The Sahel Facing Strategic Fragmentation: Rivalry between ECOWAS and the Sahel States Alliance in the Counter-Terrorism Fight

West Africa is going through a critical period of security reconfiguration, marked by the emergence of two competing military architectures that threaten to further fragment the regional response to the terrorist threat. While the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) announces the imminent deployment of 2,000 soldiers as part of its Standby Force, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), composed of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, continues its own project for a joint force of 5,000 to 6,000 fighters. This institutional duality occurs in a context where ideological armed groups have never been more powerful, now controlling vast territories and intensifying their operational tactics.

The decision made at the end of February 2026 during a meeting of the military chiefs of staff of ECOWAS in Sierra Leone marks a belated attempt by the regional organization to regain the security initiative. According to information reported by the Anadolu agency, the initial contingent of 2,000 soldiers is expected to be operational by the end of 2026, with a longer-term goal of achieving a rapid deployment force of 1,650 specialized personnel. This mobilization comes as the region faces what analysts describe as an "existential security threat," with thousands of casualties recorded and hundreds of thousands displaced in recent years.

However, this initiative faces several major structural obstacles. The first concerns funding. Nigeria, which has historically provided up to 75% of the personnel and a substantial share of the budget for ECOWAS missions, is going through a difficult economic period. High inflation in 2023 and the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic have significantly weakened Abuja's capacity to contribute. Moreover, the Nigerian armed forces are currently engaged on multiple domestic fronts: combating ideological groups in the northeast, confronting criminal gangs in the northwest and central-north, and managing secessionist movements in the south. This dispersion of Nigerian military resources significantly limits ECOWAS's projection capacity.

The second major challenge lies in operational coordination. Unlike previous interventions by the former ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which excelled in resolving civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone between 1990 and 2003, this new mission will have to confront at least eight distinct armed groups operating under complex methodologies. These organizations, primarily affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, use densely forested areas as sanctuaries and cross-border movement corridors. Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the main Al-Qaeda-affiliated group in the region with an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 fighters, has demonstrated its ability to conduct sophisticated operations, notably by blocking fuel supply routes to Bamako since September 2025, paralyzing mobility and essential services in the Malian capital.

The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), with its 3,500 to 5,000 fighters concentrated in northeastern Nigeria, and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), operating mainly in Niger and Mali with over 400 fighters according to 2018 estimates, are other major actors in this insecurity. The bold attack carried out at the end of January 2026 against Niamey International Airport, claimed by the ISSP, illustrates these groups' growing capacity to strike strategic targets in urban areas, calling into question the ability of government forces to secure even their critical infrastructure.

In the face of this threat, the Alliance of Sahel States represents an alternative response, born from the frustration of the military juntas in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey towards what they perceive as the inefficiency of ECOWAS and the excessive interference of Western partners, notably France. Initially formed in September 2023 as a mutual defense pact following the coup in Niger, the AES has gradually transformed into an autonomous security architecture. In December 2025, the alliance officially commissioned a joint force and pursues the ambitious goal of constituting a combined contingent of 6,000 fighters. The official withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from ECOWAS in January 2025, after months of tensions related to sanctions imposed by the regional bloc to compel these countries to hold elections and restore a civilian regime, consummated this institutional rupture.

This regional fragmentation also has significant geopolitical implications. The three states of the AES have severed their historical defense partnerships with Paris, leading to the gradual withdrawal of approximately 4,000 French soldiers who operated under Operation Barkhane and other counter-terrorism initiatives. In their place, approximately 2,000 Russian fighters, initially deployed via the Wagner paramilitary group and then integrated into the Russian state-controlled Africa Corps, have established their presence in the three countries. This strategic reorientation towards Moscow, recently confirmed by the visit of Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belooussov to Togo in early March 2026 to discuss military-technical cooperation, reshapes regional balances and raises concerns about the operational effectiveness of these new partners in the fight against terrorism.

The United States also maintains an active presence, as evidenced by airstrikes conducted on December 25, 2025, against the Lakurawa group in northwestern Nigeria, as well as the operation on March 8, 2026, against the Islamic State in Somalia carried out by the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). President Donald Trump reaffirmed that Washington "will not allow radical Islamic terrorism to thrive," announcing further operations to come. However, the American approach primarily favors military assistance and training rather than large-scale troop deployments. According to the Security Assistance Monitor, the United States has dedicated over $3.3 billion to security assistance in the Sahel over the past two decades, with results deemed limited by many analysts.

The humanitarian consequences of this deteriorating security situation are dramatic. In Burkina Faso alone, up to 10% of the population is reported to be displaced according to data from Refugees International as of October 2024. Between January and June 2025, the region recorded 12,964 conflict-related deaths in 5,907 distinct incidents, with nearly all victims concentrated in Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, according to the Center for Democracy and Development.

The central question emerging from this analysis is the viability of a fragmented regional response to an integrated cross-border threat. While the AES criticizes ECOWAS for its excessive focus on political and electoral issues at the expense of counter-terrorism efforts, the West African organization is now attempting to demonstrate its renewed security commitment with this planned deployment. Nevertheless, without coordination between these two military architectures, the risk remains that armed groups will exploit gray areas and porous borders to evade military pressure and consolidate their positions.

Beverly Ochieng, an analyst based in Dakar for the intelligence firm Control Risks, emphasizes that "these challenges will persist, but this response must also be conceived not only as a military operation but as a holistic intervention including social measures to counter the influence of these groups that allows them to recruit members." Indeed, terrorist organizations have developed a sophisticated local implantation strategy, collecting taxes, distributing fertilizers, building mosques, and promising security to marginalized rural communities, thus creating a form of parallel governance that is difficult to dismantle solely through military force.

Despite current tensions, some signs suggest the possibility of a gradual convergence. Senegal, Ghana, and Togo maintain constructive relations with the AES and could serve as mediators. The new security orientation displayed by ECOWAS could potentially soften the intransigent stance of Sahelian leaders, as one of their fundamental criticisms was precisely the lack of the organization's engagement in the fight against terrorism. In the long term, mechanisms for intelligence sharing, joint monitoring, and possibly coordinated missions could emerge if political trust is gradually restored.

In the meantime, the Sahel remains the theater of a double competition: that between government forces and terrorist groups for territorial control and legitimacy among the populations, but also that between two competing visions of the regional security architecture. The outcome of this confrontation will determine not only West Africa's ability to contain the terrorist threat but also the future balance of intra-African relations and the role of external powers on the continent. The coming months will be crucial to assess whether these forces can evolve towards a form of operational coexistence, or if the current fragmentation will lead to mutual weakening in the face of an adversary that demonstrates an increasing capacity for adaptation and territorial expansion.