by former colonial powers. During the meeting on February 24 and 25, 2026, the three countries worked on a common roadmap to structure an integrated doctrine covering defense, diplomacy, and economic development. Ambitious projects include the creation of a regional investment bank and a pan-African media platform aimed at controlling the public narrative. This pan-Sahelian ambition is framed within a rhetoric of regained sovereignty and a break from neocolonial logics, appealing to certain segments of African public opinion.

The French presence, once central to the Sahelian counter-terrorism framework, is now reduced to a few peripheral bases. The maintenance of a French force in Benin fuels debates about the relevance of military cooperation with Paris in a profoundly transformed regional context. Some coastal governments, like that of Ghana, fear that the security collapse in the Sahel will lead to a spillover of violence into their territories, already facing sporadic incursions by armed groups.

The African Lion 2026 exercise, scheduled in Morocco, Tunisia, and Ghana, reflects the American desire to maintain partnerships with stable African countries. With about 600 participants from the United States, France, Italy, and several African nations, this annual exercise aims to enhance interoperability and rapid response capabilities against regional threats. However, the absence of the three AES countries highlights the growing fragmentation of the African security landscape.

The U.S. Special Operations Command in Africa (SOCAFRICA) is also intensifying its engagements elsewhere on the continent, notably in Somalia, where General Claude K. Tudor Jr. met on March 10, 2026, with the president of Jubbaland, Ahmed Mohamed Islam Madobe, to discuss the fight against Al-Shabab. This geographical diversification reflects a flexible but fragmented approach, favoring bilateral partnerships at the expense of a coherent regional strategy.

Beyond tactical considerations, the Sahel reveals the limits of purely military approaches to complex crises with economic, social, and political roots. Temporary operational successes cannot replace legitimate governance, functional public services, and economic prospects for disillusioned young populations. The influx of foreign partners—American, Russian, Chinese, Turkish, Iranian—transforms the Sahel into a theater of geopolitical competition where the interests of local populations risk being relegated to the background.

The future of the Sahel will depend on the ability of regional and international actors to move beyond short-term logics and invest in sustainable solutions. The United States, by reconnecting with military juntas, risks repeating the mistakes of the past by prioritizing apparent stability over structural transformation. The AES, for its part, will need to demonstrate that its sovereignty project translates into concrete improvements for citizens, beyond nationalist rhetoric. In a context where the jihadist threat continues to expand and fragment, the urgency for a comprehensive and inclusive approach has never been more pressing.